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ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review by 
the Court. 
1. Whether or not it was error for the trial 
court to deny Defendant's Motion to either ^ continue the 
trial or in the alternative bifurcate the issues and 
hear the issue of damages at a later date. 
2. Whether or not it was error for the trial 
court to admit evidence relating to an issue raised for 
the first time on the day of trial. 
3. Whether or not the Defendant was entitled to 
additional time to prepare for and meet the new issue 
raised for the first time on the day of trial. 
4. Whether or not it was error for the trial 
court to fail to give Defendant an opportunity to 
present a closing argument. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
1. U.S. Constitution, Amendments V and XIV (Due Process 
Guarantees). 
2. Rule 42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Separate Trials. The c o u r t in f u r t h e r a n c e of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a 
s e p a r a t e t r i a l of any c la im, c r o s s - c l a i m , 
counterclaim, or th i rd -par ty claim, or of any 
sepa ra t e i s sue or of any number of c la ims, 
c r o s s - c l a i m s , c o u n t e r c l a i m s , t h i r d - p a r t y 
claims, or issues. 
3. Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a par ty , 
the court may in i t s discret ion, and upon such 
terms as may be ju s t , including the payment of 
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone 
a t r i a l or proceeding upon good cause shown. 
If the motion i s made upon the ground of the 
absence of evidence, such motion shal l also set 
forth the mater ia l i ty of the evidence expected 
t o be o b t a i n e d and s h a l l show t h a t due 
d i l i g e n c e has been used to procure i t . The 
court may a lso require the par ty seeking the 
continuance to s t a t e , upon af f idavi t or under 
oath the evidence he expects to obtain, and if 
the adverse par ty thereupon admits t ha t such 
evidence would be given, and t h a t i t may be 
considered as actual ly given on the t r i a l , or 
offered and excluded as improper, the t r i a l 
shal l not be postponed upon tha t ground. 
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Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected 
to at the trial on the ground that it is not 
within the issues made by the pleadings, the 
court may allow the pleadings to be amended 
when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that 
the admission of such evidence would prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defense upon 
the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Scope of rules: These r u l e s s h a l l govern t he 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the d i s t r i c t 
cour ts , c i ty courts, and jus t ice courts of the 
S t a t e of Utah, in a l l a c t i o n s , s u i t s and 
p r o c e e d i n g s of a c i v i l n a t u r e , w h e t h e r 
cognizable a t law or in equ i ty , and in a l l 
special statutory proceedings, except as s tated 
in Rule 81. They shal l be l ibe ra l ly construed 
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t o s e c u r e t h e j u s t , speedy, and inexpens ive 
determinat ion of every ac t ion . 
6. Rule 8 ( f ) , Utah Rules of Civ i l Procedure: 
Construction of Pleadings. All p lead ings s h a l l be so 
construed as t o do s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case in which the 
Plaintiff was injured by a vehicle belonging to and 
operated by the Defendant, the City of St. George. 
Trial was held on June 13, 1985, before the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns, District Judge of the Fifth Judicial 
District, sitting without a jury. The Court found for 
the Plaintiff and entered a judgment accordingly, from 
which judgment this appeal is taken. 
The relevant facts as found by the Court below 
and upon which this appeal is based are as follows: 
On April 5, 1983, Plaintiff hauled a load of gravel to a 
site in the City of St. George (Transcript page 20). After 
arriving at the site, Plaintiff waited for an agent for 
the City of St. George to arrive and instruct him as to 
where to dump the gravel. Ron Larson, an employee of 
St. George City, arrived and parked his pickup truck to 
the left of Plaintiff's vehicle, whereupon Plaintiff 
exited his vehicle and spoke to Larson through the 
passenger side window of said pickup. After a brief 
conversation, Larson drove the pickup forward, at which 
time, a pipe vise which extended a short distance from 
the right rear side of the pickup, struck the Plaintiff 
in the back, knocking him to the ground (Transcript page 25). 
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After a short time, the P la in t i f f recovered and climbed 
into his vehicle and dumped the load of gravel as he had 
been ins t ruc ted . P la in t i f f then returned to h is place 
of business, reported the accident to his supervisor and 
took the res t of the day off. Pla int i f f was seen by his 
physician the following day (Transcript pages 29-31), who treated 
him i n i t i a l l y and l a t e r referred him to an orthopedic 
surgeon for fur ther t reatment . This surgeon reported 
that no permanent injury was expected (Transcript pages 90-91). 
Pla in t i f f continued to experience pain after the 
incident and eventually brought su i t against the City of 
St . George, a l leging negligence, and prayed for general 
damages in addi t ion to special damages for h i s medical 
expenses. The matter proceeded to t r i a l , which was held 
in D i s t r i c t Cour t , Washington County, b e f o r e t h e 
Honorable J . Harlan Burns, s i t t i n g without a ju ry , on 
June 13, 1985. The t r i a l lasted for a period of one day, 
a t which time the Court found the City of S t . George 
n e g l i g e n t in o p e r a t i n g i t s v e h i c l e and t h a t s a i d 
negl igence was the proximate cause of the in jury to 
P la in t i f f (Transcript page 146). The Court awarded Pla in t i f f a 
t o t a l of Three Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-two Dollars 
($3,392) for specia l damages and Twenty-three Thousand 
Seven Hundred Forty-four Dollars ($23,744) for general 
damages, for a t o t a l of Twenty-seven Thousand One 
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Hundred Thirty-six Dollars ($27,136), plus costs in the 
matter. The sum of $23,744 was based upon a Finding made 
by the Court with respect to the Plaintiff of ten 
percent (10%) permanent impairment of the man as a 
whole. The Court took judicial notice of the life 
expectancy of a 45-year-old white male, 27.8 years, in 
calculating the damages (Transcript page 150). 
Throughout the course of this proceeding and, in 
fact, until the afternoon of the day before trial, 
Plaintiff had never alleged any permanent disability of 
any sort. The issue of permanent disability was not 
raised at the Pretrial Conference which was held in 
December, 1984. The Pretrial Order, which does mention 
permanent disability, was not submitted to the Court 
until the day of trial (Transcript page 4). Plaintiff himself 
did not know until the examination was conducted on the 
day before trial that there was any permanent disability 
(Transcript pages 84-87). Defendant was prepared and expected to 
go to trial on the issue of negligence, with the issue 
of damages being considered a relatively undisputed 
aspect of the case. Defendant was surprised and 
therefore unable to adequately prepare a defense for the 
permanent disability, since none was expected and none 
was alleged until the date of trial. 
On the day of said trial, Defendant objected to 
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the admission of any evidence relating to permanent 
disability and moved the Court grant a continuance until 
Defendant had a chance to conduct an examination of 
Plaintiff by his own experts and prepare an adequate 
defense for the permanent disability issue, or in the 
alternative, for the Court to bifurcate the issues, hear 
the issue of negligence at that time and reserve the 
issue of damages for a later date (Transcript pages 2-4). These 
Motions were taken under advisement by the Court and the 
trial proceeded on that day with evidence being admitted 
over Defendant's Objections (Transcript pages 27, 28, 83, 84) as to 
t h e amount of p a r t i a l permanent d i s a b i l i t y and t h e 
damages i n c u r r e d by r e a s o n of s a i d d i s a b i l i t y . The 
Cour t found t h e Defendant n e g l i g e n t , P l a i n t i f f no t 
c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t , and t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s 
n e g l i g e n c e was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of P l a i n t i f f ' s 
injury, and judgment was entered accordingly (Transcript page 
150). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The f o l l o w i n g a r g u m e n t s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d by 
Defendant . 
1. The t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have g r a n t e d 
Defendant ' s Motion t o e i t h e r cont inue the t r i a l or 
bifurcate the issues since Defendant was surprised by a 
new issue on the day of t r i a l . 
2. After denying Defendant's Motion as stated in 
Paragraph 1 above, the t r i a l court should have excluded 
any evidence pertaining to the new issue. 
3. The t r i a l cour t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
f a i l i n g to give Defendant addi t ional time to meet the 
new issue. 
4. The t r i a l cour t e r red in f a i l i n g to give 
Defendant an opportunity to present i t s closing argument 
in violat ion of due process guarantees. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I . THE COURT•S REFUSAL TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL 
AND HEAR THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES AT A LATER DATE WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
R u l e 4 2 ( b ) o f t h e U t a h R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 
s t a t e s : 
The C o u r t i n f u r t h e r a n c e of c o n v e n i e n c e 
o r t o avoid prejudice may o r d e r a s e p a r a t e t r i a l of 
a n y c l a i m , c r o s s - c l a i m , c o u n t e r c l a i m , o r 
t h i r d - p a r t y c l a i m , o r o f a n y separate issue o r o f 
a n y n u m b e r o f c l a i m s , c r o s s - c l a i m s , 
c o u n t e r c l a i m s , t h i r d - p a r t y c l a i m s , o r i s s u e s . 
(Emphas i s a d d e d . ) 
As t h i s r u l e c l e a r l y s t a t e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s 
t h e p o w e r t o b i f u r c a t e t h e t r i a l a n d h e a r s e p a r a t e 
i s s u e s a t a d i f f e r e n t t i m e ( P a g e v . , U t a h Home F i r e 
I n s u r a n c e Company, 391 P . 2 d 2 9 0 , 292 [ 1 9 6 4 ] ; Raggenbuck 
v . S u h r m a n n , 325 P . 2 d 2 5 8 , 2 5 9 ) . The i s s u e o f damages 
i s s e p a r a t e f rom t h e i s s u e o f n e g l i g e n c e and c o u l d h a v e 
b e e n h e a r d s e p a r a t e l y . The q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r o r n o t 
t h e C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o b i f u r c a t e t h e t r i a l c a n 
c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . A l t h o u g h t h e C o u r t d i d n o t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n y D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o c o n t i n u e o r 
b i f u r c a t e t h e t r i a l , i t d i d t a k e s a i d M o t i o n u n d e r 
a d v i s e m e n t and p r o c e e d e d w i t h t h e t r i a l . The a c t i o n s o f 
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t h e Court in conduc t ing t he t r i a l and e n t e r i n g a 
judgment immediately thereaf ter cons t i tu te a denial of 
Defendant ' s Motion, even though the mat te r was not 
spec i f i c a l l y reca l led nor ruled upon (Georgia Casualty 
Co. v . Body, C.C.A., C a l . , 34 F.2d 116; Wallace v. 
Gillev, 12 A.2d 416, 136 Me.523). 
Since the decision of whether or not to bifurcate 
the t r i a l as allowed by the above-stated rule i s couched 
in t h e pe rmi s s ive "may" r a t h e r than t h e mandatory 
"sha l l , " the standard of review should be whether or not 
t h e r e was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by the t r i a l court 
(Bairas v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 375, 377 [1962]), The rule 
i t s e l f suggests the appropriate standard should be to 
" avo id p r e j u d i c e " in d e c i d i n g whether or no t t o 
b i f u r c a t e t he t r i a l . I f t he Defendant was indeed 
u n f a i r l y pre jud iced by the t r i a l Cour t ' s re fusa l to 
b i f u r c a t e the i s s u e s , such would almost c e r t a i n l y 
cons t i tu te an abuse of d iscre t ion since i t i s axiomatic 
t h a t the t r i a l court should always act so as to avoid 
prejudicing ei ther s ide. 
In t h i s regard, the Utah case of Taylor v. E.M. 
Rovle Corp., 264 P. 2d 279, 280 i s in s t ruc t ive . In tha t 
case, t r i a l was held on a theory of express contract but 
judgment was entered on the bas is of a quantum meruit 
theory which had been n e i t h e r pleaded nor argued by 
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either side. Holding such ruling to be an abuse of 
discretion, the Court stated: 
It is true that our new rules should be 
"liberally construed" to secure a "just * * * 
determination of every action", but they do not 
represent a one-way street down which but one. 
litigant may travel. The rules allow 
locomotion in both directions by all interested 
travelers. They allow plaintiffs considerable 
latitude in pleading and proof, to the point 
where some people have expressed the opinion 
that careless legal craftsmanship has been 
invited rather than discouraged. Be that as it 
may, a defendant must be extended every 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and 
t o meet an a d v e r s a r y ' s c l a i m s . Also he must be 
protected against surprise and be assured equal opportunity and 
facility to present and prove counter contentions r-else unilateral 
justice and injustice would result sufficient to raise serious doubts 
as to constitutional due process guarantees. ( E m p h a s i s 
added). 
The Court went on to reverse the judgment of the 
lower court in order to give the Defendant an 
opportunity to prepare for and contest the new theory. 
Although the factual situation in Taylor is somewhat 
different than the present case, the same principles 
should still apply. A matter raised for the first time 
at trial can be no more adequately prepared for by the 
opposing side than if the matter were never raised. 
Plaintiff claims that it was not necessary to 
allege permanent disability at any time prior to trial 
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and tha t in addit ion the Defendant could have had the 
P l a i n t i f f examined by h i s own exper ts p r i o r to t r i a l 
under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure. 
While i t i s t r u e t h a t P l a i n t i f f was not requi red to-
plead specif ics such as the exact amount of damages, i t 
i s required to plead s p e c i f i c a l l y enough to give the 
Defendant notice of each issue i t intends to r a i s e . As 
the Court s t a ted in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 2 05, 
211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963): 
"What they are ent i t led to i s notice of 
jfche issues ra ised and an opportunity to meet 
them. When t h i s i s accomplished, t ha t i s a l l 
t h a t i s r e q u i r e d . Our r u l e s p rov ide for 
l i b e r a l i t y t o a l low examinat ion i n t o and 
s e t t l e m e n t of a l l i s s u e s bea r ing upon the 
c o n t r o v e r s y , b u t safeguard the right of the other party to 
have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests/" 
(Emphasis added ) . 
See also Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 
1318; Williams v. State Farm Insurance Company, Utah, 
656 P.2d, 966, 970, 971; Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 
295 (Utah 1984); Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 310 
P.2d 517, 519; National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. 
v. Thompson, 286 P.2d 249, 253. 
Permanent impairment is a separate issue from 
temporary injury, encompassing as it does compensation 
for damages incurred over a lifetime. Temporary injury 
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a n t i c i p a t e s damages for immediate medical b i l l s and 
temporary pain and suffering but no long-term effec ts . 
Plaint i ff could have put Defendant on adequate notice at 
any time p r i o r to t r i a l by simply a l l e g i n g permanent 
d i s a b i l i t y or amending h i s Complaint a c c o r d i n g l y . 
Defendant would then have been on notice tha t such was 
t o be an i s s u e a t t r i a l and cou ld have p r e p a r e d 
accordingly, including the use of Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant was ins tead surpr i sed on the day of 
t r i a l t o be faced wi th an i s s u e which he had not 
anticipated. Hindsight argues tha t Defendant should have 
a n t i c i p a t e d t h e i s s u e of permanent impairment and 
prepared accordingly. However, requir ing the Defendant 
to a n t i c i p a t e each and every issue tha t could possibly 
be ra ised by the P l a i n t i f f would place an in to l e rab le 
burden on the Defendant, requir ing him to expend great 
sums of time and money in defending even the simplest of 
cases. Our rules do not require such a r e su l t . 
Rule 8 (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
s t a t e s : 
"All p leadings s h a l l be so construed as to do 
substantial j u s t i c e . " (See also Rule 1(a) , URCP.) 
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Rule 15 of t h e Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure 
a l lows the p a r t i e s t o amend t h e i r p leadings even a f t e r 
judgment has been e n t e r e d in o r d e r t o conform t o t h e 
ev idence . However, in order t o p r o t e c t the o the r pa r ty 
from any t r i a l by ambush, Rule 15 (b) r equ i res the Court 
g r an t a continuance t o t h e ob jec t ing par ty t o allow him 
t i m e t o meet any new e v i d e n c e . Th i s was no t done, 
although the Objection and Motion t o b i fu rca t e the t r i a l 
were p r o p e r l y made (Transcript pages 2-4, 27, 28, 83, 84). 
I I . THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
RELATING TO PERMANENT DISABILITY. 
S i n c e t h e C o u r t r e f u s e d D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o 
b i f u r c a t e t h e t r i a l , t h e C o u r t was u n d e r a n o b l i g a t i o n 
t o d e n y a d m i s s i o n of a n y e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e new 
i s s u e of p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y f o r w h i c h D e f e n d a n t h a d 
had no f a i r o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e p a r e i f s u c h e v i d e n c e w e r e 
p r e j u d i c i a l t o D e f e n d a n t . T h e e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g 
p a r t i a l p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y was c e r t a i n l y p r e j u d i c i a l 
s i n c e n e a r l y 90% of t h e award was b a s e d on s a i d e v i d e n c e 
(Youncr ren v . J o h n W. L l o y d C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, 450 
P . 2 d 9 8 5 , 9 8 6 ; K a i s e r Aluminum & Chemica l S a l e s , I n c . v . 
L o r d s , 460 P . 2 d 3 2 1 , 3 2 2 ) . 
Even i n c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e C o u r t h a s r e f u s e d t o 
r e c o g n i z e a new o r u n p l e a d e d i s s u e a s p r e j u d i c i a l , t h e 
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C o u r t h a s r e l i e d on a l a c k of s u r p r i s e o r f a i l u r e t o 
o b j e c t a s i n d i c a t i o n s of w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e was any 
a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e (Buehner Block Co. v . G lezos , 310 P.2d 
517 , 5 2 0 ) . In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , Defendant b o t h c l a imed 
s u r p r i s e and o b j e c t e d t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f any 
e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e new i s s u e o f p e r m a n e n t 
d i s a b i l i t y . 
S i n c e t h e i s s u e o f p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y 
c o n s t i t u t e d a new c a u s e of a c t i o n , i t s hou ld have been 
r e q u i r e d t o a p p e a r a s an amendment t o t h e Compla in t i f 
e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g i t were t o be a l l owed . However, an 
amendment o f f e r e d on t h e day of t r i a l i s j u s t i f i a b l y 
viewed w i t h s k e p t i c i s m and shou ld be c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i z e d 
f o r a n y u n f a i r n e s s o r p r e j u d i c e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
(Gi ra rd v . Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 [Utah 1 9 8 3 ] ) . 
I I I . THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO TIME TO 
CONDUCT HIS OWN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ISSUE OF 
PERMANENT DISABILITY.* 
Although t h e r e s u l t s of such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n may 
o r may n o t have a l t e r e d t h e r e s u l t r eached by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t , t h e D e f e n d a n t s h o u l d a t l e a s t h a v e h a d t h e 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o a d e q u a t e l y p r e p a r e and a r g u e t h e i s s u e , 
and p r e s e n t ev idence on i t s b e h a l f (Taylor v . E.M. Royle 
C o r p . , 264 P.2d 279, 280; N a t i o n a l Farmers Union Prop . & 
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Cas . Co, v . Thompson, 286 P.2d 249, 1 5 3 ) . (Rule 4 0 ( b ) , 
URCP.) 
IV • THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE DEFENDANT AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
At t h e c o n c l u s i o n of D e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e t h e Court 
a s k e d t h e P l a i n t i f f i f t h e r e was any r e b u t t a l . Upon 
r e c e i v i n g a n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e , t h e C o u r t i m m e d i a t e l y 
e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s w i t h o u t g i v i n g D e f e n d a n t an 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t i t s summation (Transcript page 146). 
W h i l e t h e C o u r t h a d h e a r d a l l t h e e v i d e n c e and was 
c e r t a i n l y q u a l i f i e d t o d r a w i t s own c o n c l u s i o n s 
t h e r e f r o m , Defendant was e n t i t l e d t o an o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
p r e s e n t i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e e v i d e n c e a d m i t t e d . 
Th i s i s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t i n view of t h e r e s t r i c t i o n 
a g a i n s t commenting on t h e e v i d e n c e a t any t ime p r i o r t o 
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e l a w s u i t . Due P r o c e s s r e q u i r e s 
t h a t Defendan t have a t l e a s t an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t 
arguments i n h i s b e h a l f . 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s error i n re fus ing t o 
continue or b i f u r c a t e the t r i a l and in a l lowing evidence 
o v e r d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n r e l a t i n g t o p e r m a n e n t 
d i s a b i l i t y , and i n f a i l i n g t o a l l o w D e f e n d a n t an 
opportunity t o present a c l o s i n g argument on i t s behalf , 
Defendant r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h e Court r e v e r s e t h e 
r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and g r a n t judgment f o r t h e 
D e f e n d a n t o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r t h e Court t o 
r e v e r s e such par t of the damage award as r e l a t e s t o the 
i s s u e of permanent d i s a b i l i t y . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y submit ted t h i s 
1985. 
2A <fL day of October, 
David L. Watson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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postage prepaid, on this sy^f day of October, 1985. 
19 
Rule 1(a) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Form 29. Judgment. 
Form 30. Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Form 31. Petition for Order Granting Intermediate Appeal. 
Form 32. Designation of Record on Appeal. 
Form 33. Table of Contents of Brief on Appeal. 
Form 34. Statement of Points, as Contained in the Brief. 
Form 35. General Form of Brief and Contents. 
PART I 
Scope of Rules—One Form of Action 
RULE 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
|(a) [ Scope of Rules: These rules shall govern the procedure in the 
Supreme Court, the district courts, city courts, and justice courts of 
the State of Utah, in all actions, suits and proceedings of a qivil nature, 
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory pro-
ceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
Compiler's Notes. Construction and application. 
This Rule is substantially the same as Noncompliance with rules is allowed 
Fed. Rule 1, except that it has been only when some inadvertence, surprise, 
adapted to procedure of the State of Utah. excusable neglect, or mistake has occurred, 
and deviation is required for substantial 
Cross-References. justice to be done. Holton v. Holton, 121 
Application of Rules to other proceed- U. 451, 243 P. 2d 438. 
ings, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81. Absence of demand for attorney's fees 
Children's cases deemed civil proceed- in complaint does not preclude award of 
ings, 78-3a-44. such fees by trial court. Palombi v. D & 
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaf- C Builders, 22 U. (2d) 297, 452 P. 2d 325. 
fectcd by Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, _ „ , _
 m 
R u j e 82. Collateral References. 
Supreme Court, district courts, city Oourts<S=>85. 
courts, and justice courts, Title 78, chap- 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 174-177. 
ters 2 to 5. 20 Am. Jur . 2d 447, Courts §§ 85, 86. 
Supreme Court's rule-making power, 78-
2-4. Power of court to adopt general rule 
United States, execution of process on requiring pretrial conference as distin-
land acquired by, 63-8-1, 63-8-3, 65-6-1. guished from exercising its discretion in 
United States, service of process on each case separately, 2 A. L. R. 2d 1061. 
lands leased to, 65-1-56. 
(b) Effective Date: These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; 
and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force 
or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they 
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, 
except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application 
in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be 
feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure 
applies. 
Compiler's Notes. Collateral References. 
This Rule is substantially the same as Courts<S=>81. 
Fed. Rule 86(a) except that it has been 21 C.J.S. Courts § 176. 
adapted to the procedure of this state. 20 Am. Jur . 2d 447, Courts § 85. 
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PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS R u l e 8 ( f ) 
cient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or 
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether 
based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall 
be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 8(e) 
prior to its amendment February 28, 1906. 
Cross-References. 
Form of pleadings, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 10. 
Forms illustrative of pleadings, Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Appendix. 
Motions, forms for, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Appendix Forms 20, 23 to 25. 
One form of action, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 2. 
Signing *of pleadings, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 11. 
Election between claims. 
Where complaint set forth three alterna-
tive claims, two in negligence and one 
under 35-1-46 and 35-1-57 of Workmen's 
Compensation Act, it was reversible error 
for court at pretrial hearing to require 
election of claim by plaintiff. Rosander v. 
Larsen, 14 U. (2d) 1, 376 P. 2d 146. 
Ees judicata. 
Action to establish right of way by im-
plied easement was propeily dismissed 
where defendants had obtained judgment 
in prior action by plaintiff to establish 
right of way by prescriptive easement, 
since both issues could have been adjudi-
cated in first action. Wheadon v. Pearson, 
14 U. (2d) 45, 376 P. 2d 946. 
Separate claims. 
In action to recover wages where plain-
tiff alleged express contract of employ-
ment, which defendants in effect admitted 
but denied they were to pay, court did 
not err in allowing plaintiff to submit case 
on both express contract and quantum 
meruit bases. Morris v. Russell, 120 IT. 
545, 236 P. 2d 451, distinguished in 1 U. 
(2d) 175, 176, 264 P. 2d 279, 280. 
CoUateral References. 
Plendmg€=n to 33. 
71 C J.S. Pleading §§ 1 to 52. 
61 Am. Jur. 2d 455 to 498, Pleading § 1 
et seq. 
Election of remedies, pleading of, 99 
A. L. R. 2d 1315. 
Express contract: recovery on quantum 
meruit where only express contract is 
pleaded, under Federal Rules 8 and 54 
.ind similar state statutes oi rules, 81-
A. L. R. 2d 1077. 
in. Construction of Pleadings. 
as to do substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 8(f) . 
Cross-References. 
^ Special forms of pleadings of 
Rules of Civil abolished 
65B(a). 
CoUateral References. 
Pleading<§=>34. 
71 C.J.S. Pleading § 53. 
61 Am. Jur. 2d 500, Pleading § 59 
and writs 
Procedure, Rule 
All pleadings shall be so construed 
Employee: admissibility, under pleading 
that tort was committed by defendant, of 
evidence that it was committed by his 
seivant, 4 A. L. R. 2d 302. 
Ejectment action, defense of adverse 
possession oi statute of limitations as 
available under geneial denial or plea of 
geneial issue in, 39 A. L. R. 2d 1426. 
Manner and sufficiency of pleading for-
eign law, 134 A. L. R. 570. 
Pleading waiver, estoppel, and res judi-
cata, 120 A. L. R. 8. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Aider of pleadings. 
Principal purpose of written pleadings 
Was to frame and present issues to be 
tried; while good pleading requned facts 
to be stated directly, pleading could be 
toded by inference or presumption; in ac-
tion to quiet title, complaint which alleged 
that deceased, at time of his death, was 
owner and in possession of lands was not 
defective for failure to allege ownership at 
time action was commenced. Tate v. Rose, 
35 V. 229, 99 P. 1003; Tate v. Shaw, 35 
U. 240, 99 P. 1007. 
Ambiguities. 
Ambiguity in pleading as to whether 
count uas for money paid or for money 
had and received had to be resolved in 
53 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS R u l e 1 5 ( b ) 
|(b) [ Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.—When issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary 
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not 
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that 
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, 
if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 15(b) 
except for deletion from the third sentence 
of the phrase "and shall do so freely" 
after "allow the pleadings to be amended." 
Construction and application. 
This Rule should be read as having two 
parts, the first of which is applicable when 
issues not raised in the pleadings are tried 
by the express or implied consent of the 
parties, and the second of which is appli-
cable where a motion to amend is made in 
response to an objection to the introduc-
tion of evidence; in the first case the trial 
court has no discretion whether to allow 
amendment of the pleadings and must do 
so; only m the second case may the court 
determine whether prejudice, undue delay 
in amending or laches ought to prevent 
the amendment. General Ins. Co. of Amer-
ica v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P. 2d 
502. 
Affirmative defense not pleaded. 
Although Kule 8(c) requires that af-
firmative defenses be pleaded, it must be 
looked to in light of the fundamental pur-
pose of the Rules of liberalizing pleading 
and procedure to the end that patties can 
present all their legitimate contentions; all 
that parties are entitled to is notice of 
the issues raised and an opportunity to 
jneet them; therefore, where defendants 
did not plead subsequent agreement as an 
affirmative defense to action on prior 
&5feement an (* pla*n*iff> whose objection to 
Evidence on subsequent agreement was 
Overruled, sought no continuance and did 
n<>t claim surprise or disadvantage in 
Meeting t'ue new issue, trial court not only 
« a not abuse its discretion in allowing 
*
t t
°e to be laised and receiving evidence 
°* it but it would have failed the plain 
Mandate of justice had it refused to do so. 
Chenev v. Rucker, 14 U. (2d) 205, 381 P. 
2d 86. 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
In action to recover wages for serv-
ices rendered where complaint was based 
on both an express contract and on quan-
tum meruit, and court struck quantum 
meruit after plaintiff's evidence was in, 
and re<nstated it at the close of the de-
fendants' evidence, such ruling on the part 
of the court was not error in absence of 
showing that the employer was misled or 
prevented from presenting all their evi-
dence, since such ruling was equivalent 
to a rule permitting an amendment to 
conform to proof. Morris v. Russell, 120 
U. 545, 236 P 2d 451, 26 A. L. R. 2d 947/ 
distinguished in 1 IT. (2d) 175, 264 P. 2d 
279 
Where pleading did not fill the require-
ment of Rule 8(a) but the evidence sup-
ported finding that defendant did owe cer-
tain amount, failure to amend fully the 
pleadings to this effect was nonprejudicial 
in view of this Rule. Seamons v. Ander-
sen, 122 U. 497, 252 P. 2d 209. 
Amendment unnecessary. 
Wholesaler's complaint that fishing boats 
were defective and not fit for purposes 
intended was sufficient to raise the issue 
of breach of expiess and implied warranty, 
without amendment of the pleadings. Pa-
cific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. \ . Hydro-
swift Corp., 525 P. 2d 615. 
Consent to t ry issue. 
Where the parties, in an action on an 
insurance policy, stipulated in their plead-
ings that the value of a building was 
$2,000 and while the trial was in progress 
one of the parties testified that he was to 
receive $1,000 for the building in a sale, 
such testimony did not put the value of 
the building in issue, as alone it did not 
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Rule 40(a) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
R U L E 40 
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL; CONTINUANCE 
(a) Order and Precedence. The district courts shall provide by 
rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request 
of the parties or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other 
parties or (3) in such other manner as the courts deem expedient. Pre-
cedence shall be given to actions entitled thereto by statute. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 40 
except that it substitutes "by s tatute" for 
"by any statute of the United States" at 
the end of the Rule. 
Construction and vaUdity of local rule. 
District court rule which provided that 
clerk should make up trial calendar live 
days before first day of each term, in-
cluding all cases at issue noticed for term 
prior to making of calendar, etc., required 
either appellant's or respondent's attorney 
to serve notice required by rule before 
each term of court to entitle case to be 
placed on list of cases to be tried at that 
term, or in absence of notice, special order 
Compiler's Notes. 
There is no Fed. Rule covering this 
subject matter. 
Cross-Reference. 
Amendment of pleadings to conform to 
evidence, continuance upon, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 15(b). 
Physical condition of party. 
Refusal to grant continuance in per-
sonal injury case was an abuse of dis-
cretion where plaintiff was not able to 
at tend the trial because of his physical 
condition, there was no evidence of ma-
lingering by the plaintiff, and the plain-
Collateral References. 
Tnal<£=>l-7. 
88 C.J S. Trial §§ 18-35. 
75 Am. Jur . 2d 138, 139, Trial §§ 25, 26. 
of court had to be obtained setting case 
for trial. Riddle v. Quinn, 32 U. 341, 
90 P 893. 
District court rule which provided that 
clerk should make up trial calendar five 
days before first day of each term, includ-
ing all cases at issue noticed for term 
prior to making of calendar, etc., held 
valid and not contrary to statutory pro-
visions which were merely directory. Rid* 
die v. Quinn, 32 U. 341, 90 P . 893. 
tiff's testimony was essential to his case. 
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 U. (2d) 269, 373 
P. 2d 375. 
Procedural delays. 
Court properly denied motion for con-
tinuance in action based on credit card 
obligation which had been procedurally 
delayed for two and a half years^ by 
interrogatories and by various motions 
of the defendant; and although trial date 
had been set for four months, motion for 
continuance was not filed until nine days 
before trial . F i rs t Security Bank v. John-
son, 540 P . 2d 521. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a party, the court 
may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the 
payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or 
proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the 
ground of the absence of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the 
materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that 
due diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also require 
the party seeking the continuance to state, upon affidavit or under oath 
the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon 
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it may be considered 
as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
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Rule 42(b) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
tions were not between same parties; con-
solidation was not prejudicial error whore 
no substantial right of any defendant wns 
affected. New York Jobbing House v. 
Sterling Fire Ins. Co., 54 U. 394, 182 P. 
361. 
Unlawful detainer and action to try title. 
Plaintiff's motion in unlawful detainer 
proceeding that such proceeding and 
equitable action to try title brought by 
defendant be joined was properly over-
ruled, since defendant had right to have 
issues in unlawful detainer proceeding 
tried by jury, which might not have been 
case if actions were tried together. Wil-
liams v. Nelson, 65 U. 304, 237 P. 217. 
fb) Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or 
to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 
1 Am. Jur . 2d 647, Actions § 127; 75 
Am. Jur. 2d 123-132, Trial §§ 7-16. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 42 
(b) prior to its amendment in 1966. 
Cross-Reference. 
Separate trials authorized, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 20(b). 
Separate issues tried separately. 
Any separate issue may be tried sepa-
rately when the trial court considers it 
convenient or desirable in the interest 
of justice. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., 15 17. (2d) 257, 391 P. 2d 290. 
Collateral References. 
Action<@=>60; Trial<§=>3, 4. 
1 C.J.S. Actions §§117-122; 88 C.J.S. 
Trial S§ 7-10. 
Power of equity to enjoin prosecution 
of independent actions at law by differ-
ent persons injured by the same tort, 75 
A. L. R. 1444. 
Propriety of separate trials of issues 
of tort liability and of validity and ef-
fect of release, 4 A. L. R. 3d 456. 
Right of defendant sued jointly with 
another or others in action for personal 
injury or death to separate trial, 174 A. 
L. R. 734. 
Right of plaintiff suing jointly with 
others to separate trial or order of sever-
ance, 99 A. L. R. 2d 670. 
Separate trial of issues of liability and 
damages in tort, 85 A. L. R. 2d 9. 
RULE 43 
EVIDENCE 
(a) Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses 
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these 
Rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the 
statutes of this state or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied 
in the courts of this state. In any case, the statute or rule which favors 
the reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented 
according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes 
or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness 
to testify shall be determined in like manner. 
Compiler's Notes. General abolition of disqualification* 
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 43(a), an<* privileges of witnesses and ofexclu-
as it existed prior to its amendment in 
1972, except for deletion of material in 
the former Fed. Rule dealing with the 
application of state evidentiary rules in 
Federal Courts. 
Cross-References. 
Evidence generally, 78-25-1 et seq. 
Extrinsic policies affecting admissibil-
ity, Rules of Evidence, Rules 41 to 55. 
sionary rules, Rules of Evidence, Rule 7. 
Hearsay evidence, Rules of Evidence, 
Rules 62 to 66. 
Witnesses generally, 78-24-1 et seq. 
Admissibility. 
Where a conditional seller, having rs* 
^old repossessed goods and having cred* 
ited the proceeds to the buyer, sued tot 
the difference under the contract, th* 
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BAIEAS v. JOHNSON 
Cite as 373 I\2d 375 
13 Utah 2d 269 
Paul BAIRAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Lanard JOHNSON and Norman Cram, coad-
Utah 375 
circumstances will not reasonably allow a 
desirous party to appear in his own behalf. 
min 1strators of the estate of Philip G. Ful-
S' IW, deceased, Defendants and Respond-
ents. 
No. 9599. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 6, 19t)2. 
Action against estate for personal in-
juries suffered when deceased's automobile 
ran off highway. The District Court, Kane 
County, Ferdinand Erickson, J., dismissed 
the complaint upon the merits after refus-
ing plaintiffs request for a five-week con-
tinuance and the plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Callister, J., held that re-
fusal to grant an additional five-week con-
tinuance, even though plaintiff had pre-
viously been granted a three-month con-
tinuance because of inability personally to 
attend trial, was an abuse of discretion 
where there was no evidence of malinger-
ing, where original three-month continuance 
had been based upon physician's prediction 
as to when plaintiff could make the trip, 
and where nature of action made plaintiffs 
personal testimony essential. 
Reversed and remanded to proceed in 
accordance with decision. 
1. Appeal and Error C=966(l) 
Reviewing court should not reverse 
trial court's continuance ruling without a 
showing that trial court has abused its dis-
cretion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
40(b). 
2. Continuance 0=^19 
In determining whether to grant con-
tinuance, court should examine reasonable-
ness of request in light of the tradition that 
a party should be afforded every reasonable 
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 40(b). 
3. Depositions <£=M4 
Resort to deposition to introduce par-
ty's testimony should be done only when 
4. Continuance C=>5I(2) 
Refusal to grant an additional five-week 
continuance to plaintiff in personal injury 
action even though plaintiff had previously 
been granted a three-month continuance be-
cause of inability to personally attend trial, 
was an abuse of discretion where there was 
no evidence of malingering, where original 
three-month continuance had been based up-
on physician's prediction as to when plain-
tiff could make the trip, and where nature 
of case made it peculiarly important that 
plaintiff testify in person. 
5. Continuance C^40 
Failure of plaintiff to serve request 
for continuance five days prior to date of 
hearing and to make affidavits did not jus-
tify denial of continuance where plaintiffs 
counsel had been taken by surprise in dis-
covering need for continuance because of 
late medical opinion of necessity of an ad-
ditional operation. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rules 6(d), 40(b). 
6. Venue C==50 
Motion for change of venue by plain-
tiff in action for injuries resulting when 
automobile ran off highway was properly 
denied even though certain persons in com-
munity were of the opinion that plaintiff 
and not defendant's decedent had been driv-
ing *the automobile at the time of the acci-
dent. 
Gardner & Burns, Cedar City, Nathan 
Goller, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant. 
Hanson & Baldwin, Merlin Lybbert, Salt 
Lake City, Olson cc Chamberlain, Richfield, 
for respondents. 
CALLISTER, Justice. 
From a judgment of the lower court dis-
missing his complaint upon the merits and 
defendants' counterclaim without prejudice, 
the plaintiff appeals. He contends that the 
court erred in denying his motions for a 
continuance and change of venue. 
3 7 6 ^tah 3 7 3 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
On July 5, 1960, the plaintiff and Philip 
G. Fulstow were the sole occupants of the 
latter's automobile which ran off a highway 
in Coconino County, Arizona. Fulstow died 
as a result of the accident, and the plaintiff 
suffered a broken neck, causing him to 
be paralyzed from the neck down. 1 Main-
tiff was removed to a hospital in California 
where, at all times pertinent hereto, he has 
remained as a ward of the county of Los 
Angeles. The defendants are the duly ap-
pointed administrators of the estate of 
Philip G. Fulstow. 
The plaintiff filed a claim with the estate 
for $500,000 for personal injuries which 
was rejected. On March 9, 1961, the 
next to last day of the allowable period 
of time,1 the plaintiff commenced this ac-
tion. In his complaint the plaintiff alleged 
that Fulstow was driving the automobile at 
the time of the accident in a negligent and 
reckless manner which caused the accident 
and plaintiffs resulting injuries. Defend-
ants filed a counterclaim asserting that the 
plaintiff was the driver of the automobile 
at the critical moment, and that the accident 
was his fault 
Trial of the action in Kane County was 
first set for June 14, 1961, but it was post-
poned until June 28, 1961, to accommodate 
the personal convenience of one of plain-
tiff's counsel. On June 22, 1961, plaintiff 
filed a motion to vacate the trial setting 
for the reason that plaintiff was confined 
in the hospital and unable to travel from 
California to Utah. This motion was ar-
gued on the 26th of June. There was 
produced and filed an affidavit of Dr. C. 
H. Imes, plaintiff's attending physician at 
the hospital. This affidavit was to the ef-
fect that the plaintiff was not physically 
able to make a trip to Utah and be present 
at the trial on June 28th, but that it was the 
doctor's opinion that the plaintiff would be 
able to do so in approximately three months. 
This motion was vigorously resisted by 
the defendants who asserted that the estate 
had been ready to close for three months, 
and that the instant action was the sole 
barrier to a final disposition of that matter. 
Moreover, penalties and interest would be-
gin to run on July 5, 1961, unless the estate 
and inheritance tax returns were filed on 
that date. They also argued that Fulstow's 
hens, his elderly mother and father, were 
suffering hardship and inconvenience by 
reason of the delay in the distribution of 
the estate. 
After hearing argument thereon, the low-
er court granted a continuance to Septem-
ber 20, 1%1, and entered an order to that 
effect which read in part as follows: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
that if it appears that the Plaintiff will 
not be physically capable of testifying 
in person at the trial on September 20, 
1961 that his deposition will be taken by 
Plaintiffs counsel for use at the trial 
if the Plaintiff's testimony is to be ad-
mitted and that notice of taking of such 
deposition shall be given to counsel for 
the Defendants not less than ten days 
prior to the time set for the taking 
thereof. 
"The court notes for the record that 
the foregoing terms and conditions 
were stipulated to by counsel for the 
Plaintiff in consideration for the Court 
granting the instant continuance." 
On September 18, 1961, plaintiff's Califor-
nia counsel, Mr. Nathan Goller, sent to 
the trial judge a telegram advising that the 
plaintiff would be unable to attend the 
scheduled trial on September 20th. He 
also notified plaintiff's local counsel who, 
in turn, endeavored to notify counsel for 
the defendants. On September 20th de-
fendants were in court with their witnesses 
ready for trial, and a jury had been sum-
moned and was in the box. Local counsel 
for the plaintiff were present and moved 
the court for a continuance and for a change 
of venue. 
In support of the motion for a continu-
ance, there was presented a new affidavit 
of Dr. Imes and an affidavit of Mr. Goller. 
I. 75-!M), U.C.A.1053. 
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This second affidavit of Dr Imes, dated 
September 18, 1961, stated in effect that 
the present condition of the plaintiff was 
•one of improvement, but not to an extent to 
-permit him to travel and attend the trial 
in Utah. Dr Imes stated that plaintiff was 
scheduled for surgery of a genito urinary 
nature during the week of September 18th 
which would prevent him from leaving the 
hospital at that time. It was the intention 
of the hospital, according to the doctor, to 
discharge the plaintiff in ipproxun itcly 
five weeks and provide outpatient care ind 
an assistant It was Dr Tines' opinion th it 
at that time the plaintiff, if accompanied by 
the assistant, could make the journev md 
attend the trial. 
The affidavit of Nathan G Goller, 1K0 
dated September 18, 1961, was to the effect 
that up until September 17th he hid been 
of the opinion that the plaintiff would be 
released from the hospital for the purpose 
of attending the trial in Utah on the 20th 
of September, and that he had madt the 
necessary transportation arrangements 
The foregoing motions were argued ex-
tensivelv, the defendants strenuously op-
posing them The trial judge finally denied 
the motions, and a jurv was impanelled 
The motion for continuance was renewed 
|>y plaintiffs counsel and wis igun denud 
plaintiff's counsel cndeivored to proceed 
by offering into evidence as m exhibit the 
discovery deposition of the plaintiil taken 
June 24, 1961, on behalf of the defendants * 
The defend mts objected to this proeceluu, 
claiming thev had a right to make objec-
tion to inadm suible evidence in the deposi-
tion The court iuled that the deposition 
could be published and used in the m innei 
provided bv our civil rules ot procedure 
subject to proper objections but th it it 
could not be used in its entirety is an e\ 
hibit PI untiif thereupon withditw the )l 
fer and rested The judgment if dismissal 
with prejudice was then granted The tri il 
2. Prior to the t iking of tins dr position 
conns* 1 for dt f« ndints w ire <1 pi untiff s 
eonwl oftirm„ them the oppoitumtv to 
tnke ph Miffs deposition on Ins own he 
373 P - 4 1 , 
judge indicated that there were insufficient 
grounds to grant the motion for a con-
tinuance and that timely notice had not 
been given 
On a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff 
filed three additional affidavits, his own, 
that of Dr Edward Bobo, and a second 
one of Nathan G Goller Plaintiff, in his 
affidavit, described his physical condition 
and st iteel that three weeks prior to the 
scheduled trial date he had commenced 
preparation for the trip and that it was not 
until a week prior to his intended departure 
that he w is ad\ lsed by the eloctors that he 
could not leave the hospital, and that he 
was scheduled for an operation He notified 
Mr Goller as soon as possible of this 
elevelopment Plaintiff was operated upon 
on September 21, 1%1, and expressed, in 
his affidavit, the opinion that he would be 
able to make the journey in about five 
weeks. 
The affidivit of Dr Bobo was to the 
effect that he performed a trans-urethral 
resection of plaintiffs prostate on Septem-
ber 21, 1961, and that plaintiffs condition 
had not w irranted such an operation prior 
to that el Ue 
Mr Holler's second affidavit was to the 
ellect th it it was not until September 17, 
1%1 th it he bee line iware th it the pi untitf 
could not itten 1 trial on September 20, 
1961 th it up until that time he had been 
ot the opinion th it pi untiff would be able 
to ittenel and h i 1 not, therefore thought it 
neecbsir) to tike pi untiff s depos tion 
The me>tion fot 1 new trial was denied 
[1 2] Rule -fO(b) U R C P prov ides that 
the granting of a continuance lies in the 
tn i l courts discretion Tins c ise presents 
one ot th >se difficult 111st mccs in winch it 
I s neecssii\ t j e \ inline the reasonableness 
jf the exeicise ot t int discretion Ccr-
Itunlv this court should not reverse the 
uiimg of the tnal court absent a showing 
li lit Tins off r wis not a c c e p t al 
though Mr dolUr attended tho deposition 
and ivkid some questions 
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I that the latter abused its discretion **} How-
ever, it is in accord with the most funda-
mental traditions of our legal system that 
a party should be afforded every reasonable 
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial * 
[3] Obviouslv, there mav be times when 
a party may be able to add little or nothing 
by way of assistance or testimony at a trial, 
and in such an instance there may be little 
reason to grant a continuance to accommo-
date an absent party. But such is not the 
instant case. The plaintiff's testimony is 
essential to his case Moreover, the supe-
riority of oral testimony to tint taken b> 
deposition is apparent, and resort to a depo-
sition to introduce a partv's testimony of 
trial should only be done when the circum-
stances will not reasonablv allow a desirous 
party to appear m his own behalf 
[4] Under the peculiar facts of this 
case, we believe that the trial court's refusal 
to grant an additional continuance for fuc 
weeks, even in view of its prior onki of 
June 26, 1961, was an abuse of discretion 
Whatever might have been the case if only 
the absence of a witness were involved, 
rather than a party, the decision of this 
court must be tempered bv the fact that 
there is no evidence of malingering by the 
plaintiff. Courts should not foreclose one 
from a full hearing where it appears that 
it is impossible for physicians to predict 
with precision the date on which one who 
is recovering from a serious misfortune will 
be able to appear in court. If plaintiffs 
condition offered little hope for sufficient re-
covery, there would have been justification 
for the denial of the continuance How-
ever, there was evidence, by way of affi-
davits, that plaintiff was improving and 
would be able to attend trial in approxi-
mately five weeks. 
Not considering the court's order of June 
26, 1961, granting a continuance upon the 
conditions it did, we think the trial court 
3. Sharp v Cankis Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 
225 P. 337. 
would h u e obviously abused its discretion 
in relusmg a fuitlur continuance on Sep-
tember 20 However, that order does not 
essentiullv change the situation in \ lew of 
the import tine ot allowing a pirty to be in 
attendance at the trial to testify and as-
sist his counsel Tor the same reison the 
plaintiff was entitled to a further continu-
ance even tin ugh his counsel might have 
taken the precaution of taking plaintiff's 
deposition pnor to the September 20th trial 
date 
We arc, of course, cognizant that the five-
week del iv would have resulted in some 
hirdship to the defendants and others, and 
th it two witnesses have died since the ac 
culent However, the relative significance 
of these facts is overshadowed by the po-
tential loss to the plaintiff 
[5] The tri il court also based its denial 
of a continuance on the tailure of the plain-
tiff to mala his motion timelv and in a 
propci m inner Detendmts claim that the 
motion was defective because it was not 
served five davs prior to the date of hear-
in^ md bee mse it w is not accompanied by 
affidavits As to the latter point, the de-
fendants rely on the case of Lancino v 
Smith 5 to support the proposition that ac-
companying affidavits are necessary 
Whatever might have been the rule prior to 
its adoption, Rule 40(bj of our present rules 
of civil procedure does not expressly re-
quire affidavits to accompany a^motion for 
continuance Moreover, the reporter's 
notes following Rule 40(b) state that "the 
motion need not be by affidavit as was re-
quired by former section " 
As to the fact that the motion was not 
served five davs before the hearing as de-
fendants claim is required by Rule 6(d), 
we hold that whatever the rule might be 
when counsel have ample time within which 
to make a motion for continuance, when 
[counsel arc taken by surprise, as in this 
|caset so that they do not have five davs in 
4. Jiffe v Lihonthil, 101 Cal. 175, 35 P. 
fttti, ef. Wostfall v Motors Ins Corp., 
136 Mont. 449, 348 P 2d 7S4 (1960). 
5. 30 Utah 4G2, 105 P 914. 
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which to serve the motion, they are not pre-
cluded from making the motion. 
[6] The ruling of the trial court deny-
ing plaintiffs motion for a change of venue 
is sustained. The plaintiff filed in support 
of his motion a petition signed by several 
residents of Kane County and an affidavit 
of a traveling salesman both to the effect 
that many people in the county were of the 
opinion that plaintiff had been driving the 
car at the time of the accident, and thus 
plaintiff could not have a fair and impartial 
trial in Kane County. Under the circum-
stances it cannot be said that the lower 
court abused its discretion in denying the 
motion. 
Reversed and remanded to proceed in ac-
cordance with this decision. No costs 
awarded. 
WADE, C. J., and HENRIOD, Mc-
DONOUGH and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
KEY N t m t E t SYSTEM, 2> 
statute providing for deduction by insurer 
in its insurance tax return for expenses it 
is required to make for such examination, so 
that insurer doing business outside of state 
was able to deduct full amount paid for ex-
amination of its business conducted by in-
surance commissioner. 
Decision of commission vacated. 
1. Taxation C=>387 
Domestic insurer doing business out-
side of state was entitled to deduct, in com-
puting premium tax, full amount paid for 
examination of its out-of-state business 
conducted by insurance commissioner. U. 
C.A.1953, 31-3-1, 31-3-6, 31-14-4(3). 
2. Taxation 0=387 
Tax commission, in refusing to allow 
deduction on domestic insurer's insurance 
tax return for expenses incurred in con-
ducting triennial examination of its out-of-
state business by tax commission and pro-
mulgating prorata deduction rule, went be-
yond its rule-making powers. U.C.A.1953, 
31-3-1(3), 31-3-6, 31-14-4(3). 
13 Utah 2d 275 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah, 
Defendant. 
No. 9570. 
Supremo Court of I'Uih. 
July 3, 1!><>2. 
Original proceeding to review decision 
r? T? •• Commission refusing to allow de-
duction in insurance company's tax return. 
The Supreme Court, Wade, C. J., held that 
statute requiring insurance commissioner to 
make triennial examination of affairs of 
domestic corporation authorized to do busi-
ness outside state coincident with and as 
part of convention examination of corpo-
ration made by other states, did not limit 
Marr, Wilkins & Cannon, J. Thomas 
Greene, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
A. Pratt Kesler, Atty. Gen., Norman S. 
Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
WADE, Chief Justice. 
Surety Life Insurance Company, plain-
till' herein, seeks review of a decision of 
the State Tax Commission of Utah, defend-
ant herein, refusing to aHow a deduction 
in plaintiff's insurance tax return for 1959 
for the full amount paid by plaintiff for an 
examination of its business conducted by 
defendant. 
Plaintiff is a stock legal reserve life in-
surance company organized and domiciled 
in Utah. During the year 1959 plaintiff 
was qualified and doing business in a num-
ber of states besides Utah. Under the pro-
292 lTtah «Ts P U1FIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES 
a contrarv agreement IVIWUP the pu ties 
to the prow 
In the instant case, the proxies did ' oth-
erwise provide' since the\ contained ex 
press language that declared them to be 
irrevocable The irrevocable nature ot the 
proxies effectively neutralized the termina-
tion language of the statute, and therefore 
they remained valid until revoked 
Generally, a proxv is revocable at the 
pleasure of the stockholder even though bv 
its terms it is declared to be irrevocable ' 
However, a proxy, coupled with an interest, 
constitutes an exception to the general 
rule, and such a prox^ v is irrevocable wheth-
er or not the instrument so providesl 
Again, however, there is AW exception to 
that exception. Although a proxv is given 
for a valuable consideration, it nu\ be te 
voked where it is used for a fraudulent 
purpose l 
In this case, the trial court aptly ob-
served that the proxies were coupled with 
an interest, but it erred in not declaring 
them to have been lawfully revoked The 
stockholders had every right to revoke the 
proxies by reason of the breaches of faith 
on the part of Baggs and in light of his 
unauthorized activities that were wholly in-
consistent with the purpose of the proxies 
and contrary to the best interests of the 
corporation and the stockholders 
On remand, I would also direct the entry 
of a judgment declaring the proxies invalid, 
but would do so on the basis of the lawful-
ness of the revocation thereof by the stock-
holders 
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ , concur in the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of 
HALL, CJ 
1. 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations § 675 
2. Id. at § 676 
Preston BOWN and Olive Bown, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
McKay M. LOVELAND, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18686. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Feb 1, 1984 
Grantors brought action seeking con 
struction of warranty deed that they ext 
cuted in favor of grantee who had paid 
debt of grantors to third partv based on 
oral understanding he was to double his 
money in return The Second District 
Court, Davis County, Douglas L Contain 
J , found that transaction was a consumer 
related loan, that deed was intended to In 
equitable mortgage, and that transaction 
was unconscionable, and reformed deed 
and grantee appealed The Supreme 
Court, Hall, C J , held that (1) remedv ot 
reformation of warranty deed was improp 
er, (2) transaction was "consumer-related 
loan", (3) understanding that grantee wa^  
to double his money in return for loan had 
no validity as contract, and (4) evidence did 
not clearly preponderate against finding of 
district court that warranty deed was mort 
gage intended as security for loan 
Affirmed in part and vacated and set 
aside in part 
1. Deeds <3=>124 
Warranty deed executed without aM\ 
reservations conveys in fee simple all o( 
rights and interests grantor has in premi^ 
es therein described. 
2. Reformation of Instruments @=>19(1), 
20 
To reform written warranty deed or 
any written instrument, plaintiff must 
show mutual mistake of parties or mistake 
3. 1 8 C J S Corporations § S50g 
BOWN v. LOVELAND 
Cite as 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984) 
on part of one and fraud or inequitable 7. Consumer Credit <®»33 
conduct on part of other, as result of which 
instrument reflects something neither par-
ty had intended or agreed to. 
Utah 293 
3. Reformation of Instruments <s=»36(3), 
45(1, 4) 
To reform written warranty deed or 
any instrument, proof of mistake must be 
presented by clear and convincing evidence; 
furthermore, party seeking reformation of 
deed due to mutual mistake must plead 
such mistake with particularity. 
4. Reformation of Instruments <&=>41 
Where pretrial order listing issues ta 
be tried in grantors' action seeking con-
struction of warranty deed did not mention 
specifically or by implication question of 
mistake or deed reformation, grantors did 
not raise mistake during trial and did not 
argue mistake or reformation in their post-
trial memorandum, and explicit testimony 
and logic inherent in transaction indicated 
grantee intended to acquire entire piece of 
property subject to grantors' option to re-
purchase and that grantors understood this 
to be the case, reformation of warranty 
deed on basis of mutual mistake was im-
proper. 
5. Consumer Credit <^1 
Transaction whereby grantors exe-
cuted warranty deed on their property was 
not "consumer loan," where grantee was 
realtor, not regularly engaged in business 
of making loans, and debt was not incurred 
by grantors primarily for personal, family, 
household or agricultural purposes, but for 
use in stone-cutting business. U.C.A.1953, 
70B-3-104. 
See publication Woids and Phiases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Consumer Credit <s=>4 
"Loan," for purposes of statute defin-
ing consumer-related loan, is made when 
•reditor creates debt by advancing money 
o person on behalf of debtor. U.C.A.1953, 
•OB-3-602 (Repealed). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Where grantors of warranty deed 
owed debt, which was secured by trust 
deed on the real property, to leasing com-
pany to secure lease on bulldozer to be 
used in stone-cutting business, grantee 
made payment to leasing company in re-
turn for which he received assignment of 
leasing company's interest as lessor of bull-
dozer and assignment of trust deed, and 
both grantors and grantee understood that 
if grantee advanced sum to leasing compa-
ny, grantors would owe grantee approxi-
mately double that amount, transaction 
was "consumer-related loan." U.C.A.1953, 
70B-3-602 (Repealed). 
8. Consumer Credit O(J0 
Pursuant to statute governing consum-
er-related loans, parties may not contract 
for default charges in excess for those 
provided in statute; therefore, parties' oral 
understanding that grantee of warranty 
deed was to double his money in return for 
loan to grantors to save grantors from 
foreclosure action brought by third party 
had no validity. U.C.A.1953, 70B-1-102; 
U.C.A.1953, 70B-3-602, 70B-3-604(l, 2) 
(Repealed). 
9. Mortgages <s=>32(3) 
Deed, absolute in form, may be con-
strued as mortgage if it is intended as 
security under parol agreement rather than 
an outright conveyance. 
10. Mortgages c=>38<2) 
Burden of proof is on party claiming 
that warranty (k%n\ was mortgage to show 
by clear and convincing evidence that con-
veyance was intended as mortgage 
11.. Mortgages C=>32(1) 
Elements to be considered in determin-
ing whether absolute deed is intended as 
mortgage include: whether there was con-
tinuing obligation on part of grantors to 
pay debt or meet obligation which it is 
claimed dead was made to secure; question 
of relative values; contemporaneous subse-
quent acts; declarations and admissions of 
parties; form of written evidences of trans-
actions; nature and character of testimony 
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relied on, various business, social or other 
relationship of parties, and apparent aims 
and purposes to be accomplished 
12. Appeal and Error o1009(2) 
Standard of appellate review of find-
ings in equity cases, even wheie level ol 
proof in trial court is clear and convincing 
evidence, is clearly preponderates standard 
13. Mortgages c=>:j8( I) 
Evidence in grantors action seeking 
construction of vv.irr.intv dvt'd, including 
evidence that property covered bv warran-
ty deed was appraised for over $100 000, 
that both grantors and grantee understood 
there was continuing obligation on part of 
grantors to pav grantee double his invest-
ment, that both parties operated under as-
sumption that if there was sale of property, 
grantee was entitled to only double amount 
paid plus expenses with remainder belong-
ing to grantors, and that grantors' son and 
his family continued to live on and use 
property rent free after transfer of war-
ranty deed, did not clearly preponderate 
against finding of district court that war 
ranty deed was mortgage and intended as 
security for loan 
Richard L. Bird, J r , David J Bird, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for plaintiffs 
and respondents 
HALL, Chief Justice 
Plaintiffs Preston and Olive Bown 
brought this action seeking construction of 
a warranty deed that the\ executed in fa-
vor of defendant McKay Loveland Love 
land appeals from a decision of the district 
court which found that the transaction w as 
a consumer-related loan covered bv the 
Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, that 
the deed was intended to be an equitable 
mortgage and that the transaction was un-
conscionable. The court further reformed 
the deed. We affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
In March, 1978, the Bowns executed a 
trust deed on the north 466 feet of real 
propertv owned by them m Davis County, 
L tah, to MFT Leasing to secure a lease on 
a bulldozer to be used in a stone-cutting 
business When the Bowns defaulted m 
their payments on the loan, MFT com-
menced foreclosure proceedings Approxi-
mately two weeks before the scheduled 
trustee's sale, Preston Bown approached 
Loveland, a realtor for whom Bown had 
done work in the past, and offered to sell 
him the south end of the Bowns' propertv 
m order to raise the money to pav off MFT 
Loveland declined to buy On February 10, 
1081, the day before the trustee's sale 
Bown again contacted Loveland in an ef-
fort to arrange a deal to prevent foreclo-
sure by MFT Loveland agreed to rescue 
Bown from the foreclosure action only if 
Loveland could double the money he put up 
in the transaction Pursuant to their 
agreement, Loveland paid MFT the amount 
owed on the loan ($23,403 76) and received 
an assignment of the lease on the bulldozer 
and the trust deed. Bown then executed a 
w arranty deed to Loveland conveying both 
the north and south portions of the Bowns' 
property, subject to an oral option to repur-
chase for approximately $50,000 within six 
months Soon after this transaction, Love-
land placed "For Sale" signs on the proper-
tv and potential purchasers were referred 
to him The Bowns' son continued to live 
on the property rent-free 
Nearly eight months after the warrantv 
deed was signed, Loveland informed the 
Bowns that he intended to sell the propertv 
and that the repurchase option would ex-
pire on October 5, 1981 The Bowns there 
upon brought this action to construe the 
warranty deed, claiming that the transac-
tion was not a sale but a mortgage. 
I 
The trial court found that the Bowns did 
not intend the south portion of the property 
to be included in the warranty deed and 
that Loveland did not know it had been 
included until after the deed was recorded 
The court therefore ordered that the south 
portion be deleted from the deed. 
arc lacking hire 
BOWN v LOVELAND 
tile as 678 P 2d 292 (Utah 1984) 
[1-3] A warranty deed executed with 
out any reservations conveys in fee simple 
all of the rights and interests the giantor 
has in the premises therein described * To 
reform a written warranty detd or any 
written instrument, the plaintiff must show 
mutual mistake of the parties or mistake 
on the part of one and fraud or inequitable 
conduct on the part of the other, as a result 
of which the instrument reflects something 
neither party had intended or agreed to -
Proof of the mistake must be presented by 
Utah 295 
party's rights influenced thereby, that par-
ty must have notice of the issue and an 
opportunity to meet it * [Those elements 
clear and convincing evidence J A party 
seeking reformation of a deed due to mutu 
al mistake must plead such mistake with 
particularity4 
In the Bowns' complaint neither mistake 
nor fraud was pled, much less described 
with particularity The only mention made 
ID the complaint of the inclusion of the 
south portion of the property in the war 
ranty deed and the one the Bowns rel\ on 
to support their claim oi having pled with 
particularity was in the context ot
 A uu ta 
tion of fact "As additional s<<iuit\ tin 
defendant required the plaintiffs to execute 
a deed prepared by the defendant who is i 
realtor to the property COY t ml bv the 
Trust Deed plus additional propuU uijom 
ing thereto " This statement does not il 
lege mistake Rather it ipp* us to IK m 
admission that there was no mistake 
Rule V>(b) Utih R ol ( i\ I> pmudis 
that when issues not raised bv the pie id 
ings ire tried bv the express or implnd 
consent ot the parties, those issues should 
be treated as if thev hid bt( n r usul
 ln tht 
pleadings However in this case then is 
no evidence in the record to indie itt that 
both parties implicitiv understood th it the 
issue of mistake of description in the w u 
ranty deed was being tried tJustiet 
quires that if an issue is to be tried md t 
1. UCA 1953 §57-1-12 ,LL d o llauh H,s 
nan Utah 567 P 2d 1100 (197") 
2. Thompson \ Smith Unh 6^0 P ">d ^20 ( 1<->SO) 
3. Hatch supra note 1 at 1102 
4. Rule 9(b) Utah R Civ P
 t< // \<</M , 
Kelsch Utah 600 P2d 979 (1^79) 
± See e% Williams t State farm In 
656 P 2d 966 (19S2) I I I. 
flj Furthermore the record does not 
K licet that mistake was raised in the con 
text of the trial The pretrial order listing 
the issues to be tried does not mention 
specifically or by implication the question 
of mistake or deed reformation Plaintiffs 
did not raise mistake during the trial and 
did not argue mistake or reformation in 
their post trial memorandum On this ba-
sis alone reformation of the deed was lm 
proper 
Finally the e\ idence in the record in any 
way relating to the intent ot the parties as 
to the description of the land to be con-
veyed does not rise to the standard of clear 
and convincing that is required to reform a 
deed showing no imbiguity on its face In 
iact, the evidence is to the contrary Both 
explicit testimony and the logic inherent in 
the transaction indicate that Loveland in 
tended to acquire the entire piece of prop-
er tv subject to the Bowns option to repur-
chase md that the Bowns understood this 
to be the case 
I he re fort since mutual mistake of fact 
was neither pled nor proven by clear and 
convincing evidence the remedy of refor 
maUon ol the warrantv deed was improper 
II 
lou lmd ilso contends that the finding 
oi the trial court that this transaction was 
a consumer related loan governed by the 
Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
UCA 19** s^ 70B-3-602 to -604, and 
thus subject to a maximum 18 percent in 
tercst is in error b U C \ 195J & 70B-3-
6 I C \ \)^3 ^ 70B-3-602 to -604 were le 
pc tkd b\ the 1981 Utih State Legislature 
i IUS oi l^M eh 279 § S However pursuant 
to \ii \ l s, ^S of IIR Ut ih State Constitution 
the icpc il docs not take effect until 60 da>s 
iltci icl| >LII nine ut unless otherwise provided 
IIK u | k il w is ippiovcd Mauh 2^ 1981 with 
n o c l k U i u dak pmvision Theicfoic §§ 70B-
7
 6<r t( 601 u ic in c I k i t when this ti ansae 
h l i t < k pi ice i ebili u V 10 1981 
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602 provides that a "consumer related 
loan" is ua loan which is not subject to the 
provisions of this act applying to consumer 
loans and in which the principal does not 
exceed $25,000; if the debtor is a person 
other than an organization." 
U.C.A., 19rrf, ** 70B-3-101 defines a 
"consumer loan" as: 
[A] loan made by a person regularly en-
gaged in the business of making loans in 
which 
(a) the debtor is a person other than an 
organization; 
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a 
personal, family, household, or agricul-
tural purpose; 
(c) either the debt is payable in install-
ments or a loan finance charge is made; 
and 
(d) either the principal does not exceed 
$25,000 or the debt is secured by an 
interest in land. 
[5] This transaction is clearly not a con-
sumer loan since Loveland, a realtor, is not 
regularly engaged in the business of mak-
ing loans 7 and the debt was not incurred 
by the Bowns primarily for a personal, 
family, household, or agricultural purpose, 
but for use in a stone-cutting business. 
The Comment of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws suggests the purposes for 
which § 70B-3-602, defining a consumer-
related loan, was drafted: 
Many relatively small credit transactions 
with individuals do not fall within the 
general provisions of the act because the 
purpose of the transaction is not person-
al, family, household, or agricultural. 
However, a debtor in a small transaction 
for a business purpose may need some 
protection in credit transactions. There-
fore, Part 6 of this Article extends a 
measure of protection over a special cate-
7. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Ihith, Utah, 664 P.2d 
455 (1983). 
8. Comment of Commissioners on Uniform State-
Laws. 
9. See, e.g., Burke v. Boulder Milling & Elevator 
Co., 11 Colo. 230, 235 P. 574, 575 (1925). 
gory of relatively small loans defined as 
consumer related loans. The principal 
transactions covered are (1) a loan by a 
lender not regularly engaged in making 
similar loans, (2) a loan to an individual 
for a business purpose, and (3) a loan to 
an organization 
[61 Accordingly, the first thing to be 
determined is whether this transaction con-
stitutes a loan. U.C.A, 1953, § 70B-3-106 
defines "loan" as including: "(1) the cre-
ation of debt by the lender's payment of or 
agreement to pay money to the debtor or to 
a third party for the account of the debtor 
.. " Thus, a loan is made when a credi-
tor creates debt by advancing money to a 
person on behalf of the debtor.8 
[71 There is no question that both Love-
land and the Bowns understood the pay-
ment of $23,403.76 to MFT to be on behalf 
of the Bowns. Both parties testified that 
the payment was to be paid to MFT to 
rescue the Bowns from the foreclosure ac-
tion. 
The question thus remains whether the 
payment to MFT by Loveland on behalf of 
the Bowns creates debt. "Debt" has been 
defined variously, but generally it is an 
obligation to pay a fixed and certain sum of 
money.9 
The Bowns owed a debt of $23,403.76 to 
MFT Leasing. As a result of his $23,-
403.76 payment to MFT, Loveland received 
an assignment of MFT's interest as lessor 
of the bulldozer and assignment of the 
trust deed. Thus the sum certain debt 
owed by the Bowns to MFT became a sum 
certain debt owed by the Bowns to Love-
land. 
Further, both parties understood that if 
Loveland advanced the $23,403.76 to MFT, 
the Bowns would owe Loveland approxi-
mately double that amount.10 Therefore, a 
10. This type of transaction is exactly the type of 
transaction that the Utah Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code and § 70B-3-602 were enacted to 
cover: a small businessman, needing credit, and 
subject to usurious demands by a lender if not 
given some protection. See also U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 70B-1-102, Purposes—Rules of Construction. 
BOWN v. LOVELAND 
Cite as 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984) 
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fixed and certain sum of money was due 
and owing by the Bowns to Loveland and a 
debt was created. 
Finally, Loveland, while disclaiming cre-
ation of a debt, contends that the warranty 
deed executed on his behalf was intended 
as payment of the debt secured by the 
trust deed. While we reject this conten-
tion, infra, the point to be made here is 
that payment of a debt does not make the 
fact that there was a debt disappear. 
This transaction was clearly a consumer-
related loan. Therefore, under the provi-
sions of 70B-3-604(l), default charges in 
this case are limited to: "(a) reasonable 
attorney's fees and reasonable expenses in-
curred in realizing on a security interest; 
(b) deferral charges not in excess of 18 per 
cent per year of the amount deferred for 
the period of deferral; and (c) other 
charges that could have been made had the 
loan been a consumer loan." 
[8] Section 70B-3-604(2) provides that, 
with respect to consumer-related loans, the 
parties may not contract for default 
charges in excess of those provided in the 
Act. Therefore, the parties' apparent oral 
understanding that Loveland was to double 
his money in return for the loan has no 
validity as a contract and the provisions of 
§ 70B-3-604(l) govern. 
III. 
Loveland also contends that the trial 
court erred in finding that the warranty 
deed executed by the Bowns to Loveland 
was a mortgage intended as security for 
the >'»an. 
[9,10] This aspect of the case is essen-
tially one in equity since the Bowns, in 
asking the court to give the warranty deed 
and option to repurchase the effect of a 
11. Willard M. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, Utah, 580 
P.2d607 (1978). 
12. W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources 
Co., Utah, 627 P.2d 56 (1981); see also Kjar v. 
Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972); 
Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utali 445, 25 l\2d 940 
(1933). 
13. Sohio, supra note 12. 
mortgage, are seeking equity.11 It has 
long been recognized that a deed, absolute 
in form, may be construed as a mortgage if 
it is intended as security under a parol 
agreement rather than an outright convey-
ance.12 Parol evidence is admissible to 
show the purpose and intent of parties to a 
deed.13 The burden of proof is on the 
party claiming a mortgage, here the 
Bowns, to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the conveyance was intended 
as a mortgage.14 
[11] Some of the elements to be con-
sidered in determining whether an absolute 
deed is intended as a mortgage include: 
Whether or not there was a continuing 
obligation on the part of the grantor to 
pay the debt or meet the obligation which 
it is claimed the deed was made to se-
cure; the question of relative values; the 
contemporaneous and subsequent acts; 
the declarations and admissions of the 
parties; the form of the written evi-
dences of the transactions; the nature 
and character of the testimony relied on; 
the various business, social, or other rela-
tionship of the parties; and the apparent 
aims and purposes to be accomplished.15 
[12] The standard of appellate review 
of findings in equity cases, even where the 
level of proof in the trial court is "clear and 
convincing evidence," is the "clearly pre-
ponderates standard." 1H Under that stan-
dard, after reviewing the evidence in this 
case in light of the elements set forth, we 
are unable to conclude that it clearly pre-
ponderates against the finding of the dis-
trict court on this issue. 
[13] For example, the evidence reveals 
that, first, the property covered by the 
warranty deed was appraised for over 
14. Baker v. Taggart, Utah, 628 P.2d 1283 (1981). 
15. Hansen v. Kohler, Utah, 550 P.2d 186, 188 
(1976). See also Baker, supra note 14; Cox, 
supra note 11. 
16. Abbott v. Oiristensen, Utah, 660 P.2d 254, 257 
(1983). 
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$100,000. Therefore, the payment of $&*,-
403.76 appears to be inadequate considera-
tion to support a sale thereof. Second, 
both parties understood that there was a 
continuing obligation on the part of the 
Bowns to pay Loveland double his invest-
ment. Third, both written and oral evi-
dence indicated that both Loveland and the 
Bowns* operated under the assumption that 
if there was a sale of the property, Love-
land was entitled to only double the $213,-
403.76 plus expenses. The remainder be-
longed to the Bowns. Fourth, the Bowns' 
son and his family continued to live on and 
use the property rent-free after transfer of 
the warranty deed. All of this evidence 
points to the intent of the parties that the 
warranty deed was intended to be a mort-
gage. 
No useful purpose would be served by 
further analysis of the evidence as it re-
lates to the intention of the parties at the 
time the deed was executed and delivered. 
Suffice it to say that the Court remains 
unpersuaded that the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates against the finding of the trial 
court that the warranty deed was intended 
as a mortgage. Having so concluded, we 
do not reach the issue of whether the trans-
action was unconscionable. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed except that its order of reformation 
of the deed is vacated and set aside. No 
costs awarded. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
Jo £ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Elwood K. McFARLAND, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 18352. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 1, 1984. 
Store customer, mistakenly stopped on 
shoplifting charges, brought false arrest 
charges against store seeking $10,000 in 
compensatory and $50,000 in punitive dam-
ages. The Second District Court, Weber 
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered judg-
ment on jury verdict awarding customer 
$10,000 in general damages and $25,000 in 
punitive damages, and store appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) act 
of releasing customer without first taking 
him before magistrate did not itself consti-
tute abuse of privilege to arrest and did not 
give rise to liability for false imprisonment; 
(2) arrest was not justified upon pri\ lege 
of private citizens to make citizen's arrest 
of one who has committed assault; and (3) 
appropriate standard for determining avail-
ability of punitive damages award in action 
for false imprisonment is that of malice in 
fact or actual malice, and not malice in law. 
Affirmed in part, remanded in part. 
1. False Imprisonment G=>2 
Where store customer merely got up 
and left when told he was free to do so 
after being stopped on shoplifting charges, 
customer consented to be released from 
store's custody; thus, act of releasing cus-
tomer without first taking him before mag-
istrate did not itself constitute abuse of 
privilege of arrest and did not give rise to 
liability for false imprisonment. 
2. Arrest <S=>68(1) 
To be lawful, arrest must be effected 
in accordance with statutory dictates. 
disappeared in 1934, 
that there never was such a fence within the 
time of her earliest recollections. 
[2] As previously noted the city has 
shown no title to 21st East Street where it 
adjoins plaintiffs' property. Its only valid 
claim thereto is based on plaintiffs' failure 
to establish their title to the disputed strip 
or on prescription or adverse user. In view 
of these facts, although the court as we have 
held, erred in quieting the plaintiffs' title to 
the part of the disputed strip east of the 
fence line on the east side of the row of 
large trees, this does not apply to the part 
of this strip west of that fence line. As to 
the west part of this strip the evidence is 
clear that plaintiffs and their predecessors 
have possessed, occupied and used it ad-
versely to all the world, including the city, 
under claim of right, and had it enclosed by 
a substantial fence and have paid all the 
taxes assessed against it for more than 20 
years. There is no evidence that the city 
has ever possessed or used it either for a 
right of way or otherwise, or held any valid 
claims thereto. Thus plaintiffs have estab-
lished their ownership to this strip by ad-
verse user for more than 7 years immediate-
ly preceding the commencement of this ac-
tion. 
[3-5] Although Section 78-12-13, U.C 
A.1953, prohibits a person from acquiring 
"any right or title in or to any lands held 
by any" city designated for use as a street, 
it has no application to this case, for the city 
has completely failed to show that this land 
is now or ever has been "held" by the city, 
as that term is used in this statute. In order 
for the city to hold property under the above 
statute, it must have some semblance of ti-
tle, possession or the right to the use there-
of. It is not sufficient to establish a holding 
by the city for the city engineers to make a 
survey of the property and destroy a fence 
which serves as a boundary line between the 
street and adjoining property and verbally 
assert that the city is the owner of such 
property. That is about the extent of the 
hohi rig" by the city of this property. 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed as to the land lying east of the east 
BTJEHNER BLOCK COMPANY v. GLEZOS Utah 5 1 7 
Citeas310P.2d517 
Mrs Savage testified side of the fence with directions that the 
trial court take evidence and determine the 
location where the east side of that fence 
was. In all other respects the trial court's 
judgment is affirmed. 
Each side shall bear its own costs. 
MCDONOUGH, C. jr., and CROCKETT, 
WORTHEN and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
6 Utah 2d 226 
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY, a corpora-
tlon, and South State Builders Supply 
Company, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Nick GLEZOS, Harry Hong, Charles C. Mc-
Dermond, Copa Supper Club, a corpora-
tion, and Valley Amusement Enterprises, 
Inc., a corporation, Defendants, 
Harry Hong, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 8591. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 20, 1057. 
Action brought by materialmen against 
lessor, lessee, and alleged partner of lessee 
in operation of club in building built on 
leased premises with materials furnished 
by plaintiffs. The Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Ray Van Cott, 
Jr., J., entered a judgment holding the les-
see and the third defendant liable for cost 
of improvements and foreclosing mechan-
ics' liens on leasehold, and the lessee ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., 
held that evidence would support finding 
that lessee had held himself out as a part-
ner of third defendant in operation of club. 
Affirmed. 
I. Judgment C=a25l(l) 
In applying rule providing, in essence, 
that even though issues are not raised by 
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pleadings, if they arc tried by express or 
implied consent of parties, final judgment 
can be rendered on such issues, adverse 
party should be given benefit of every 
doubt, and he must not have been misled 
or in any way prejudiced by introduction 
of new issues. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rules 15(b), 54(c).1 
2. Courts £=85(2) 
If an issue is to be tried and a party's 
rights concluded with respect tlurcto, he 
must have notice thereof and an oppor-
tunity to meet it. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rules 15(b), 54(c).2 
3. Judgment <3=>251(0 
Where partnership issue was raised 
(hiring trial without objection on defend-
ant's part, and both sides went into facts 
as to whether a partnership was shown, 
and there was no indication that defendant 
was surprised or misled by introduction of 
such issue, fact that issue had not been 
formally raised by pleadings or by motion 
to amend did not vitiate finding on such 
issue. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 15 
(b), 54(c). 
4. Appeal and Error C=>93l(!) 
Appellate court would have to rewew 
evidence, and every inference and intend-
ment fairly arising therefrom, in light most 
favorable to party prevailing below J 
5. Partnership C=>34 
One who has, by words or conduct, 
represented himself, or consented to anoth-
er's representing him, to be partner is liable 
to those who have on faith thereof ad-
vanced materials, money or credit to pait-
nership; and this is so even though, as be-
tween them, no real partnership exists. U. 
C.A.1953, 48-1-13. 
6. Partnership <S=>56 
In action brought by materialmen 
against lessor, lessee, and alleged partner 
1. Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 54.", 230 P. 
2d 451. 
2. National Farmers Union Property & 
Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 240. 
3. Toomer's Estate v. Union Pae. Ry. Co., 
of lessee in operation of club in building' 
built on leased premises with materials fur-
nished by plaintiffs, evidence would support 
finding that lessee had held himself out as 
a partner of third defendant in operation of 
club. 
7. Mechanics' Liens C=>58, 191 
A lessee is an "owner," within mean-
ing of mechanics' Hen statutes, and his 
interest is subject to hen for improvements 
made under contract with him. 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Owner". 
8. Mechanics' Liens O I 9 I 
Lien for improvements made under 
contract with kssee may attach to, ; d bt 
enforced against, his leasehold interest, for 
labor or materials furnished under express 
or implied contract with lessee.4 
9. Mechanics' Liens C=af34 
When statutory requirements as to 
contents of notice of lien are met, it is not 
essential to validity of mechanics' lien that 
names of others whose interests might be 
affected thereby be stated. U.C.A.1953, 38-
1-3, 38-1-7. 
Gcoigc II*. Searle, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Dean E. Condcr, Delbert M. Draper, Jr., 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Defendant, Harry Hong, appeals from 
a judgment holding him liable, as a partner, 
for the cost of improvements on a build-
ing leased to him, and foreclosing mechan-
ics' liens on his leasehold. He contends that 
the finding of partnership is in error: (1) 
that the issue of partnership was not raised 
121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163; Nasner v. 
F. G. Burton Co., 2 Utah 2d 236, 272 P. 
2d 1G3. 
4. Ellis v. Brisacher, 8 Utah 108, 20 P. 
870; Ecclcs Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 
Utah 211, S7 P. 713. 
BUEHNEB BLOCK ( 
Cite as 31 
by the pleadings, and (2) that such finding 
]$ not supported by the evidence. He also 
contends that the mechanics' liens cannot 
be foreclosed against his leasehold interest. 
Defendant Nick Glezos is the owner of 
a cafe located at 3793 South State Street 
in Salt Lake City. On December 1, 1953, 
he leased it to defendant Harry Hong for 
a period of six years at a monthly rental of 
$250. Hong operated on the premises a 
cafe known as The Golden Pheasant. Dur-
ing the year 1954 Hong was approached by 
defendant C C. McDermond, who was de-
sirous of taking over the premises and 
buying Hong's interest, when and if he 
could raise the money. Hong introduced 
McDermond to Glezos, the owner, who 
thereafter gave McDermond and I long per-
mission to build an addition to the building, 
such addition to be used as a private club. 
Hong told Glezos that he intended to be-
come a partner with McDermond in the 
operation of the club, and he later told 
others that he was in fact a partner with 
McDermond and others in the building 
project. Materials for the construction of 
the new addition were furnished by plain-
tiffs Buehner Block and South State Build-
ers' Supply at the instance of McDermond. 
^ A t the time the materials were ordered 
there was some concern on the part of 
plaintiff Buehner Block Company as to 
exactly who would pay for them. When 
its credit manager questioned McDermond 
on this point he referred him to Hong who 
told the credit manager that he (Hong) 
would pay for the materials after he got 
the money from McDermond. I long was 
in possession of the premises; was present 
during parts of the construction and was 
aware of the delivery and use of the ma-
terials from these plaintiffs. In fact, the 
prooi shows that he paid for parts of the 
construction with his own money. From the 
time construction was completed in Novem-
ber, 1954, until November, 1955, Hong re-
ceived $250 per month rent from operations 
of the new club. At this time he and 
>MPANY v. GLEZOS Utah 5 1 9 
P.2d 517 
Glezos, by mutual agreement, terminated 
their original lease, initiating a new one 
by which Hong leased only the old part 
of the building. 
Meanwhile the plaintiffs, Buehner Block 
Company and South State Builders' Supply 
Company had been making unsuccessful 
attempts to collect for the materials fur-
nished and had each filed notice of lien on 
the premises. They separately commenced 
actions against I long, Glezos and McDer-
mond seeking: (1) To foreclose the liens 
against the property, and (2) to hold each 
defendant liable for the materials. The 
two causes were joined for trial. The ac-
tions were dismissed as to Glezos. De-
fault judgments were taken against Mc-
Dermond. After a trial the court found 
that I long was a partner of McDermond 
in the building project and entered judg-
ment against him for the value of the 
materials furnished, and foreclosed the 
liens against his leasehold. 
[1-3] Dnecting attention to the claimed 
error in finding partnership liability when 
such issue was not raised in the pleadings: 
Rule 15(b) and Rule 54(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure bear upon this 
problem. They provide in essence that even 
though issues are not raised by the plead-
ings, if they are tried by express or im-
plied consent of the parties, a final judg-
ment can be rendered on such issues. But, 
as this court has held on prior occasions, 
the adverse party should be given the bene-
fit of every doubt. He must not have been 
misled nor in any way prejudiced by the 
introduction of the new issues.1 As we 
recently declared: 
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts 
to eliminate technicalities and liberalize 
procedure, we must not lose sight of I 
the cardinal principle that under our 
system of justice, if an issue is to be 
tried and a party's rights concluded 
with respect thereto, he must have no-
tice thereof and an opportunity to meet 
it."2 
t. Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 515, 2VA\ P. 2. National Fanners Union Property & 
2d 451, 26 A.L.B.2d 947. Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
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There is no indication in the instant ca*e 
that the defendant wis surprised or mi Jed 
by the introduction of the partnership is-
sue. It was raised during the trial with-
out objection on his part, and both sides 
went into the facts as to whether a part-
nership was shown lUnder such circum-
stances the fact that the issue was not 
formally raised by the pleadings or by mo-
tion to amend does not vitiate a finding 
on such issue 
[4-6] This brings us to the question 
whether the evidence supports the finding 
of partnership. The trial court having 
found in favor of the plaintiffs, we are 
obliged to review the evidence and every 
inference and intendment fairly arising 
therefrom in light most favorable to them 3 
Under the Uniform Partnership Act one 
subjects himself to partnership liability by 
words or conduct representing himself, or 
consenting to another's representing him, to 
anyone as a partner 4 He is liable to those 
who have on the faith thereof advanced 
materials, money or credit to the partner-
ship, and this is so even though as between 
them no real partnership exists5 The facts 
that Mr Hong stated to Glezos and others 
that he was or intended to become a. part-
ner; that when plaintiffs credit manager 
inquired as to who would pay for the ma-
terials, Hong gave him assurance that he 
would pay as soon as he received the money 
from McDermond, that Hong did in fact 
pay for some of the construction costs by 
his own check, and further that he was 
present when the materials were being de-
livered and used in the construction on the 
13, 280 P 2d 249, 253 See also Tiylor v 
E. M Royle Corp, 1 Utah 2d 173, 2G4 
P 2d 279 
3. Toomer'a Estate v Union Pac Ry. 
Co, 121 Utah 37, 239 P 2d 163, Nasner 
v F G Burton Co, 2 Utah 2d 230, 272 
P2d 163 
4. Sec 48-1-13, UCA. 1953. 
5. Gustafson v. Taber, 125 Mont 225, 234 
P 2d 471. 
6. 57 CJ.S Mechanics' Liens § 65(b), p. 
558 
premises where he was operating The8 
Gokkn Pheasant Cafe, all combine to pro* 
vide ample basis for the finding that he 
held himself out as a partner of McDer-
mond in the transaction. 
[7,8] As to defendant's contention that 
the nicdi MILS' liens could not be fore* 
closed agunst his interest, it is well settled 
that a ICSNLC is an owner within the mean* 
in** of the mechanics' hen statutes, and h» 
interest is subject to a hen for improve* 
ments made under a contract with hiffl-
This hen may attach to and be enforced 
agunst his leasehold estate for labor or 
materials furnished under an express of 
implied contract w ith the lessee 7 
[9] A further ass uilt upon the hen by 
Mr Hong is that it was not effective against 
him nor his interest in the property because 
his name was not listed on the notices of 
hen This contention is without merit 
The lien attaches to the property8 All 
the statute requires is that the notice of 
hen contain the name of the owner, u 
known, the person to whom the labor of 
materials was furnished, the terms of the 
contract; the dates when the first and last 
materials were furnished, a description of 
the property, and a statement of the hen* 
or's demand9 When these requirement! 
are met it is not essential to the validity of 
the lien that the names of others whose 
interests might be affected thereby be stat-
ed Indeed in many instances such knowl-
edge might be unavailable to the lienor and 
such requirement could defeat his claim 
of hen The purpose of recordation of the 
notice of hen is to give notice thereof to 
870 See also l>eles Lumber Co T. 
IMiu tin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, Na-
ti »iial C is Co v Ada Iron & Metal 
Co, 185 Okl 115 93 P2d 529; Archi-
bald v Iacopi, 120 Cal App 2d 666, 262 
P2d 40, Horn v Clark Hardware Co> 
54 Colo 522, 131 P. 405, 45 L.R.A-, 
N S, 100. 
8. Sec 3S-1-3, U C A 1953: "Contractors, 
* * * shall have a hen upon the prop-
erty upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or fur-
nished materials * • *." 
7. Ellis v. Bnsacher, 8 Utah 108, 29 P. 9 Sec 3S-1-7, U C A 1953. 
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all persons who may be affected thereby. 
Particularly in this case defendant Hong 
has no basis for complaint on this ground 
because he had actual notice of the entire 
transaction; the facts that the materials 
were delivered and used for construction 
on the premises he was in possession of, 
and the concern plaintiffs had about pay-
ment for their materials. 
Other errors are assigned which we do 
not deem of sufficient importance to war-
rant discussion. 
Affirmed. 
McDONOUGH, C. J., and WADE, 
WORTHEN and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
[ o I KEY mmttR SYSTEM. 
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Flora M. ROBISON, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Pete WILLDEN, a minor, by and through 
his Guardian ad litem Marvel! Willden, 
and Marveil Willden, Defendants and Ap-
pellants. 
No. 8597. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1957. 
Action by automobile passenger for 
personal injuries sustained in collision be-
tween automobile which she was riding and 
vehicle being driven by one of the defend-
ants. The Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, A. H. Ellett, J., entered 
judgment for passenger and defendants ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., 
held that evidence was sufficient to sustain 
finding that defendant driver was guilty of 
negligence for failure to keep a proper 
lookout and to yield right of way to opposite 
direction driver making a left-hand turn at 
I. Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P.: 
243 P.2d 747. 
WILLDEN Utah 521 
P.2d 521 
intersection and that such negligence was 
a proximate cause of the injuries. 
Affirmed. 
Automobiles 0244(11, 36) 
In passenger's action for personal in-
juries sustained in collision between auto-
mobile in which she was riding and vehicle 
being driven in opposite direction upon same 
highway by one of the defendants, evi-
dence sustained finding that defendant driv-
er was negligent in failing to keep a proper 
lookout and to yield right of way to auto-
mobile making a left-hand turn at intersec-
tion and such negligence was the proximate 
cause of injuries.1 
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lants. 
Woodrow D. White, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
WADE, Justice. 
Appeal from a judgment granted by the 
court sitting as the trier of the facts in 
favor of Flora M. Robison, for injuries 
sustained in a collision between an automo-
bile being driven by her husband in which 
she was a guest, and a car owned by Mar-
veil Willden and being driven by her son, 
Pete Willden, defendants below and ap-
pellants herein. 
The question we have to decide is wheth-
er the evidence was insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to sustain the findings that Pete 
Willden was negligent and that such neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of the ac-
cident in which plaintiff's injuries were 
received. 
The record discloses that the accident oc-
curred at the intersection of Fifth East 
Street with Hawthorne Avenue in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Fifth Fast Street is a four-
lane highway running in a northerly and 
southerly direction. Its lanes are separated 
for opposite bound traffic by yellow painted 
double lines in its center. It also has park-
l 777; Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 
310 P.2d—33"& 
8 6 Utah 381 P A C I F I C R E P O R T E R , 2d SERIES 
generally prohibit combinations which at-
tempt to control prices, including the costs 
of professional services. This argument 
was not presented or discussed below, but 
is first urged on appeal. It is generally 
held, and this court has so held, that matters 
not raised in the trial court will not be con-
sidered on appeal.1 The re does not appear 
to be any reason to depart from this rule 
under the facts of the present case. 
[2] Defendants next contend that the 
sales contract provision quoted above which 
automatically provides the realtor with a 
6% commission even though the owners 
themselves sell the property dur ing the 
contract period, is a penalty and unen-
forceable, and that the proper measure of 
liability of defendants to plaintiff is the 
actual value of services rendered by plain-
tiff under the contract . 
In view of defendants ' emphasis on the 
question of penalties and liquidated dam-
ages, it is well to observe at the outset that 
liability sought to be imposed on the seller 
herein is essentially in fulfillment of the 
obligations created by the contract ra ther 
than in the form of liquidated damages 
for the breach thereof. The contract was 
entered into for the purpose of effecting a 
sale of the property, which purpose was 
accomplished. Likewise the contract clear-
ly provided that if the owner made the sale, 
the realtor was to receive the stated com-
mission. 
In Andreason v. Hansen 2 this court sa id : 
" [ I ] t is to be kept firmly in mind, 
that the courts recognize the rights of 
parties freely to contract and are ex-
tremely reluctant to do anything which 
will fail to give full recognition to such 
r ights ." 
Defendants do not a rgue that there wa 
fraud or any other factor which renders tin 
contract void, nor that the seller did no 
unders tand the provision covering the pay-
ment of the commission. Recognizing tin 
importance of the right to contract, ami 
under the circumstances of this case, we 
are reluctant to alter the terms agreed 
upon in the contract . 
Moreover, the type of "exclusive r ight to 
sell" real estate listing involved in this 
action has been universally upheld.3 The 
nature of the real estate business, wherein 
the broker is paid only if a sale is made, 
would seem to make the contract provision 
here in question a reasonable one. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
TTTCNRTOD, C. JM and OROCKb '" ;' 
C A L L I S T E R and W A D E , JJ. , concur. 
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A. H. CHENEY and Harold S. Peterson,. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, and 
Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
W. R. RUCKER and Addle W. Rucker, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 9646. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1003. 
Action by assignee of accounts of cor-
porate broker to recover for broker 's ser-
vices in a r ranging trade of owners ' proper-
ty. The Firs t District Court, Box Elder 
3. Anno., 64 A.L.R. 395, particularly Sec-
tion IV, p. 416; 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 94. 
The following Utah eases support the 
general nile: Frederick May & Co. v. 
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 
(1062); Lewis v. Dahl, 108 Utah 486, 161 
P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040 (101.")). 
1. Ruber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 6 
Utah 2d 15. 305 P.2d 47S (1056); Rnd-
ley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 
465 (1957); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error 
§ 233. 
2. 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1910). 
See also Peek v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 
326 P.2d 7J2 (1958); Ode. v. Parker, 
5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956). 
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County, Lewis Jones, J., rejected claim that 
assignee was entitled to $4,750 as provided 
by earnest money agreement and granted 
him judgment of $3,500 based on a sub-
sequent agreement, and defendants appealed 
and plaintiff cross-appealed. Notice of de-
fendants' appeal was dismissed. The Su-
preme Court, Crockett, J., held that parties 
who have rights under existing contract 
have same power to renegotiate terms or 
waive those rights as they had to make 
the contract and that evidence supported 
finding that subsequent contract which was 
made before any commission had become 
due and while there was uncertainty wheth-
er the trade had developed «uto binding 
transaction was supported by adequate con-
sideration. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, C. J., and Callister, J., dis-
sented. 
1. Brokers <§=a40 
Corporate broker and property owner 
who had entered into earnest money agree-
ment which had not dealt with payment of 
broker's commission but only with percen-
tage to be paid had right to make second 
agreement to set down in writing the method 
of payment. 
2. Brokers C=>40 
Agreement between corporate broker 
and owners on method of payment of prior 
agreed on commission for arrangement of 
trade of realty arose out of and related to 
same transaction as the prior agreement 
and would be viewed as part thereof, and 
no new consideration was necessary to >up-
port the agreement as to method of pay-
ment. 
3. Appeal and Error C=>934(l) 
Judgment was endowed with presump-
tion of validity. 
4. Appeal and Error 0^901 
Party attacking judgment had burden 
t,f afninuthely showing judgment to be m 
error. 
5. Appeal and Error <$=>93l(l) 
Evidence and all inferences that fairly 
and reasonably might be drawn therefrom 
were required to be viewed in light most 
favorable to judgment in non-jury case. 
6. Contracts <§=>236, 256 
Parties who have rights under existing 
contract have same power to renegotiate 
terms or waive those rights as they had to 
make the contract. 
7. Appeal and Error C=>994(3) 
Credibility of testimony was for find-
er of facts. 
8. Brokers C=>85(l) 
In absence of express language making 
payment of $3,500 to broker within partic-
ular time condition to validity of contract 
providing that it superseded any other 
agreement, trial court entertaining action by 
broker's assignee for $4,750 under prior 
agreement properly considered evidence 
relating to background and circumstances 
to determine if agreement to accept $3,500 
was supported by new consideration. 
9. Brokers 086(8 ) 
Evidence supported finding that con-
tract which required owners to pay $3,500 
real estate broker's commission in lump sum 
rather than $4,750 payable by installments 
under previous contract and which was 
made before any commission had become 
due and while there was some uncertainty 
as to whether realty trade, had developed 
into a binding transaction was supported 
by adequate consideration, as claimed by 
owners sued for the $4,750. 
10. Contracts C=>237(2) 
Settlement of dispute provides consid-
eration which will support a contract chang-
ing the terms of a prior contract. 
11. Assignments 0=^73 
Assignee of account of broker could 
ha\e nothing more than assignor had and 
was bound 1>\ any waiver, relinquishment, 
or change which had occurred in broker's 
lights b\ virtue of i \ icutnm of new agree-
ment before assignment. 
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12. Pleading e^87 
Purpose of rule requiring pleading of 
affirmative defenses is to have issues to be 
tried fairly framed. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 8(c). 
13. Courts <S=85(2) 
All the rules of procedure must be 
looked to in light of their fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and 
procedure to end that litigants arc afforded 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have. 
14. Pleading <3»370 
Litigants are entitled to notice of is-
sues raised and opportunity to meet them. 
15. Novation <©=>!! 
Notwithstanding failure to plead sub-
sequent agreement as affirmative defense to 
action on prior agreement and objection to 
evidence on issue of subsequent agreement 
by plaintiff who made no request for con-
tinuance or representation of surprise or 
other disadvantage, permitting defendant to 
raise the issue was not abuse of discretion. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 8(c), 15(b), 
54(c) (1). 
George M. Mason, Brigham City, for de-
fendants and appellants. 
George B Handy, Ogden, for plaintiffs 
and respondents and cross-appellants. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Plaintiff A. H. Cheney, assignee of cer-
tain accounts of Real Estate Exchange, 
Inc., sued to recover for broker's services 
the latter had rendered defendants in ar-
ranging a trade of their motel property for 
a dairy farm. The trial court rejected 
plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to 5% 
on the $95,000 value of the property, to-
talling $4,750, as provided by an earnest 
money agreement, but granted him judg-
I. "Where two or more written instru-
ments are executed as a part of one 
transaction such instruments should, 
when possible, be construed together." 
Strike v. White, 91 Utah 170, 63 P. 
ment for $3,500 based upon a subsequent 
agreement. Defendants' attorney filed a 
notice of appeal, which was later dismissed. 
We are concerned only with plaintiff's 
cross-appeal in which he insists on entitle-
ment to the full $4,750. 
On March 14, 1957, the defendants 
Rucker signed the earnest money agree-
ment which committed them to "pay 5% 
commission on transfer of the property 
* * *." Two days later, March 16, 1957, 
in negotiating with respect to this trans-
action, another contract was signed which 
detailed the manner of payment: that the 
Ruckcrs would execute a note for the major 
portion of the commission, $4,250, payable 
at the rate of $200.00 per month to be 
secured by a chattel mortgage, or by an 
assignment of part of the monthly milk 
check expected from the operation of the 
dairy farm; and that these payments were 
to begin 30 days after the Ruckers took 
possession of the farm. 
[1,2] It wiU be noted that the earnest 
money agreement had not dealt with the 
method of payment, but only with the per-
centage to be paid. The parties certainly 
had the right to make a second agreement, 
as they did, to set down in writing the 
method of payment. This second contract 
arose out of and related to the same trans-
action as the first and would therefore be 
viewed as part of it.1 Under such circum-
stances there is no necessity to be concerned 
with new consideration because it is pro-
vided by the mutual promises of the parties 
in connection with the entire transaction.2 
A little different situation exists with re-
spect to the next contract the parties exe-
cuted, which is the one upon which judg-
ment was granted. On March 30, 1957, two 
weeks after the making of the second con-
tract, but still before there had been anv 
transfer of the property, the Real Estate 
Exchange and defendant W. R. Rucker en-
2d 600 (1936); Freedland v. Greco, 
45 Cal.2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955). 
2. Davis v. City of Okmulgee, 174 Okl. 429, 
50 P.2d 315 (1935). 
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tercd into a third contract relating to the 
commission as follows: 
"This commission agreement super-
sedes and replaces any other agree-
ment whatsoever in regard to the com-
mission that is to be paid on the sale 
of the Shady Lane Motel, home and 
fourplex owned by Mr. W. R. Rucker. 
"We the undersigned Real Estate 
Exchange agree to accept as full pay-
ment and I the undersigned \V. R. 
Rucker agree to pay a cash commission 
of $3,500.00 to said Real Estate Ex-
change. 
"In mutual agreement whereof we 
have signed this agreement this 30 day 
of March 1957. 
"[Signatures]" 
About two months later, Real Estate Ex-
change brought suit to recover the $3,500 
provided for in this third agreement. That 
action was later dismissed without preju-
dice. This account, together with others, 
was assigned to the plaintiff Cheney, who 
brought the instant suit, in which he did 
not limit his claim to the $3,500, but asked 
for the full 5% of the value of the property 
on the basis of the earnest money agree-
ment, amounting to $4,750. 
[3-5] In considering the soundness of 
the trial court's conclusion and judgment 
that the third contract was valid, certain 
cardinal rules must be kept in mind: that 
the judgment is endowed with a presump-
tion of validity; that the party attacking 
it has the burden of affirmatively showing 
that it is in error; and that the evidence 
and all inferences that fairly and reason-
ably may be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to it.3 
[6] It is fundamental that where parties 
have rights under an existing contract they 
3. Charlton v. Haekett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 
3<>Ol\2d 170 (1W1). 
4. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (19(>0). 
5. SOP 1 Am.Jur.2d pp. 344-4ti: also 15 
C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement § 46, 
p. 7G9. 
381 P 2d—6Vi 
have exactly the same power to renegotiate 
terms or to waive such rights as they had 
to make the contract in the first place. As 
stated by Justice Wade for this court in 
Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc . : 4 
"It is a well-established rule of law 
that parties to a .written contract may 
modify, waive, or make new terms 
And this was held to be so notwithstanding 
terms in that contract designed to hamper 
such freedom. (Citing authorities.) 
[7] There may have been some merit 
in plaintiff's contention that he was entitled 
to rescind the third contract and sue on the 
earnest money agreement if the trial court 
had believed that the third contract was 
conditioned upon immediate performance.5 
But there is nothing in the wording of that 
contract expressly so stating; and the trial 
court did not believe Mr. Cheney's testi-
mony to that effect, as was its prerogative.6 
[8,9] In the absence of express lan-
guage in the contract •making the payment 
of the $3,500 within a particular time a con-
dition to its validity, it was entirely proper 
for the trial court to look at the evidence 
relating to the background and circum-
stances to determine what was*intended in 
that regard and whether the agreement to 
accept $3,500 in cash was supported by 
some new consideration, as it concededly 
must be.7 In doing so it could reasonably 
regard the evidence as showing adequate 
consideration and as sustaining the view 
that the parties intended the third contract 
to replace the prior commission agreements. 
[10] This third contract was entered 
into before any commission had become due 
because there had been no "transfer of the 
property" as the earnest money agreement 
required. Further, it is apparent that there 
was at least some uncertainty as to whether 
6. Page v. Federal Security Ins. Co., 8 Utah 
2d 221;, 332 P.2d (i(M» (11)58). 
7. See: Bamberger (1o. v. Certified Pro-
ductions. SS Utah 194. 48 P.2d 489 
(1935>; Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah 
114, GO P.2d 1115 (1936); and 12 Am. 
Jur. p. 988. 
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the t rade of the Ruckcrs ' property to the 
Nielsens had been developed into a binding 
transaction. This was not in fact deter-
mined until disputes between them were re-
solved by the final termination of a lawsuit 
many months later.8 In addition. Real Es-
tate Exchange had agreed to accept the 
broker 's fee in payments of $200.00 per 
month extending over a period of two 
years. They were not to begin until 30 
days after Ruckcrs took possession of the 
dairy farm, which had not occurred. 
In view of those uncertainties, the Real 
Es ta te Exchange could very well have re-
garded this third contract, which gave it 
a definite promise of $3,500 in a lump sum, 
as more desirable than the claims it there-
tofore had. I t certainly must have thought 
so, otherwise i t^would not have entered 
into such a contract . It is also t rue that the 
new agreement bound the Ruckcrs to a dif-
ferent obligation and one which would 
probably be more burdensome to them. 
Thus , there is no difficuky to be encoun-
tered in finding this new contract a benefit 
to the Real Esta te Exchange and a detri-
ment to the defendant. This provides ade-
quate new consideration for this third 
agreement and makes it binding on both.9 
Since this third contract was valid at the 
time it was made, the question which must 
be confronted and answered is t h i s : W h a t 
justification is there for the plaintiff, as-
signee of Real Esta te Exchange, to rescind 
it and go back to the original earnest money 
8. Nielsen v. Itm-ker, 8 Utah 2d 302, 33 
P.2d 1007 (10.10); that settlement of 
dispute provides consideration, see 
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soe. 
of United States, 04 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 
1000 (1037); State for Use and Rene-
fit of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 
et al., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 (1038); 
Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity 
Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75 
P.2d 6f>9 (1038); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 
Utah 489, 39 I\2d 1073 (1035); Gray 
v. Bullen. 50 Utah 270. 1G7 P. 083 
(1017); Smoot v. Chcekwts, 41 Utah 
211, 125 P . 412 (1012). 
9. Williams v. Peterson, NO Utah 520. 40 
P.2d 674 (1035) ; see also: Allen v. Hose 
Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah Gl)\ 237 P. 
agreement? W e think the tr ial court cor-
rectly concluded that there was none. I t 
was not at all unreasonable for it to sup-
pose that if the part ies had intended that 
this third agreement should be valid only 
if the $3,500 was paid immediately, or with-
in some part icular time, they would have 
said so. I t is of especial significance that 
they did not say so ; and that the agree-
ment did not make payment a condition to 
its validity, but plainly indicates that it was 
the "agreement * * * to pay a cash 
commission of $3,500 * * * " which was 
intended to "supersede and replace any 
other agreement whatsoever ." The view 
of the trial court that the Real Es ta te E x -
change accepted this agreement to pay a 
lump sum, ra ther than any requirement of 
immediate payment, in lieu of its prior 
claims, is not unreasonable in the light of 
the evidence, nor is the view that the ac-
ceptance of such an agreement consti tutes 
an accord and satisfaction.1 0 
Tha t the parties intended the new con-
tract to be unconditionally binding upon 
them and to supplant their prior agree-
ments is persuasively supported by the fact 
that the Real Estate Exchange and its at-
torney regarded and treated the new con-
tract as valid when it brought suit for the 
$3,500 based on it. If the unders tanding 
had been that the new agreement was to be 
conditioned upon payment by the Ruckers 
of that amount in cash forthwith or within 
any set time, it is only logical that the Real 
2d 823 (1051); Latimer v. Ilollnday, 
103 Utah 152, 334 P.2d 183 (W4:i); 
Utali Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. 
Nelson, 3S Utah 100, 111 P. 007 (1010). 
10. A distinction is sometimes made be-
tween situations where payment or per-
formance is a condition to the accord 
and satisfaction, and where the new 
promise is accepted as the accord and 
satisfaction. See 1 Am.Jur.2d 1. 347 
and authorities therein cited; see also 
15 C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement 
§ 40. p. 700; Oholson v. Steinhauser, 
21S Or. 532, 315 P.2d 136, 340 P.2d 87 
(1050); and French v. Commercial 
Credit Co., 00 Colo. 447, 64 P.2d 127 
(1030). 
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Estate Exchange would have repudiated the 
new contract because of the failure of pay-
ment, and would have claimed the full 5%, 
or $4,^50, instead of $3,500 as it did. This 
court stated in the case of Jenkins v. Jen-
sen, et al.:11 "Where the language used by 
the parties to a contract is indefinite * * 
the practical construction [given by] the 
parties themselves is entitled to great, if not 
controlling, influence." 
[11] It is elementary that plaintiff 
Cheney, as assignee of Real Estate Ex-
change, could have nothing more than his 
assignor and is bound by any waiver, relin-
lishment or change of its rights which 
had occurred by virtue of its execution of 
the new agreement. 
[12-15] Plaintiff also raises the pro-
cedural point that since defendants did not 
plead the subsequent agreement as an 
affirmative defense, they should not have 
been permitted to rely thereon. It is true, 
as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., 
requires that affirmative defenses be plead-
ed. It is a good rule whose purpose is to 
have the issues to be tried deafly framed. 
But it is not the only rule in the book of 
JPMIPS of Civil Procedure. { Thev must all 
be looked to in the light of their even more 
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both 
pleading and procedure to the end that the 
parties are afforded the privilege of pre-
senting whatever legitimate contentions 
:hey have pertaining to their dispute. 
Kvhat they are entitled to is notice of the 
issues raised and an opportunity to meet 
(•them. When this is accomplished, that is 
ill that is required.12 Our rules provide 
I for liberality to allow examination into and 
settlement of all issues hearing upon the 
I• -nntnrwersy. but safeguard the rights of the 
I other par tyto have a reasonable time to 
•peet a new issue_jf he so requests j R u l e , 
15(b). U.R.C.P., so_staies. It furthJraN 
lows for an amendment to conform to the 
proof after trial or even after judgment, 
11. 24 Utah 10S, 66 P. 773 (3901). 
12. See Taylor v. E. M. Roylo Corporation, 
1 Utah 2d 175, 20i P.2d 279. 
and indicates that if the ends of justice so 
require, ''failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues." This 
idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c) (1), U.R. 
C.P.: "[E]very final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings." 
I Although the plaintiff did object to evi-
dence on the issue of subsequent agreement, 
when it was overruled, he made no request 
for a continuance nor did he make any rep-
resentation to the court that he was taken 
Iby surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage 
[in meeting that issue. [The trial court not 
only did not abuse his discretion in allowing 
the issue to be raised and receiving the con-
tract in evidence, but he would have failed 
the plain mandate of justice had he refused 
to do so. 
Judgment affirmed. No costs awarded. 
McDOXOUGH and WADE, JJ., concur. 
IIENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. There were three writings be-
tween the parties. The first dated March 
14, 1957, was a valid contract, supported by 
consideration; the second, dated March 16, 
1957 had to do with method of payment, 
which could be justified and binding, per-
haps, since it simply implemented the first, 
with respect to mode of payment,—not as 
to the principal obligation. The third in-
strument in writing, dated March 30, 1957, 
purported to reduce the primary obligation 
j by $1,250 if payment were made in cash 
instead of on protracted terms. It was 
loosely drawn, recited no consideration or 
any definite time for payment. Defendants 
did not respond to this or any of the other 
written instruments and refused to recog-
nize either for several alleged reasons, in-
cluding fraud in the inception,—and that 
was their tie tense in Nielsen v. Rucker,1 
—a position we rejected. 
I. 8 Utah 2d u02, 3^3 P.2d 1067 (1D59). 
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A suit was filed based on the third docu-
ment ($3,500), but it was dismissed on mo-
tion of the plaintiff without prejudice, after 
which the present litigation was 'launched 
based on the initial earnest money agree-
ment ($4,750). The $3,500 suit, therefore, 
had a status as though it never had been 
filed. Consequently, it was error to admit 
the file in that case in the instant case, and 
greater error to base the $3,500 judgment 
in the present case on the record in the for-
mer. This is particularly true, since de-
fendants in the principal case, after insist-
ing on and procuring admission of the file 
in the previous case, promptly denied lia-
bility thereunder, or under any other al-
leged contract. Significantly, they did not 
plead that they owed only $3,500. They 
pleaded they owed nothing. 
Logically, it follows that defendants' con-
tention that there was no obligation at all 
should have been the only issue in this case. 
The introduction of the file in the $3,500 
lawsuit should be held to have been in error. 
The only matter left was the contention of 
the cross-appeal for $4,750 on the only 
clear, consideration-supported document ex-
tant in this case. 
The defendants appealed the $3,500 judg-
ment and then moved to dismiss their ap-
peal. At that juncture, had there been no 
cross-appeal, the $3,500 judgment would 
have been affirmed. There was nothing 
then left for this court to determine save 
the merits of the cross-appeal based on the 
record, which clearly reflects a promise to 
pay $4,750, without any refutation by de-
fendants, except by an abortive claim of 
fraud, which we negated in Nielsen v. 
Rucker, supra. 
The main opinion talks of the $3,500 
"agreement" and surmises that there must 
have been consideration therefor, else the 
parties would not have signed it. The con-
sideration is supplied by this court through 
conjecture and not by any showing in trie-
record of any quid pro quo. Assuming 
there may have been some question as to 
consideration, it would have nothing to do 
with the erroneous admission into evidence 
at defendants' behest of an alleged $3,500' 
agreement which defendants themselves 
claimed to be void. Some other conclusion 
could have maintained, perhaps, if defend-
ants had taken the position that the $3,500' 
document was binding to the exclusion of 
that for $4,750. But they didn't. 
The main opinion talks about an accord 
and satisfaction. This is untenable, since-
both parties claimed there was no such: 
settlement or agreement. The court pre-
sumed to make such an agreement for them 
over their mutual rejection of such a 
theory. Besides, under the Rules an accord 
and satisfaction must be pleaded as an 
affirmative defense,2 which was not plead-
ed, but which was rejected by an untenable 
defense of fraud that allegedly vitiated not 
only the $3,500 claim but the two others. 
Furthermore, assuming that there might 
be a question as to the efficacy of the $3,500 
document, the only possible conclusion 
would be that payment should have been 
made within a reasonable time. Defend-
ants made no offer to comply for 5 years, or 
at all, which would point up the invalidity 
of any such contract, which strangely 
enough both parties emphatically claimed to 
be invalid and unenforceable. 
This case should be remanded with in-
struction to enter judgment for plaintiff 
for $4,750, with interest. 
CALLTSTER, J., concurs in the dis-
senting opinion of HENRIOD, C. J. 
2. Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Pornography has been and can be suc-
cessfully prosecuted by conduct which com-
ports with traditionally established rules 
and under properly drawn ordinances and 
statutes, but aversion to pornography must 
not become an instrument to mar our legal 
system's commitment to a fair trial. 
In many trials, civil and criminal, the 
controversy involves distress, dishonesty, 
brutality, filth, violence—involves indeed all 
types of ugly and unpleasant matters. Hut 
our system's commitment does not permit 
imposition of sanctions against even the 
"hated and despicable" without observing 
the proper legal processes and standards. 
And I do not think that our legal system, 
which requires these standards, promotes 
technical nonsense or results in vast futility. 
It rather aids and solves—in this imperfect 
world—more than it hinders or fails. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
FILLMORE CITY, a Municipal Corpora-
tion, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Thomas A. REEVE and A Ida E. Reeve, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 14697. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 31, 1977. 
City brought action against landowners 
to abate and enjoin an alleged nuisance 
created by keeping of livestock on premises 
at edge of and partly within city where 
zoning was for residential purposes only. A 
preliminary injunction was issued pursuant 
to which owner sold livestock. The Fifth 
District Court, Millard County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., entered judgment in favor of 
landowners and the city appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Crockett, J., held that: (1) 
there was evidence to support findings that 
landowners had established a valid noncon-
forming use, had not kept animals in excess 
of such nonconforming use and there was 
no public nuisance; (2) city was not preju-
diced under circumstances by failure of 
landowners to file a motion or counterclaim 
for damages after dissolution of prelimi-
nary injunction, and (3) trial court did not 
err in permitting expert to testify as to 
damages suffered by landowners in forced 
sale of livestock. 
Affirmed. 
1. Zoning c=»78b\ 788 
Where violation of zoning ordinance is 
shown, burden of proof is on violator to 
prove by preponderance of evidence a 
preexisting nonconforming use, but when 
the nonconforming use is established then 
burden of proof is reversed and is on 
government to prove that landowner violat-
ed zoning ordinance by exceeding his estab-
lished nonconforming use. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=»931(l) 
Where evidence is in conflict, Supreme 
Court assumes that trial court believed 
those aspects of evidence that support his 
findings. 
:t. Zoning c=>788 
In action by city to abate and enjoin an 
alleged nuisance created by landowners in 
keeping pigs, cattle and horses on premises 
at ad^e of and partly within city limits 
where zoning was for residential use only, 
there was evidence to support findings that 
landowners had established a nonconform-
ing use entitling them to keep livestock on 
premises, that the animals were not kept in 
excess of any nonconforming use and there 
was no public nuisance. 
4. Injunction c=»241 
Rule relating to posting of security as 
condition to issuance of restraining order or 
preliminary injunction eliminates necessity 
of independent action by aggrieved party to 
recover damages upon dissolution of injunc-
tion by providing that liability on surety 
bond may be enforced on motion, this does 
FILLMORE CITY v. REEVE 
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not normally eliminate necessity of giving CROCKETT, Justice: 
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adverse party some notice and opportunity 
to meet that issue by filing a motion or 
counterclaim for such relief. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 65A(c). 
5. Appeal and Error c=> 204(2) 
Where city, seeking to abate nuisance, 
stipulated that a $6,000 bond would be filed 
by city to indemnify landowners for any 
damages which would inure to them be-
cause of removal of livestock under prelimi-
nary injunction, city was not prejudiced by 
failure of landowners, found to have a valid 
nonconforming use, to file a motion or 
counterclaim for damages after dissolution 
of preliminary injunction after which evi-
dence was introduced, without objection, as 
to damages to landowners because of a 
forced sale of livestock, and city was pre-
cluded from claiming error in this regard. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 65A(c). 
6. Evidence c=>536, 546 
If witness has specialized knowledge in 
field to extent that his testimony can be 
helpful to jury on matters with which they 
personally are not familiar, his testimony 
may be received as an expert, and whether 
he is so qualified rests within sound discre-
tion of trial court. 
7. Evidence c=»548 
Trial court did not err in permitting a 
qualified expert in the raising and manage-
ment of livestock, to testify as to losses 
suffered by landowners, compelled to make 
a forced sale of livestock pursuant to pre-
liminary injunction obtained by city in ac-
tion to abate nuisance, notwithstanding 
claim that such witness did not have first-
hand knowledge of landowners' operation. 
Fillmore City brought this action to abate 
and enjoin an alleged nuisance created by 
the defendants in keeping pigs and cattle 
and horses on premises at the edge of and 
partly within its city limits where the zon-
ing was only for residential use. Defend-
ants denied the charge of nuisance and af-
firmatively alleged a right to keep livestock 
on the premises because of a prior estab-
lished non-conforming use, which was ex-
pressly exempted by the zoning ordinance.1 
On November 11, 1974, at a hearing on an 
order to show cause why a preliminary in-
junction should not be issued, the parties 
entered into stipulations that if injunctive 
relief was granted and if the defendants' 
claim of non-conforming use was later 
found to be valid, the defendants would be 
entitled to damages resulting from their 
compliance with the order. They further 
stipulated that a $6,000 bond would be filed 
by the plaintiff to indemnify the defend-
ants for any damages that would inure to 
them because of the removal of their live-
stock.2 In consequence of the foregoing, 
the court made an order that the defend-
ants remove their livestock from the prem-
ises within fifteen days. The defendants 
complied and sold their stock, partly by 
private sale and partly through the Delta 
Livestock Auction. 
Dexter L. Anderson, Fillmore 
tiff and appellant. 
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for defendants 
and respondents. 
At the trial on March 3-4, 1975, evidence 
was presented that dating back twenty 
years or more the defendants (or others, 
including their lessees) had kept varying 
numbers of pigs, sheep, cattle and horses on 
tiu premises. From those facts the court 
concluded that the defendants had estab-
lor plain- lushed the claimed non-conforming use. 
Further, on the basis of the evidence, in-
cluding that there was nothing abnormally 
filthv or offensive about the manner of 
1. The zoning ordinances in question became 
effective January 5, 1972 Section 4 200 pro 
vides* "Except as hetemattet specified, anv IIM1 
lawfully existing at the time ul enact 
Tnent of this ordinance may be continued even 
though such use does not contoim 
with the pioMsious ot this oidinance for the 
distuct in which it is located." 
2. Lvin though Rule (35A(c), U R.C P , provides 
that no secuntv is required of a subdivision of 
the state, plaintiff City so stipulated. 
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keeping the livestock, the court also ruled 
against the plaintiff on its contention of 
public nuisance. 
The court having thus found the issues in 
favor of the defendants as to the keeping of 
the livestock, proceeded to hear e\ idence a> 
to the damages suffered by the defendants 
because they had had to sell their stock in a 
hurry at forced sale and upon a depressed 
market, rather than to U\\HH\ them out" and 
sell them when they were in a finished 
condition and upon a more favorable mar-
ket. Upon the basis of the testimony of a 
Mr. Don Evans, who qualified as an expert 
in the raising and management of livestock, 
and who testified to the losses thus suffered 
by the defendants, the trial court computed 
their loss, plus interest thereon to the time 
of judgment, totaling the $2,470 he award-
ed to them. 
This appeal is by the plaintiff, Fillmore 
City. In attacking the judgment it argues 
that the trial court erred 
(1) in finding that the defendant had es-
tablished a non-conforming use; and in re-
fusing to find that it had kept animals in 
excess of any such non-conforming use; 
(2) in failing to find that there uas a 
public nuisance; 
(3) awarding damages when the defend-
ants had failed to plead or counterclaim 
therefor; and 
(4) awarding damages without an> foun-
dation in competent evidence. 
[1] As to (1) above: we agree that 
where the violation of a zoning ordinance is 
shown, the burden of proof is on the violat-
or to prove by preponderance of the evi-
dence a pre-existing non-conforming use. 
However, when the non-conforming use is 
established, the burden of proof is reversed. 
It is then on the city to prove that the 
defendant violated the zoning ordinance by 
exceeding his established non-conforming 
use. 
3. First Security Bank v. Wright, Utah, 521 P 2cl 
563 (1974); Hardy v. Hendnckson, 27 Utah 2d 
251, 495 P.2d 28(1972). 
[2^4] With respect to issues (1) and (2), 
\\e follow the standard rule of review, that 
where the evidence is in conflict, we assume 
that the trial court believed those aspects of 
the evidence that support his findings.3 In 
the interest of brevity, we omit any further 
detail of the evidence, but deem it suffi-
cient to say that in applying the rules just 
stated, there is a basis therein to support 
the findings. 
In regard to issue (3) stated above, Rule 
G5A(c) U.R.C.P. states that: 
no restraining order or pre-
liminary injunction shall issue except 
upon the giving of security by the appli-
cant, in such sum as the court deems 
proper, for the payment of such costs and 
damages as may be incurred or suffered 
by any party who is found to have been 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
It is true that in particular circumstances 
this Court has held that upon the dissolu-
tion of an injunction the aggrieved party 
should resort to an independent action to 
recover damages.4 However, that rule 
eliminates the necessity of an independent 
action by further providing that liability on 
the surety bond "may be enforced on mo-
tion without the necessity of an indepen-
d e n t action on the bond."! This of course [ 
does not normally eliminate the necessity of 
giving the adverse party (plaintiff here) 
some notice and an opportunity to meet 
that issue by filing a motion or a counter-
Iclaim for such relief. | 
[5] Although it is true that there was no 
such motion or counterclaim filed, plaintiff 
City has no justifiable cause for complaint 
in this instance for several reasons. The 
first is its own stipulation that if at the 
trial the defendants were found to have a 
non-conforming use they would be entitled 
to damages resulting from the injunction. 
Coupled with this are these important addi-
tional facts j that eyideJiciuinJhe subject of 1 
l i n a g e s was prespnt^d without any objee-J 
{tion from the plaintiff; that its counsel I 
4. Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 101 Utah \ 
118 P 2d 130 (1941). See also City of Wichuj 
v. Krauss, 190 Kan. 635, 378 P.2d 75 (1963); 42 
Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 383. 
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made no representat ion^ the court that_he 
was surprised or put at any disadvantage in 
meeting that issue; andlhaJLhe did not ask-
forjrny ccmt\rumr\c.p for t^af. pnrpnsp. Iln-
der such circumstances the city is now pre-
cluded from claiming error in that regard.5 
STATE of Utah, in the Interest of Ta-
mara SUMMERS and Tina Summers, 
v. 
Beatrice WULFFENSTEIN, Appellant. 
No. 15141. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 2, 1977. 
Paternal grandmother appealed from 
order of the juvenile court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, John Farr Larson, J., which summarily 
dismissed petition by which she sought cus-
tody of her two granddaughters. The Su-
preme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1) 
paternal grandmother was entitled to hear-
ing to determine her fitness as custodian 
for her grandchildren after their mother 
died and parental rights of their father 
were terminated and the children were 
placed in the custody of the Division of 
Family Services, and (2) juvenile court had 
jurisdiction over the petition. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Kllett, C. J., dissented. 
1. Infants c=> 19.3(3) 
Paternal grandmother was entitled to 
hearing to determine her fitness as a custo-
dian for grandchildren after the children's 
mother died and parental rights of the fa-
ther were terminated. 
2. Infants c=»19.1 
One of the attributes of legal custody is 
the right to determine where and with 
whom a child shall live. U.C.A.1953, 55-
10 64(7). 
3. Infants o=>18 
Vesting of legal custody in Division of 
Famih Services is analogous to placing the 
6. Hooper \ General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 
515, 260 P2d 549 (1953); Stagmeyer v. Leath-
am Bros, 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P 2d 279 (1968). 
[6] In regard to issue (4), a distinction 
should be noted between the statement just 
made above: that plaintiff made no objec-
tion to the presentation of evidence relating 
to damages, and the objection it did make 
to the testimony of Mr. Don Evans, on the 
ground of his failure to qualify as an expert 
and his lack of actual knowledge of defend-
ant's premises and keeping of livestock. 
The basic rules are: that if the witness has 
specialized knowledge in the field to the 
extent that his testimony can be helpful to 
the jury on matters with which lay persons 
are not familiar, his testimony can be re-
ceived as an expert;6 and that whether he 
is so qualified rests within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court.7 
[7] In regard to the plain tiff V specific 
objection that Mr. Evans did not have first-
hand knowledge of the defendants' opera-
tion and therefore should not have been 
permitted to testify, that objection is with-
out merit because the expert does not need 
to have any such specific knowledge and he 
did not pretend that he did so. His testimo-
ny was as to matters that would applv to 
any similar situation. 
We have found no prejudicial error and 
'herefore no basis for disturbing the find-
ings and judgment. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WIL-
KINS and HALL, J J , concur. 
5. That this is true, see Taylor \ E M Ro\le 
Corp, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P 2d 279, Cheney \ 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P 2d S6 
7. lamb \ Bangart, Utah, 525 P 2d 602 (1974). 
GIRARD v. 
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In its findings of January 19, 1981, the 
medical panel observed that it had a suspi-
cion that plaintiff was a victim of multiple 
sclerosis and suggested further testing in-
cluding spinal fluid studies to try to resolve 
the question whether the head trauma was 
causally connected to the exacerbated 
symptomatology of multiple sclerosis. 
Subsequently, plaintiff underwent a spi-
nal fluid determination, which showed a 
positive test for multiple sclerosis. This 
information was conveyed to the Commis-
sion by Dr. John P. Barbuto, plaintiff's 
treating neurologist, along with his obser-
vation that: 
[T]rama [sic] has been postulated as 'a 
mechanism to promote multiple sclerosis. 
There are certainly many reports to sug-
gest that trauma will exacerbate multiple 
sclerosis which is already present. How-
ever, the debate regarding the etiology of 
multiple sclerosis has been going on for 
many years and probably will continue 
for years in the future. If we wish to 
avoid the folly of speculation and endless 
discussion of unresolvable issues, I think 
we are left with the following basic ob-
servation: Terry [plaintiff] was well, he 
hit his head on the truck, and he then 
presented with several objective neuro-
logic abnormalities. We are not talking 
about a case of chronic pain syndrome or 
some other subjective problem in this 
case. We are talking about clear cut, 
definable, neurologic function loss. . . . 
[E]ven though I do not understand the 
relationship between the trauma and his 
symptoms, this does not mean that there 
is no relationship. . . . [Plaintiffs] histo-
ry indicated a temporal relationship be-
tween the trauma and the onset of symp-
toms. [Emphasis in original.] 
It thus appears that plaintiff had a preex-
isting condition described as multiple sclero-
sis and that the issue as to whether the 
injury to his head had the effect of exacer-
bating his preexisting condition was square-
ly presented to the Commission but was left 
undetermined. 
Therefore, we remand to the Commission 
for the purpose of resolving whether the 
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injury to plaintiff's head had any causal 
effect upon the exacerbation of his sympto-
matology of multiple sclerosis. Inasmuch 
as the medical panel did not have the bene-
fit of the subsequent determination that 
plaintiff was suffering from a preexisting 
condition of multiple sclerosis, on remand 
the Commission should refer that issue to 
the medical panel for their determination 
and guidance in resolving the issues. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
Salli Smith GIRARD, Plaintiff, Respon-
dent, and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Charles L. APPLEBY, Jr., David E. Wood, 
Don Bjarnson, Catherine R. Appleby, 
Leone E. Wood, Grace Bjarnson, Steven 
Alfred, and Beth Alfred, Defendants, 
Appellants, and Cross-Respondents. 
No. 17662. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 11, 1983. 
Cross appeals were taken from a judg-
ment of the Fifth District Court, Wash-
ington County, Robert F. Owens, J. pro 
tern., which was rendered in an action to 
declare a forfeiture of a lease. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) court 
erred in reopening the case sua sponte for 
purpose of permitting lessor to present evi-
dence in support of a demand for an award 
of attorney fees incurred in enforcing the 
terms of the lease; (2) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying lessor's mo-
tion to amend, which was made the day of 
trial and which proposed to introduce new 
and different causes of action, where lesser 
was unable to state an adequate reason for 
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the untimeliness of the motion and where 
lessees contended that they would be preju-
diced in their defense; and (3) forfeiture of 
lease was waived by lessors' acceptance of 
rental payments following lessees' breach 
notwithstanding a unilateral reservation 
that no waiver of defaults would be grant-
ed unless in writing and signed by all par-
ties concerned. 
Award of attorney fees vacated and set 
aside and judgment affirmed in all other 
respects. 
1. Trial to 66 
It lies within sound discretion of trial 
court to grant a motion to reopen for pur-
pose of taking additional testimony after 
the case has been submitted but prior to 
entry of judgment and court should con-
sider such a motion in light of all the cir-
cumstances and grant or deny it in interest 
of fairness and substantial justice. 
2. Trial <3=>66 
In action to declare a forfeiture of a 
lease, trial court erred in reopening the case 
sua sponte for purpose of permitting lessor 
to present evidence in support of a demand 
for an award of attorney fees incurred in 
enforcing the terms of the lease. 
3. Pleading <3=>310 
While an exhibit may be considered as 
part of the pleadings to clarify or explain 
the same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot 
serve the purpose of supplying necessary 
material averments and the content of the 
exhibit is not to be taken as part of the 
allegations of the pleading itself. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rules 8(a), 10(c). 
4. Pleading «*=> 245(3) 
Rule governing amendment of plead-
ings by leave of court is to be applied with 
less liberality when the amendments are 
proposed during or after trial, rather than 
before trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(a). 
5. Pleading <§=> 236(7) 
In action to declare forfeiture of a 
lease, trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying lessor's motion to amend, which 
was made the day of trial and which pro-
posed to introduce new and different causes 
of action, where lesser wTas unable to state 
an adequate reason for the untimeliness of 
the motion and where lessees contended 
that they would be prejudiced in their de-
fense. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(a). 
6. Landlord and Tenant <s» 112(2) 
Forfeiture of lease was waived by les-
sors' acceptance of rental payments follow-
ing lessees' breach notwithstanding a uni-
lateral reservation that no waiver of de-
faults would be granted unless in writing 
and signed by all parties concerned. 
Michael D. Hughes, St. George, for de-
fendants, appellants, and cross-respondents. 
Ronald B. Boutwell, Hurricane, J. McAr-
thur Wright, John L. Miles, St. George, for 
plaintiff, respondent, and cross-appellant. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. 
Smith, Beth M. Smith and Salli Smith Gir-
ard brought this action to declare forfeiture 
of a lease on the ground that defendant 
lessees had failed to furnish liability insur-
ance coverage as required by the terns of 
the lease. Plaintiffs also sought an injunc-
tion restraining defendants from conduct-
ing a health spa business on the leased 
premises until the required insurance cover-
age was obtained. Defendants stipulated 
that a temporary injunction might issue, 
and they also furnished the required insur-
ance coverage. Subsequently, they stipu-
lated that the temporary injunction might 
be made permanent, and all parties except 
plaintiff Girard further stipulated to the 
dismissal of all issues, and that each of the 
parties should bear their own attorney fees 
and costs. The trial court accepted the 
stipulation and entered its order of partial 
dismissal, and the case proceeded to trial 
with only Girard as party plaintiff. 
On the morning of trial, Girard moved to 
amend the complaint to include causes of 
action for waste and for violations of the 
health and building codes. The court re-
served ruling on the motion, but permitted 
evidence to be presented on those issues. 
GIRARD v. 
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The complaint contained a demand for an 
award of attorney fees incurred in enforc-
ing the terms of the lease agreement, but 
Girard rested her case without presenting 
any evidence in support thereof, and with-
out reserving the issue. 
The case was duly submitted, and in its 
subsequent written findings, conclusions 
and judgment, the court ruled, inter alia, as 
follows: 1) denied the motion to amend the 
complaint, concluding that it was untimely 
and that the proposed amendment com-
prised new and different causes of action; 
2) set aside its prior order of partial dismiss-
al and joined the other plaintiffs as involun-
tary defendants, since all plaintiffs, being 
co-owners, had not agreed on a common 
course of action to waive the alleged forfei-
ture; 3) concluded that defendants had 
breached the insurance covenant of the 
lease, but that the breach was not of suffi-
cient substance as would justify forfeiture, 
and that in any event, all plaintiffs had 
waived the forfeiture by reason of their 
acceptance of rental payments following 
the breach; and 4) determined that plain-
tiffs were entitled to reimbursement for 
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the in-
surance covenant, and ordered proof there-
of by way of affidavits. On the basis of the 
affidavits thereafter submitted, the court 
awarded Girard the sum of $3,487.50 as and 
for attorney fees. 
On this appeal, defendants challenge the 
award of attorney fees, contending that the 
court erred in reopening the case sua sponte 
for the purpose of permitting Girard to 
submit evidence omitted at the time of tri-
al. Girard cross-appeals, contending that 
the court erred in refusing to consider 
waste and health code violations as further 
evidence of breach, and that the court erred 
in c.'nying her motion to amend the com-
plaint at the time of trial, and erred in 
ruling that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture 
by the acceptance of rent. 
1. Lewis v. Porter, Utah, 556 P2d 496 (1976) 
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[1,2] It lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court to grant a motion to 
reopen for the purpose of taking additional 
testimony after the case has been submitted 
but prior to entry of judgment.1 The court 
should consider such a motion in light of all 
the circumstances and grant or deny it in 
the interest of fairness and substantial jus-
tice.2 However, no such discretion is af-
forded the court to reopen the case sua 
sponte. Preservation of the integrity of the 
adversarial system of conducting trials pre-
cludes the court from infringing upon coun-
sel's role of advocacy. Counsel is entitled 
to control the presentation of evidence, and 
should there }>e a failure to present evi-
dence on a claim at issue, it is generally 
viewed as a waiver of the claim.3 
In the instant case, we are not apprised 
of the reason Girard saw fit to rest her case 
without presenting evidence in support of 
her claim for attorney fees. However, even 
if it l>e assumed that it was the result of 
oversight, the interests of justice are not 
enhanced when the court exceeds its role as 
arbiter by reaching out and deciding an 
issue that would otherwise be dead, it not 
having been litigated at the time of trial.4 
Turning now to the merits of the cross-
appeal, Girard concedes that the only claim 
for relief stated in the complaint is the 
failure to furnish evidence of insurance cov-
erage. Nevertheless, she contends that the 
"Notice to Cure Defaults" which was at-
tached to the complaint as an exhibit is 
sufficient to raise the issues of health and 
business code violations and waste. 
|3] Girard relies upon Rule 10(c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, 
inter alia, that an exhibit to a pleading is a 
part thereof for all purposes. However, the 
fact that an exhibit becomes a part of the 
complaint does not satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that a complaint "shall contain (1) a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing 
3. Interiors Contracting Inc v Navalco, Utah, 
648 P2d 1382 (11)82) 
2. Id., citing 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d 
ed.), Sec. 59.04[13] p. 59-37. 4. See Di\on v Stoddard, Utah, 627 P 2d 83 
(1981) 
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that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) 
a demand for judgment for relief he deems 
himself entitled." 
While an exhibit may be considered as a 
part of a pleading to clarify or explain the 
same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot serve 
the purpose of supplying necessary material 
averments, and the content of the exhibit is 
not to be taken as part of the allegations of 
the pleading itself.5 
court exercises its discretion under Rule 
15 to deny the motion to amend. 
[4] Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, permits the amendment of plead-
ings by leave of court, and the rule is to be 
liberally construed so as to further the in-
terests of justice.6 However, the rule is to 
be applied with less liberality when the 
amendments are proposed during or after 
trial, rather than before trial.7 In any 
event, the granting of leave to amend is a 
matter which lies within the broad discre-
tion of the court, and its rulings are not to 
be disturbed in the absence of a showing of 
an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice 
to the complaining party.8 
[5] In the instant case, the motion to 
amend was not made until the day of trial, 
and it proposed to introduce new and dif-
ferent causes of action. Defendants object-
ed to the granting of the motion, contend-
ing they would be prejudiced in their de-
fense, not having been apprised of the new 
claims until the morning of trial. Thereup-
on, the court concluded as follows: 
[T]hat the matter of the other breaches 
was a significant change in the cause of 
action (which consumed most of the trial 
time), that it was not consented to be 
tried by defendant [sic], and that no rea-
son was adduced for not timely moving to 
amend prior to trial. Accordingly, the 
In light of the facts and circumstances of 
this case, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying the motion to amend the 
complaint. Girard's inability to state an 
adequate reason for the untimeliness of the 
motion discloses that this is not a case 
where "justice requires" an amendment 
On the other hand, the disadvantage de-
fendants would face if required to meet the 
new causes of action reveals that the inter-
ests of justice will best be served by the 
court's denial of the motion to amend.9 
[6] We also find no merit in Girard's 
remaining contention that the court erred 
in concluding that the forfeiture had been 
waived by the acceptance of rent. 
The ruling of the trial court follows the 
rule long recognized by this Court that: 
Where by reason of a breach of a condi-
tion, a lease becomes forfeited, the lessor 
is entitled to recover possession. He 
waives that right by the acceptance of 
rent He cannot accept rent, and at the 
same time claim a forfeiture of the 
lease.10 
Nevertheless, Girard contends that her 
acceptance of rent did not constitute a 
waiver because the "Notice to Cure De-
faults" heretofore mentioned contained a 
declaration that: "No waiver of this notice 
or the required thirty (30) days to cure the 
above-mentioned defaults will be granted 
unless in writing and signed by all parties 
concerned." However, her contention is to 
no avail. 
In Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Inter-
mountain Theatres, Inc.,11 the Court con-
5. Hoover Equipment Company v Smith, 198 9. Id 
Kan. 127, 422 P.2d 914 (1967); see also 71 
C.J.S. Pleading § 375(2); 41 AmJur Pleading 
§ 56. 
6. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P 2d 
1045 (1971). 
7. Id. 
8. Johnson v. Bnnkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P 2d 
1132(1936). 
10. Bngham Young Trust Company v Wagener, 
13 Utah 236, 44 P 1030 (1896), cited with 
approval in Woodland Theatres, Inc v. ABC 
Intermountain Theatres, Inc, Utah, 560 P2d 
700 (1977). 
11. Supra n 10, at page 701. 
PHILLIPS v. UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TRUST 
Cite as, 660 P.2d 249 (Utah 1993) 
eluded that such a unilateral reservation Insurance c=>467.11 
avails the lessor nothing.12 
The trial court's award of attorney fees is 
vacated and set aside. In all other respects, 
the judgment is affirmed. Each party to 
bear their own costs. 
Utah 249 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
T. Ray PHILLIPS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TRUST, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 18279. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 11, 1983. 
Retired city employee, who elected to 
cor.tinue coverage under policy providing 
hospital and medical benefits for city em-
ployees, sought to recover benefits for inju-
ries he sustained in a fall while engaged in 
casual hourly work. The Second District 
Court, Weber County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., 
granted summary judgment in favor of the 
employee, and the insurer appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that employ-
ee was entitled to coverage under the poli-
cy, despite clause in the policy excluding 
coverage when workmen's compensation is 
or should be available. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., concurred in the result. 
12. Id, citing with approval 3A Thompson on 
Real Property (1959 Replacement), Sec. 1328, 
p 576, 1976 Supplement, p. 74, which is now to 
Retired city employee, who elected to 
continue coverage under policy providing 
hospital and medical benefits for city em-
ployees, was entitled to coverage for inju-
ries he sustained in a fall while engaged in 
casual hourly work, despite clause in the 
policy excluding coverage when workmen's 
compensation is or should be available. 
Michael T. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and apj>ellant. 
Stephen A. Laker, Ogden, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
Defendant is the underwriter for hospital 
and medical benefits for employees of Utah 
cities and towns. After his retirement 
from Ogden City, plaintiff elected to con-
tinue his coverage, as permitted by the city 
and its underwriter. Thereafter, while en-
gaged in casual hourly employment fixing a 
roof for a private individual, he was injured 
in a fall. Defendant rejected his claim for 
hospital and medical expenses because of 
the following provision in the Master Poli-
cy, which both parties apparently concede 
to be applicable to employees and retired 
employees alike: 
7.1. The benefits described in this certif-
icate do not cover: 
7.1.1. Accidental injury arising out of or 
in the course of any occupation or em-
ployment for remuneration or profit or 
sickness for which the insured employee 
or insured dependent is entitled to bene-
fits under any workmen's compensation 
law, employer's liability law, or similar 
law or for an injury suffered as the result 
of an accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment (i.e., this policy is 
not a substitute for workmen's compensa-
tion). 
On cross-motions for summary judgment in 
this action against the underwriter, the dis-
trict court gave plaintiff judgment for his 
^6,738.62, plus interests and costs, and de-
fendant appealed. 
be tound in the 1981 Replacement, Sec. 1328, p 
585 S6 
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL SALES, INC. v\ LORDS Utah 3 2 1 
Cite as 460 P.2d 321 
CALLISTER, Justice. 
Plaintiff initiated this action against the 
defendants on their written guarantee for 
the prompt payment and performance of 
obligations of Western States Wholesale 
Supply, a corporation, in which defendants 
held the positions of president and vice 
president. 
23 Utah 2d 152 
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL 
SALES, INC., Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
iack E. LORDS, B«th C. Lords and Western 
States Wholesale Supply, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 11470. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 22, 11)60. 
Action on written guarantee for prompt 
payment and performance of obligations of 
corporation in which defendants held posi-
tions of president and vice president. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Merrill C. Faux, T., rendered judgment for 
plaintiff, and defendants appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Callister, J., held that ruling 
that defendants could not inject a wholly 
inconsistent issue they had failed to assert 
and to have included in pretrial order did 
not amount to abuse of discretion where 
issue and evidence defendants sought to 
introduce did not qualify as a changed or 
newly discovered condition and defendants 
failed to show that the exclusion in any 
manner created a manifest injustice. 
Affirmed. 
Trial C=>9(l) 
Ruling that defendants could not inject 
a wholly inconsistent issue they had failed 
to assert and to have included in pretrial 
order did not amount to abuse of discretion 
where issue and evidence defendants sought 
to introduce did not qualify as a changed or 
newly discovered condition and defendants 
failed to show that the exclusion in any 
manner created a manifest injustice. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 16. 
Horace J. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for 
appellants. 
Claron C. Spencer and A. Robert Thur-
man, of Senior & Senior, Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
460 P 2d—21 
Defendants asserted in their answer that 
on or about October 1, 1966, plaintiff, 
through its authorized agent, entered into 
an accord and satisfaction with the defend-
ants, whereby the plaintiff received a re-
turn of its merchandise, which was in pos-
session of defendants and Western, in con-
sideration of the full satisfaction of the in-
debtedness or obligation of the defendants 
to plaintiff. 
The complaint was filed in January of 
1%7 and the answer during March of 1967. 
A pretrial conference was held in March 
of 1%S, with an order dated April 1, 1968. 
At the pretrial conference plaintiff con-
tended that after giving credit for all pay-
ments and merchandise returned, there re-
mained an unpaid balance of $8265.97. De-
fendants continued to assert that there had 
been a full settlement of the account and a 
release from their guarantee by a return of 
the merchandise. The pretrial order per-
mitted the plaintiff to file an amended com-
plaint against the corporation, Western 
States Wholesale Supply; plaintiff subse-
quently obtained a default judgment against 
the defendant corporation. The pretrial 
order listed four issues to be tried in the 
case; with the subsequent default of the 
corporation, there remained one issue: 
" * * * was there an agreement by the 
plaintiff, upon the return of certain mer-
chandise to release the defendants from any 
liability on their guarantee for any balance 
owing to the plaintiff by Western States 
Wholesale Supply." 
The pretrial order further states; 
The foregoing order when entered will 
continl (be subsequent course of the ac-
tion, unless modified at the trial to pre-
\ent manifest injustice. 
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Any desired amendments must he 
moved for in writing" within five days of 
the date of this order. 
The jury trial was held July 9, 196S, at 
which time defense counsel asserted that 
there was another issue. Defendants did 
not make a motion to amend the pretrial 
order hut merely submitted an offer of 
proof. Defendants offcied to piove that on 
November 1, 1965, plaintiff's agent icquest- I 
ed that defendant corpoiation, acting 
through its president, Jack K Lords, exe-
cute certain promissory notes covering the 
indebtedness on an open account. Lords 
inquired what effect the execution of the 
notes would have upon defendants' per-
sonal guarantee of the account. Plain-
tiffs agent responded that the effect would 
be to terminate the guarantee upon any 
indebtedness incurred prior to the execu-
tion of the notes, but the guarantee would 
continue to cover any subsequent indebted-
ness. 
Plaintiffs counsel objected to the inter-
!fectiorT"of this new issue and claimed sur^J. 
[pi isc; he stated that pl.tmtitt was not J_H_C^  
[pared to meet the issue. 
The court luhd th.it theie was nothing m 
the pretrud order about this new issue: 
and, therefore, the trial would be limited to 
a determination of whether an accord and 
satisfaction was effected by the return of 
certain merchandise m October or \ o \ em-
ber of 1966. The trial court rendered judg-
ment on the jury \erdict for plaintiff. De-
fendants appeal and seek a retrial including 
the excluded issue. 
The pretrial ordei controls the issues of 
the case where it is made without ob-
jection and no motion is made to change 
I. Citizens Casualty Company of Now Yoik 
v. Hackett, 17 T'tnh 2d \°>04, .°.(MJ, HO 
P.2d 7(57, 7(tS (KMMJ): also MM« Uulr 
1G, U.R.C.P.; Vtw v. Trail Homo Fire 
Insurant Co.. 1.r> Ctnli 2d 257, 200. .§i!)1 
P.2d 200 (1004) ; :j Moore's l'Ydern! 
Practice (2d Kd.), See. 10, 10, pp. 1KM), 
3131. 
it, unless it is modified at the trial to pre-
vent a manifest injustice. * * * l 
The record in the instanf action does not 
reveal that defendants made a motion to 
amend the pretrial order but merely 
proffered evidence on a matter not in 
issue f This court recently approved the 
exclusion by a trial court of evidence con-
cerning an issue defendant attempted to 
raise during the trial, which had been 
neither trained in the pleadings nor raised 
in the pretrial order 2 _ _ . 
* * * Where objection is made to 
thc evidence on the ground it is outside 
the pretrial order, the court should he 
some what less liberal in amendingJiigLQLL. 
der than they would be if mere pleadings 
were involved, since flTe" pretriafcon-
ferenec is held shortly before trial ancT 
at a tunc when each side should usualK_ 
know wrhat it intends to prove. * * * 3 
In Case v. Abrams,1 the court observed 
that when the issues have been defined in 
the pretrial order, they ought to be adhered 
to m the absence of some good and suf-
ficient reason which must rest iargelv with-
in the discretion of the trial court. The 
court quoted the following as an appmpnate 
guideline: 
* * * "Treatment of the pretrial 
order after entry requires an appropri-
ate balance between firmness to pre-
s e n e the essential integrity of the order, 
and adaptability to meet changed or 
newly discovered conditions or to re-
spond to the special demands of justice. 
In the instant action, the issue and evi-
dence defendants sought to introduce did 
2. Yountrron v. John W. Lloyd Const a -
Hon Co, 22 Utah 2d 207, 210, 4.T0 l\2d 
!>sr> (1000). 
3. 1A Barron and IToltzoff, Federal Prae-
tm» & Procedure, Se<\ 47o, p. sr>l. 
4. ,°>r>2 K2d 103 (C.A. 10th, 100."). 
5. SOP Honorable A. Sherman Chnstenson 
on 'The Pre-Tnai Order," 29 F.U.L). 
REYNOLDS v. MERRILL 
Cite as 460 I \2d 323 
Utah 323 
not qualify as a changed or newly discover-
ed condition, since they had knowledge of 
these facts from November of 1965. 
Furthermore, defendants have not indicated 
that the exclusion, in any manner, created 
a manifest injustice. It was not an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to rule that 
defendants could not inject a wholly in-
consistent issue they had failed to assert 
and have included in the pretrial order. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed; costs are awarded to plaintiff-re-
spondent. 
CROCKETT, C J., TUCKETT and 
ELLETT, JJ., and JOSEPH E. NELSON, 
District Judge, concur. 
HENRIOD, J., does not participate here-
in . 
O | KEY NVMKft StSTEM> 
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Darrell H. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Charles S. MERRILL, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 11482. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Oct. 22, !<)(>& 
Suit for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of automobile collision. 
Defendant set up as defense release signed 
by plaintiff. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., 
entered summary judgment dismissing com-
plaint, and plaintiff appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Ellett, J., held that plaintiff 
was entitled to have release set aside if 
there was mutual mistake of fact regarding 
injury which actually was in existence but 
which was unknown to both parties when 
release was signed, and that plaintiff was 
entitled to day in court to establish such 
material mistake. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Callister and Henriod, JJ., dissented. 
Release <S=»I6 
Plaintiff was entitled to have release 
set aside if mutual mistake of fact existed 
regarding injury which actually was in 
existence but which was unknown to both 
plaintiff and insurance adjuster at time 
release was signed. 
Wilford A. Beesley, Orval C. Harrison, 
Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent. 
ELLETT, Justice: 
This is an action to recover for personal 
injuries and property damages arising out 
of a collision between cars driven by the 
parties hereto. The accident occurred on 
Friday, June 3, 1966, when the defendant's 
automobile ran into the rear of the plain-
tiff's Volkswagen. Immediately after 
getting home, the plaintiff called his physi-
cian, who prescribed conservative treat-
ment, and made an appointment for the 
following Tuesday. For some two and a 
half months thereafter the doctor treated 
the plaintiff for what was diagnosed as a 
recurrence of bursitis. On August 22, 
1066, at the request of the defendant's 
insurance adjuster the doctor signed an 
Attending Physician's Report containing 
the following information: 
(W) Diagnosis and concurrent condi-
tions— 
[Answer] (1) Traumatic bursitis 
of rt. shoulder. 
(2) Traumatic myositis 
posterior neck mus-
cles. 
(IB) Were X-rays taken? [Answer] 
Yes. 
If >es, where? [Answer] Cot-
tonwood Hospital. 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION PROP. & CAS. CO. • . THOMPSON Utah £49 
pellants have not been foreclosed by their 
stipulation, we are of the opinion that 
probably no federal income tax would have 
been assessable to the corporation on a 
sale and distribution by the stockholders.3 
Respondent contends that the defendant 
directors should not be allowed to appeal 
this judgment as it is in effect a consent 
judgment. Believing as we do that there 
is some merit to this contention, we never-
theless refrain from passng upon the point 
in view of the disposition made by us of 
the case. 
Affirmed, with costs to respondents. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
HENRIOD and WADE, JJ., concur. 
Citeas2SGP.2d243 
for new trial and reinstated judgment. In-
surer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that since a timely motion 
had been interposed to set aside order 
granting new trial, court retained jurisdic-
tion to vacate order granting new trial 
and to reinstate original judgment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
sntw) 
4 Utah 2d 7 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION PROPER-
TY AND CASUALTY CO., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Leland J. THOMPSON, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
* No. 8286. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July VI, 1!KM. 
Action by insurer to recover amount 
paid insured on fire policy. Insured coun-
tercJaimed for additional amount allegedly 
due under policy. The First Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Box Elder County, Lewis 
Jones, J., entered judgment for insured on 
complaint and counterclaim, and then, on 
Ins own initiative and without notice to 
parties, entered conditional order for new 
trial unless insured consented to reduction 
ia amount of judgment. Insured moved 
to set aside conditional order and upon 
hearing of such motion, court vacated order 
1. New Trial C^I65 
Where court granted a new trial unless 
insured within 10 days filed consent to re-
duce amount of judgment received in ac-
tion on fire policy, and insured, within 10 
days moved to set aside such order, court 
retained jurisdiction to set aside order for 
new trial and to reinstate original judg-
ment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 6 
(b), 59(d). 
2. New Trial <§=> 163(2) 
An order denying a new trial is final 
in character and operates to terminate trial 
court's jurisdiction for the reason that once 
trial judge has made his decision no fur-
ther modifications can be made, and losing 
party, if he feels impelled to seek further 
redress, must appeal.1 
3. New Trial 0=163(2) 
An order granting a new trial is dif-
ferent in character than an order denying 
one, and the latter terminates the cause, 
while the former operates to vacate the 
judgment and reinstate the case as one un-
disposed of before the court, and over 
which the court retains jurisdiction. 
4. New Trial <^=> 165 
Where trial court made order for new 
trial on his own initiative and without no-
tice to the parties, court had power to set 
aside the order. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rules 7(b), 52(b). 
5. Insurance C=>l 15(1) 
A person having such interest in prop-
erty that he may derive pecuniary benefit 
from property's continued existence or suf-
fer pecuniary loss from its destruction by 
fire has such "substantial economic in-
% Unitod States v. Cumberland Public I. 
Service Co.. 328 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280, 
W I'.K(1. 251. 
236 P.2d—16H 
Luke 
1023. 
v. Colemuu, &> Utah 3S;>, 113 P. 
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terest" within statute as to give him an in-
surable interest which will permit him to 
enforce insurance contract. U.C.A.1953, 
31-19-4. 
See publication Wonfa and Phrasos, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Substantial Economic In-
terest". 
6. Insurance C=>II5(6) 
In action to recover amount paid un-
der fire policy, evidence was sufficient to 
support trial court's finding that insured, 
who had sold building insured but had 
retained right to use building to store 
machinery, had an insurable interest in 
building. U.C.A.1953, 31-19-4. 
7. Courts 085 (2 ) 
Under Rules of Civil Procedure, if an 
issue is to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded with respect thereto, the party 
must have notice thereof and an oppor-
tunity to meet it. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 15(b).2 
8. Judgment €=>305 
In action to recover amount paid on 
fire policy, where insured countcrclaimed 
to recover additional amount under policy, 
where parties stipulated to value of in-
sured structure, but insured testified that 
he was to receive $1,000 additional in sale 
of certain property if such building was 
included in sale, and jury found that value 
of building was $2,000, court properly cor-
rected its order that building was only 
worth $1,000 by restoring jury's finding of 
value. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
15(b), 54(c). 
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Paul Thatcher, Ogden, for respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Company 
sued to recover $2,000 it had paid Leland 
J. Thompson for loss by fire of a frame 
building used to store farm machinery; 
2. Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 
175, 264 P.2d 279; Morris v. Russell, 
Utah, 236 P.2d 451. 
Mr. Thompson counterclaimed for $4,000 
additional for machinery also damaged by 
the fire. The issues of fact were submitted 
to a jury on special interrogatories, ail of 
which were answered favorably to the de-
fendant Thompson and judgment was en-
tered thereon. 
The first matter of concern is one of 
procedure. The trial judge, on his own 
initiative and without notice to the parties, 
entered a conditional order: that a new 
trial be granted unless the defendant, with-
in ten days, filed his consent to reduce 
the amount of $2,000 allowed for the frame 
building to $1,000, which the judge recited 
was the actual value of the building as 
found by him. 
Thompson failed to file a consent to so 
reduce the judgment within the ten days, 
but just before 5 p. m. on the 10th day filed 
a motion to amend the court's finding of 
$1,000 as to the value of the building to 
$2,000, as found by the jury, and to set 
aside the conditional order; at the same 
time of this filing the clerk filed an order 
granting the new trial in accordance with 
instructions previously given him by Judge 
Jones to file it if the consent to reduce the 
judgment did not come in. This motion 
was called up for hearing, and after argu-
ments and filing of briefs, some five months 
later, the court entered its order "vacating 
order for a new trial and reinstating judg-
ment" restoring the original jury finding 
of $2,000 as the value of the building. 
[1] The plaintiff* Farmers Insurance 
challenges this action as improper, insisting 
,that after the trial court made its order 
conditionally granting a new trial it was 
functus officio with respect to the cause and 
had no further authority to vacate such 
order. It reasons that since the court 
would not have had jurisdiction, on its own 
initiative in the absence of a motion, to 
enter an order granting a new trial after 
ten days from the entry of judgment,1 
it likewise could not modify or set aside an 
order for a new trial made within the ten 
day period even though a motion to vacate 
I. Rule 59(d) U.R.C.P., Rule 6(b) U.R. 
C.P. See Barron and Holtzoff, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Vol. 3, page 241. 
NATIONAL PABMEBS UNION PROP. & CAS. CO. v. THOMPSON 
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was also filed within ten days. Defendant's should be as found by the jury, or modified 
position is not well taken. It must be kept 
clearly in mind that there is a significant 
difference between a trial court's attempt to 
enter an order affecting a judgment after 
the lapse of ten days where no motion 
has been filed, and his action thereon where 
a timely motion has been interposed, as was 
the case here. 
[2, 3] Plaintiff refers to Luke v. Cole-
man 2 wherein this court held that an order 
denying a new trial is final in character 
and operates to terminate the trial court's 
jurisdiction for the reason that once the 
trial judge had made his decision no further 
modifications can be made. This is based 
upon the principle, which we recognize as 
sound, that there must be some point where 
litigation terminates and if the losing party 
is so aggrieved that he feels impelled to 
seek further redress it must be to the ap-
pellate court. Indeed, if a judge were al-
lowed to change his decision and in effect 
reverse himself, tenacious litigants and 
lawyers might persist in arguments and 
pressures which would be both interminable 
and intolerable. We recognize some merit, 
however, in defendant's argument that an 
order granting a new trial is different in 
character than an order denying one. The 
latter terminates the cause, while the for-
mer operates to vacate the judgment and 
reinstate the case as one undisposed of be-
fore the court, over which it retains juris-
diction.3 
[4] Focusing attention directly on the 
trial court's action in first changing, then 
restoring, the jury's finding as to the value 
of the building: most of us have need to 
reflect, all too often, that "hindsight" is not 
only more accurate than foresight, but we 
have a lot more of it. It now seems clear 
enough that it would have been wiser for 
the trial judge to have notified the parties 
of his intention, given them an opportunity 
to present their arguments and then made 
&s decision as to whether the judgment 
t 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023. 
j . DeLuca v. Boston Ele\nted Railway 
Company, 312 Mass. 495, 45 N.K.lid 403, 
and Farmers & Merchants National 
Bank of El Porndo v. Wright, OS Kan. 
as he apparently first thought it should be. 
Fortunately for the benefit of "hind-
sight," our Rules of Civil Procedure allow 
some latitude for correction of such sua 
sponte actions by the court by making 
specific provision for their reconsideration 
by him. Rule 7(b), insofar as applicable 
here, provides: 
"* * * any order made without 
notice to the adverse party may be 
vacated or modified without notice by 
the judge who made it, or may be 
vacated or modified on notice/' 
Since the defendant filed a motion to 
set aside the conditional order within ten 
days, and thus before it was to take effect, 
it never became operative. The effect of 
this was to hold it in abeyance until the 
court had an opportunity to pass upon 
the motion. And Rule 7(b) just referred 
to confers express authority upon the judge 
to set aside the order he had made. 
The other aspect of the defendant's mo-
tion which the trial court granted, that of 
amending the judgment back to conform to 
the original finding of the jury, finds sup-
port in Rule 52(b), U.R.C.P., which reads 
in part: "Upon motion of a party made 
not later than 10 days after the entry of 
judgment the court may amend its find-
ings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accoldingly.', Such 
motion was also timely filed under this rule 
and arrested the running of time until the 
tried court acted upon it. 
We are not here concerned with what 
the situation would be if the motion had 
been filed after the ten days had elapsed, 
nor whether the court could vacate an order 
granting a new trial if the original motion 
for a new trial had been properly noticed 
and heard. 
Turning from the procedural aspects of 
the case to the merits: the Farmers In-
surance Co. insists that the evidence does 
not support the finding of the jury that 
24S, lf>7 P. 1178. See Batcman v. Dono-
van, K*>1 K.2(i 750, where the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals approved the 
modification of an order tjranting a new-
trial some 45 dii^ M after it was granted. 
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Mr Thompson hid an insurible interest 
m the buildm0- bcciusc it hid Ucn sold b) 
him before the fire 
[5] The parties and this court are all in 
accord as to the sou idncss ot the rule that 
one v ho has i o interest in property cannot 
insure it 1 his is ^eneially accepted and 
is enacted into statute in this st ite Sec 
tion 31-19-4, U C \ 1 < ^ \ provides 
"(1) No contract of insurance 
* * * shall be enforceable except 
for the benefit of persons having an 
insuiabic interest in the things insured 
"(2) 'Insurable lnteicst is used in 
this section means any law ful and sub-
stantial economic interest in the safety 
or preservation of the subject of the 
insurance free from loss, destruction, 
or pecuniary damage" 
The pertinent inquiry hire is what the 
term "substanti il economic interest' as used 
in the foregoing statute means \\ c agree 
that such an interest would not exist if 
it were based solely upon an agreement 
that an owner (such as H irdv) would 
permit another (such as Thompson) to 
insure the owner's (Hardy's) property for 
the benefit of the latter (Thompson) un-
less the latter had some interest in the 
property other than the right to recover 
if it were destroyed by fire Such an agree-
ment would permit one having no interest 
in the property except a potential gain from 
its destruction to gamble upon its loss and 
would be against public policy 4 It is un-
questionably true that the party insuring 
must have some interest bevond this But 
if he has an interest of any character in 
the property so that he will or may derive 
some pecuniary benefit from the continued 
existence of the propcrtv or suffer pecu-
niary loss from its destruction b> fire,5 
he may properly be said to meet the stitu-
tory requirement of having a "substantial 
economic interest" If this test is met, that 
suffices, and the niture of his interest 
or the status of title or possession is im-
material 6 
4. See Price v United Pacific Casualty Ins. 
Co, 153 Or 259, 5G P2d 116 
5. 44 C J S, Insurance, § 180 and casos 
cited in footnote 57 at page 877 See 
[6] The facts which bear upon the que* 
tion whether Thompson had an insurant* 
interest in the building are these He ha ' 
been carrving insurance on it with plamtit 
betore he sold his farm, and this building 
to Mr John M Hardy In connection with 
this sale Hardy agreed that Thomp^o 
should retain possession and use of th 
building to store his machinery The jun 
expicsslv found that Thompson had 'sold 
but not conveved' the building to IIarch 
There was testimonv that the defendant ad 
vised the insurance company of this faet 
bv letter and th it the company acccptc 1 
a renewal premium contained in that letter 
and mailed the receipt back to Thomp^o i 
In answer to another question the jun 
found that this sale was "not unknown 
to the pi untiif Farmers Insurance It i« 
undisputed that Thompson did retain po* 
session of tlu building, that bis machine r\ 
w is stored therein and that he had never 
turned the kc>s over to Mr Hardy 
Defendant's evidence was in substance 
that Mr Thompson had obligated himscH 
to be "responsible" to Mr Hardy for the 
building during the time he retained pos 
session and used it, that he expected to 
make it good and Hardy expected to be paid 
for it Having assumed such obligation^ 
Thompson had a right as well as a duty to 
protect the building and stood to benefit 
by its continued existence or to lose if 
it burned, upon the basis of these fact^ 
the finding that Thompson had an insurable 
interest in the building can be sustained 
under the test above set out. 
[7,8] Another controversy here is the 
Tanners Insurance Companv's argument 
that it is ^disputable that the building wi^ 
only worth $1,000, that therefore the trnl 
judge was correct m ordering that the 
$2 000 value be reduced to $1,000 and th u 
he committed error m vacating such order 
In explanation of his later action the jud^t 
stated, "the court did not have in mind the 
fact that the parties, by their pleadings hid 
stipulated to the value of said structure ' 
4 Appleman Insurance Law and Prac-
tice Section 2123. 
6 44 C J S , Insurance, § 180 
HATIONAL FARMERS UNION PROP. & CAS. CO. v. THOMPSON 
Cite as 28GP 2d 219 
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&t plaintiffs complaint alleged the value the building to be $2,000 which the de-
fendant admitted by answer and the plain-
jHf again so alleged in its reply to the de-
4adant's counterclaim. The issue of its 
^glae was never raised at the trial. How-
j|er r in connection with the dispute over 
parable interest, defendant testified that 
§t had a financial interest in the building 
jjlthat he was to receive $1,000 additional 
S the building was included in the deal. 
flfct was the only evidence bearing upon 
^question of value. 
If Plaintiff urges that inasmuch as the evi-
±pptt of value just referred to was volun-
l^jly introduced by-defendant, the court 
p^ttJd pass on the issue, citing Rule 15(b) 
j& the effect that, though an issue is not 
mj§itd by the pleadings, liberal amendments 
jfrptld be allowed "even after judgment"; 
mmi further that the judge could modify the 
judgment as he did, under the authority of 
isle 54(c): " * * * every final judg-
aesit shall grant the relief to which a party 
•k whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
f?. if the party has not demanded such gjjtf in his pleadings." 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to 
ttjminate technicalities and liberalize pro-
cure , we must not lose sight of the cardi-
a l principle that under our system of jus-
ijjcc, if a n i s s u e IS t° De ^ied and a party's 
rights concluded with respect thereto, he 
must have notice thereof and an oppor-
tunity to meet it.7 This is recognized in 
Rule 15(b) which recites that such liberal 
amendments shall be allowed if the issue 
is tried "by express or implied consent of 
the parties." It does not appear that there 
was any such consent to try the issue oi 
the value of this building. Defendant now 
urges that had the matter been in dispute, 
he could have adduced evidence that this 
was a forced sale and other proof support-
ing his claim of value. The plaintiff had an 
opportunity to raise this issue, but instead 
rof doing so, pleaded its value as $2,000, 
which was agreed to by the defendant. As 
the matter was presented, and under the 
findings of the jury as made, we are of the 
opinion that there was no impropriety in the 
trial court correcting his original order by 
restoring the value to $2,000 as pleaded by 
the parties and as found by the jury. 
The plaintiffs final contention is that the 
insurance policy was void by reason of mis-
representation made by the defendant in 
applying therefor. It is sufficient to note 
that upon disputed evidence the jury found 
that no such misrepresentation was made. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
WADE and WORTIIEN, JJ., concur. 
% See Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 
rtah, 236 P.2d 431, 2G A.LR 2d 047. 
Utah 2d 175, 2G1 P.2d 279; Morris v. Russell, 
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Meredith PAGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COMPA-
NY, a Utah corporation, Defend-
ant and Respondent. 
No. 0902. 
Supremo Court of. Utah. 
April !>, 1!M;|. 
Action on $10,000 fire policy ami on 
$20,000 fire policy. On the basis of the 
jury ' s findings, the Third Dist i ict Court, 
Salt Lake County, Merrill C. Faux, T, en-
tered judgment d o m i n g plaintiff r eco \e iy 
on either po l io and thereafter granted a 
new trial as lo the ^10,000 puluv '1 lie 
plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross-
appealed. The SupmiK* Couit, Mc-
Donough, J., held that trial jud^e did not 
abuse his discretion when he ordered new 
trial as to $10,000 fire policy so that issue 
of failure of insurance company's agent 
to disclose material facts when he applied 
to company for $10,000 fire policy on his 
own property could be tried separately 
from issue of failure to disclose material 
facts with respect to $20,000 fire policy. 
Affirmed and cause remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error C=93l(l) 
Conflicting evidence was reviewed in 
light most favorable to finding against 
plaintiff-appellant. 
2. Trial C^9(l) 
I t was proper to allow issue in case 
after pretrial conference and order, where 
plaintiff had ample opportunity to meet the 
issue in that three weeks before trial the 
court had granted motion to amend order 
to include issue. 
3. Trial <&»349(l) 
The trial court did not err in submit-
t ing special interrogatories instead of gen-
eral verdict as requested by plaintiff. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 49(a) . 
4. Appeal and Error C=>922 
Jurors are presumed to be of ordinary 
intelligence. 
5. Trial 0*352(15) 
In ter rogatory as to whether insured 
knowingly failed to make full and honest 
disclosure of material facts to fire insurer 
was not vague and uncertain in that jury 
would not understand what the material 
f u ts were. 
6. Insurance C=258 
Insurance C o m p a q ' s agent had afiii in ' 
tive duty to make disclosure of material 
facts relating to insurability an« risk in-
volved when he applied to company for fire 
insurance on his own proper ty ; his failure 
to make disclosure of facts which would 
h a \ e material bearing upon decision as to 
whether to issue insurance constituted fraud 
ou eotup.uu Mifficuut to a u u d the policy 
7. New Trial C=>9 
Ti ia l judge did not abuse his d'scietion 
when he ordered new trial as to $10,000 fire 
policy so that issue of failure of insurance 
company's agent to disclose material facts 
when he applied to company for $10,000 fire 
policy on his own property could be tried 
separately from issue of failure to disclose 
material facts with respect to $20,000 lire 
policy. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 42 
(b) . 
8. New Trial C=6 
Tr ia l court has broad discretional y 
pow er to grant or deny new trial. 
9. Appeal and Error C=>977(1) 
The Supreme Court is reluctant to 
interfere with trial court 's exercise of his 
discretionary power to g ran t or deny new 
trial unless trial court clearly acted unrea-
sonably and arbitrari ly. 
Dahl & Sagers , Midvale, for appellant. 
Lawrence L. Summerhays, Salt Lake 
City, for respondent. 
MCDONOUGH, justice: 
Plaintiff sued to recover under two fiie 
insurance policies issued by the defendant, 
one for $20,000 and one for $10,000 on a 
fourplex building owned by plaintiff, which 
was destroyed by fire. 
PAGE v. UTAH HOME TIRE INSURANCE COMPANY Utah 2 9 1 
Cite as 301 P.2d 200 
The case was submitted to the jury on 
these special interrogatories: 
" 1 . What was the actual cash value of 
the burned fourplex just before it was 
destroyed by fire? 
"Answer: $10,000. 
"2. Did plaintiff Meredith Page 
knowingly fail to make a full and 
honest disclosure to defendant Fire In-
surance Company of the material facts 
regarding the nature and intended use 
of the burned fourplex? 
"Answer: Yes." 
On the basis of the jury's findings, the 
court entered judgment denying plaintiff 
recovery on either policy. But it later en-
tered an order granting plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. Upon a reconsideration of 
that order, the court stated that he thought 
that the issues as to the two policies should 
have been submitted to the jury separately. 
He then reinstated the judgment against 
me plaintiff as to the first polic, (the $20,-
)00 one). But as to the second policy (the 
510,000 one) he ordered a new trial on the 
ingle issue posed by interrogatory No. 2 
hove set forth. 
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment 
gainst him on the first policy (the $20,000 
ne); whereas the defendant seeks to sus-
lin it; and the defendant cross-appealed, 
eking reinstatement of the judgment 
gainst the plaintiff on the second policy 
he $10,000 one). 
[1] Inasmuch as the jury found against 
e plaintiff, that he did not make a full 
^closure of material facts to the defend-
t, wherever there is conflict in the evi-
ICC on that issue, the defendant is entitled 
have us review it in the light most favor-
e to that finding. 
Maintiff Page purchased the budding in 
stion from the U. S. Government in 
"ember, 1°58, for approximately $1,800. 
was a substantial building which had 
l used as an Air Force Officers' Quar-
at the Salt Lake Air Base. It was the 
titiff's purpose to, and he in fact did, 
e the building about 20 miles to the 
southern part of Salt Lake County and 
placed it on property at 14610 South State 
Street, just south of Utah State Prison. 
Plaintiff Page had been an agent for the 
defendant Utah Home Fire Insurance Com-
pany for over 30 years, and worked through 
Heber J. Grant & Company, a general 
agent for the defendant. Shortly after he 
purchased the building, Mr. Page discussed 
with Mr. O. C. Inkley, Secretary of that 
Company, the matter of taking out fife in-
surance on it. He gave the information as 
to its size, construction and condition; that 
the plumbing, heating and lighting were in; 
that he intended to move the building; and 
that it would need some minor repairs. 
But the defendant's evidence is that Mr. 
Page did not disclose to Mr. Inkley these 
facts: that the building would have to be 
cut in several pieces to be moved; that the 
internal wiring, plumbing and heating lines 
would be cut; that many of the windows 
and some of the walls were damaged; and 
that the building would remain vacant for 
some time. 
There can be no doubt but that these 
facts would increase the fire risk. The 
Company relied on Mr. Page's representa-
tions .ib to the condition and location of the 
building and did not send anyone else out 
to inspect it. On December 31, 195S, it 
issued a fire insurance policy for $20,000 
showing the location of the building to be 
at H610 South State Street. The policy 
was signed by the plaintiff, Meredith Page, 
as agent. The building was severed and 
in four or five pieces was moved to that 
location in April, 1959. Some time after 
it was set up there and some superfic.al 
repairing done on it, Mr. Page, by tele-
phone, ordered an additional policy on it 
in the amount of $10,000. Pursuant to this 
older, the second policy (the $10,000 one) 
was issued on June 27, 1960, also signed by 
the plamhli Mircdilh Page as agent. It 
was about eight months later, on February 
11, 1%1, that the building was destroyed by 
fire. 
[2,3] We are not impressed with the 
plamtiifs contention that the issue of fraud 
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and failure to disclose was improperly al-
lowed in the case because it was done after 
the pretrial conference and order. Three 
weeks before trial the court granted defend-
ant's motion to amend the order to include 
the issue whether plaintiff violated his fidu-
ciary duty. Plaintiff had ample opportunity 
to meet the issue, and that is all that is re-
quired.1 Nor do we find merit in the charge 
that the court erred in submitting the 
special interrogatories instead of a general 
verdict, as requested by the plaintiff. This 
procedure is sanctioned by our rules.2 
[4,5] The plaintiff also contends that 
the second interrogatory concerning wheth-
er Mr. Page knowingly failed "to make a 
full and honest disclosure of material facts" 
is vague and uncertain in that the jury 
would not have understood what the mate-
rial facts were. Upon our survey of the 
trial and of the respective contentions of 
the parties, it is our opinion that jurors of 
ordinary intelligence, which they are pre-
sumed to be, would have had no difficulty 
in understanding what was meant by the 
material facts and that the issue they were 
to determine was whether the plaintiff dis-
closed such facts to the Company. Ac-
cordingly, we find no prejudicial error in 
that regard. The same observations and 
conclusion apply to the instructions as to 
value about which the plaintiff complains. 
[6] Due to the fact that the plaintiff as 
agent for the defendant Company was in an 
advantaged position to know the facts con-
cerning the insurability and the risk in-
volved on this property, and to the fiduciary 
relationship he bore to the defendant Com-
pany as its agent, he had an affirmative duty 
to make disclosure of the material facts 
relating to the insurability and the risk in-
volved in this property. This is particularly 
1. See Morris v. Russel, 120 Utah 545, 236 
P.2d 451, 26 A.L.R.2d 047: and Taylor v. 
E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 204 
P.2d 279. 
2. Rule 49(a) U.R.C.P. 
3. Restatement of Agency, Seo. .390; see 
also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. \. Mc< Jreovy, 
8 Cir., 118 F. 415; Westchester Fire Ins. 
so because of his sclf-intcrcbt in the trans-
action. Under such circumstances, the 
failure to make disclosure of facts which 
would have a material bearing upon the 
decision as to whether to issue the insur-
ance constitutes a fraud on the principal 
suflkn nt to avoid the policy, and the trial 
court was justified in entering such judg-
ment on the basis of the jury's findings that 
he failed to make such disclosure.3 
[7-9] A substantially different problem 
exists in regard to the second policy (the 
$10,000 one) in view of the fact that tht 
trial court granted a new trial with respecj 
thereto. Although the observations abov| 
made about the judgment on the $20,0f 
policy are generally applicable to the $10,| 
000 policy, there are some substantial dif-V 
fcrenccs. When the latter policy was is4 
sued the building had been moved and re-
stored in its new location. The transaction 
in obtaining the policy was handled in a 
different manner and with different per] 
sonnel. Additionally, there had been a fira 
loss to an outbuilding (a toolshed) on thtf 
premises, which the defendant Company 
had sent another of its agents to inspect[ 
These facts may justify the trial court'; 
conclusion that the issue as to disclosure o£ 
material facts as to the $10,000 policy 
should be tried separately. |Rulc 42(1 
U.R.C.P. recognizes that when the coui 
considers it convenient or desirable in tl/ej 
interest ot justice, any separate issue: 
be tried separately.4 
The broad discretionary power of the 
trial court in the granting or denying of 
new trials is well established. This is 
necessarily so to allow the court an op-
portunity to cause re-examination or cor-
rection of jury verdicts or findings which it 
believes to be in error or where there is 
Co. of New York City v. Fitzpatrick, 3 
Cir., 2 F.2d G51; Cascade Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Journal Pub. Co., 1 Wash. 452, 
25 P. 331; Muncey v. Security Ins. Co., 
43 Idaho 441, 252 P. 870. 
4. See comment on the rule in Raggcnhuck 
v. Suhrmnnn, 7 Utah 2d 327, 325 P.2d 
258. 
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substantial doubt that they were fairly tried. 
And we have repeatedly expressed our 
reluctance to interfere with its judgment 
in such matters unless the action is clearly 
unreasonable and arbitrary. There having 
been a plenary trial of the controlling issue 
as to the $20,000 policy; the jury having 
rendered its verdict adverse to the plaintiff; 
and the trial court having given its approval 
by refusing to grant a new trial thereon, 
that is all the parties are entitled to and the 
judgment with respect thereto is affirmed. 
On the other hand, the trial court having 
concluded that as to the $10,000 policy there 
should be a new trial on the issue whether 
the plaintiff made a full and honest dis-
closure of the material facts, we are not 
prepared to say that he transgressed the 
broad latitude of discretion allowed him in 
such matters, and that order is likewise af-
firmed, and the cause is remanded for trial 
of that issue. The parties to boar their own 
costs. 
H E N R I O D , C. J., and C A L L I S T F R , 
C R O C K E T T and W A D E , JJ. , concur. 
O 5 *C> NUMBtR SrSICM, 
15 r tahLM LMK» 
UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPORA-
TION, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Rex L. SOHM and Katheryn Sohm, Defend-
ants and Respondents, and Third-
Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Richard H. NICKLES, d/b/a Zion Manage-
ment, Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 9865. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April IT., 1!MU. 
Action of d m it basa l on a l l i e d ml 
ful misrepresentation in connection w itli 
sale of new-type electronic stove. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Joseph G. Jcppson, J., rendered judgment 
for the buyers, and the appliance company 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hcnriod, 
C. J., held that evidence adduced by buyers 
of stove which was specifically recom-
mended to them by another couple was in-
sufficient to establish that selling appliance 
dealer a n d / o r his agent practiced fraud 
with respect to the alleged capabilities of 
the stove. 
Reversed. 
Crockett, J., dissented. 
1. Fraud 0 5 8 ( 1 ) 
Fraud must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, or, stated another way, 
by clear preponderance of evidence. 
2. Fraud O 5 0 
For buyers to recover in action for 
alleged deceit based on alb ged wilful mis-
representation in connection with sale of 
electronic stove, they were required to 
demonstrate that the appliance dealer 
and /or bis agent intentionally, wilfully, 
clearly and convincingly practiced a fraud 
on plaintilfs by way of telling them de-
liberate lies. 
3. Fraud C=>58(l) 
Evidence adduced by buyers of elec-
tronic s to \e which was spc cifically rec-
ommended to them by another couple was 
insufficient to establish that selling ap-
pliance dealer and /o r his agent practiced 
fraud with respect to the alleged capabil-
ities of the stove. 
RirkcT & lv\berg, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Keith F. Sohm, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondents. 
I IFXRTOI) , Chief Jus t ice : 
\ppeal fioni a judgment for damages 
in AW action of deceit based on alleged 
will ul misu pu sui ta lmns in connection 
with the sale of a new-type electronic 
.sto\e. I s e u r s c d wilh costs to defendants. 
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Edith RAGGENBUCK et al.. Plaintiffs and 
Respondents (I I cases), 
v. 
Emil SUHRMANN, dba Suhrmann's South 
Temple Meat Company, and Albert Noorda 
and Sam L. Guss, dba Jordan Meat and 
Livestock Company and Valley Sausage 
Company, a Utah corporation, Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
No. 8753. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 8, 1958. 
Actions were brought for trichinosis 
contracted by plaintiffs through eating 
y^ausage. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, A. H. Ellctt, J., entered an 
order consolidating to determine liability 
only, eleven actions involving nineteen 
plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed. 
The Supreme - Court, Wade, J., held that 
consolidation was not prejudicial to de-
fendants and did not violate constitutional 
provision that no person should be de-
prived of property, without due process 
of law, or constitutional provision dealing 
with right of trial by jury, or statute pro-
viding that in action for injuries, issue of 
fact may be tried by the jury, unless jury 
trial is waived or reference is ordered, or 
statute providing that all questions of fact, 
where trial is by jury, other than those 
mentioned in following statute, are to be 
decided by the jury. 
Order affirmed. 
I. Appeal and Error C=>1035 
Constitutional Law e=305 
Jury <$=>3I(3) 
Trial (3=2 
Consolidation, to determine liability 
only, of eleven actions involving nineteen 
plaintiffs claiming damages for trichinosis 
contracted by eating sausage, was not prej-
udicial to defendants and did not violate 
constitutional provision that no person 
should be deprived of property, without 
due process of law, or constitutional pro-
vision dealing with right of trial by jury, 
or statute providing that in action for in-
juries, issue of fact may be tried by the 
jury, unless jury trial is waived or rclYr 
ence is ordered, or statute providing that 
all questions of fact, where trial is by 
jury, other than those mentioned in follow-
ing statute, are to be decided by the jury. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 42; Const, 
art. I,' §§ 7, 10; U.C.A.1953, 78-21-V, 
78-21-2. 
2. Trial C=>2 
Use of term "the jury" in statute pro-
viding that all questions of fact, where trial 
is by jury, other than those mentioned in 
following statute, are to be decided by 
"the jury" does not mean that one and 
the same jury must try all issues in the 
case, but simply means that all questions of 
fact are to be decided by the jury im-
paneled to try such issues. U.C.A.1953, 
78-21-2. 
Grant Macfarlane, Hurd, Bayle & Hurd, 
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Robert Gordon, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black, 
Thomas A. DufFm, Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
WADE, Justice. 
This is an intermediate appeal from,*>sn 
order of the District Court consolidating! 
to determine liability only, 11 suits iiy-
volving 19 plaintiffs. Each plaintiff claims 
damages from all of the defendants for 
contracting trichinosis through eating a 
sausage mettwurst product purchased from 
defendant Suhrmann, doing business as 
Suhrmann's South Temple Meat Company. 
The plaintiffs claim that the other de-
fendants are liable for such damages be-
cause they had a part in the preparation 
of the sausage mettwurst product ior sale. 
They claim damages based on negligence 
and a breach of an implied warranty. 
Each plaintiff* alleges the same facts as 
the basis of liability. However, the lia-
Dility of defendant Suhrmann is based on 
his selling such product, whereas the lia-
RAGGENBUCK v. SUHRMANN 
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hMt) of the other defendants is based on 
them supplying Suhrmann with this prod-
uct. There may be a sharp conflict in the 
evidence as to such facts. 
[1] The order complained of was made 
on motion of plaintiffs and opposed by the 
defendants who initiated the intermediate 
appeal. Appellants contend (1) that such 
consolidation is contrary to the Constitu-
tion and statutory provisions of this State, 
md (2) that it would be highly prejudicial 
u defendants. W e conclude that the trial 
"nun ' s order was nei ther erroneous nor 
i breach of its discretion. 
He fore considering* defendants ' claims 
ve call attention to Rule 42 of Utah Rules 
»f Civil Procedure. Subdivision (a) thcrc-
)f expressly authorizes the trial court to 
»rder a joint hear ing of common questions 
if law or fact arising from different ac-
ions and to order such proceedings as 
u \ tend to avoid unnecessary costs or 
J a v . T S u b d ivision (b) authorizes the tna l I 
ourt in furtherance of convenience or t o J 
void prejudice to order a separate trial 1 
t any separate issue or any_jimrjj)cjL_Q-f..f 
^ues. I So, unless the trial court 's order is 
mtrary to the Constitution or statutes of 
us State, or is likely to be prejudicial 
> defendants, it was clearly within the dis-
•etion of the trial court to order a coii-
)lidation for trial of the issue of ha-
ll t\ m all of these cases. 
(1) This order does not violate any con-
uutional or statutory provision. To sup-
)i*t their contention contrary to this 
atement defendants rely on Article I, 
action 7 of our Constitution that no "per-
il shall be deprived of * * * property, 
ithoiir due process of l aw" ; also Article 
Section 10, providing: 
"In *apital cases the right of trial 
by j u : y shall remain inviolate. In 
courts of general jurisdiction, except 
in capital cases, a ju ry shall consist of 
eight ju io r s . In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a ju ry shall consist of four 
uiois . In criminal cases the veidict 
dial! be unanimous. In civil cases 
d i m foiuths of the jurors n u \ find 
a verdict. A ju ry in civil cases shall 
be waived unless demanded." 
From the details therein provided counsel 
concludes that the legislature has no power 
to change those provisions. W e do not 
disagree with this conclusion but we find 
nothing in either Section 7 or 10 which is 
not in complete harmony with the tr ial 
court 's order. 
Counsel then refers to Section 78-21-1 , 
U.C.A.1953, as follows: 
" In actions for the recovery of spe-
cific re.il or personal property, with 
or without damages, or for money 
claimed as. due upon contract or as 
damages for breach of contract , or 
for injuries, an issue of fact may be 
tried by a jury , unless a jury trial is 
waived or a reference is ordered." 
and Section 78-21-2, U.C.A.1953, as fol-
lows : 
" , / / / questions of fact, where the 
trial is by jury, other than those men-
tione 1 in the next section, are to be 
decided by the jury, and all evidence 
thereon is to be addressed to them, 
except when otherwise provided/ ' 
(It dies taken from appellants ' brief.) 
[21 Counsel claims that this statute, 
sr ice it usi s the term "the jury ," means 
that one and the same jury must try all 
issues m the c.tsi . This is obviously a 
strained construction of that language. 
Tha t language simply means that all qiu s-
tioiis of fact are to be decided by the jury 
impaneled to try such issues. It docs not 
consider or determine the question of 
w l u t h i r more than one jury may try dif-
ferent issues in a case. So, we conclude 
that neither the Constitution nor these 
s t a t u e s have any bearing on whether the 
same jury must decide all issues of fact 
in a given case. 
(2) We are also unable to see that the 
consolidation of thesu cases for determina-
ifon of liability only by one ju ry will be 
prejudiced to the defendants. Certainly 
a\^ingle d»U numat iou of the question of 
liability will tend to save time and expense 
in the trial. F^u-na l ly is this t rue since it 
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is agreed that there will be a sharp conflict 
in the evidence on the facts which will be 
determinative oi liability. 
Defendants' claim, that the consolidation 
of the cases to determine liability only 
will be prejudicial, is based on two propo-
sitions: (1) They claim that a jury which 
determines liability only without a^sess-
ing'specific amounts of damages is more apt 
to decide that question against tlum than 
would a jury charged with a determination 
of the amount of damages. (2) They chum 
that if the same jury determines liability 
and the amount of damages, the amount 
of damages would probably be greatly re-
duced. 
We see no reason why a jury which de-
termines only the question of liability would 
be more apt to determine that question 
against the defendants or cither of them 
than would a jury which also determined 
the amount of damages. In fact, it is 
sometimes claimed that a showing that 
damages have been sustained appeals to 
the emotions of the jury and causes little 
or no consideration of the facts which 
create liability. In such case a jury which 
determines liability only would more care-
fully consider the facts on which such lia-
bility is claimed than would a jury charged 
with assessing the amount of damages also. 
The claim that a jury which heard all 
the evidence on liability and damages would 
be likely to reduce the amount of damages 
is only well founded where a serious doubt 
of liability causes a compromise \erdiec 
on the amount of damages. Of course, the 
defendants arc not entitled to the benefit 
of such a compromise verdict. They are 
only entitled to a separate fair consult ra-
tion of the issues of fact which arc deter-
minative of the question of liability and 
the amount of damages. In cither event 
we cannot sec that either plaintiffs or de-
fendants will be prejudiced by the order oi 
consolidation made by the trial court. 
Order of the trial court is affirmed. 
Costs to respondents. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT 
and WORTHEN, JJ., concur. 
IIExXRIOD, Justice. 
I concur, but make the following obser-
vation. The consolidation to determine lia-
bility which was ordered at pre-trial, so 
far as I can determine from the record, 
was without any motion therefor having 
been made by any of thQ parties. The 
consolidation to determine liability no 
doubt was made to expedite matters and 
save expense. I am wondering if expedi-
tion and saving of expense would not be 
accomplished further if consolidation were 
ordered to determine not only liability but 
to determine damages, if liability were es-
tablished. In such event, one jury could 
handle all matters and it would save a 
great deal of time and expense in im-
panelling eleven new and different juries. 
O | *Ff HUMBEU SYSTIM> 
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MINERSVILLE LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Earl P. STATEN, Administrator of the Es-
tate of William Story, Jr., deceased, et 
a!., Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 8662. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
May 14, 193$. 
Action to quiet title to land and for 
order directing state to issue patent to land. 
The Uifth Judicial District Court, Beaver 
County, Will L. Hoyt, J., rendered judg-
ment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed. 
The Supreme Court, McDonough, C. J., 
held that failure of purchaser of land wdiich 
had been granted by federal government to 
state for use of agricultural college, and his 
successors in interest to demand issuance 
of patent or state's delay in issuing patent 
could not defeat plaintiffs title to land by 
adverse possession where state had received 
payment of purchase price long before 
plaintiff's entry, state claimed no interest 
TAYLOR V. E. M. ROYLE CORP, 
No. 8028. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 2, 1053. 
Action was brought to recover money 
allegedly owed plaintiff by defendant for 
services performed by plaintiff as manager 
for defendant. The Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Utah County, Joseph E. Nel-
son, J., entered judgment for plaintiff, and 
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that it was error to charge defendant 
with liability under quantum meruit, an is-
sue which defendant was never called on 
to meet. 
Judgment reversed. 
1. Courts <§=>85(2) 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be liberally construed to secure a 
just determination of every action, but they 
do not represent a one-way street down 
which but one Htigant may travel. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 1(a). 
2. Courts C=>85(2) 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, a defendant must be extended ev-
ery reasonable opportunity to prepare his 
case and to meet an adversary's claims. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 54(c) (1). 
3. Master and Servant 0=380(14) 
Where plaintiff managed defendant's 
store under written contract, which by its 
terms ended March 1, and after March 
1 plaintiff stayed on as manager and ac-
cepted the same compensation until July, 
when plaintiff quit, and during interim par-
ties talked of a new contract, but none was 
signed, and plaintiff then brought action un-
der complaint alleging that defendant owed 
plaintiff certain sum of money under the 
terms of a new contract consummated be-
tween March and July, and no effort was 
made to amend complaint to conform to 
any different proof, nor was any proof af-
firmatively offered to establish a quantum 
meruit theory, it was error to charge de-
fendant with liability under quantum meruit 
theory, since defendant was never called 
on to meet such issue. Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, rule 54(c) (1). 
TAYLOR 7. E. M. ROYLE CORP. Utah 279 
Cite as 264 P.2d 279 
4. Contracts 0346(12) 
There are circumstances where court 
can allow recovery under quantum meruit, 
even though plaintiff declared on an express 
contract, but only if defendant had fair op-
portunity to be apprised of and meet issue 
so presented. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 54(c) (1). 
Herbert F. Smart, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Maurice Harding, Provo, for respond-
ent. 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff 
who claimed damages for breach of an ex-
press contract of employment. That por-
tion of the judgment based on a contract 
implied in law is reversed. No costs are 
awarded. 
Plaintiff managed defendant's radio and 
television store under a written agreement 
calling for a salary and bonus, which con-
tract, by its terms, ended March 1, 1951. 
Plaintiff stayed on as manager and accepted 
the same compensation until July, when he 
quit. During the interim the parties had 
talked of a new contract, but none was 
signed. 
Plaintiff's complaint, a short form per-
mitted under the rules, together with an at-
tached exhibit, alleged that defendant owed 
him some S730 under the terms of a new 
contract consummated between March and 
July. No effort was made to amend the 
complaint to conform to any different proof, 
nor was any proof affirmatively offered 
to establish a quantum meruit theory. The 
trial court took the case under advisement. 
Several days later in a memorandum deci-
sion the court adjudged that there had been 
no express contract, but that plaintiff was 
entitled to recover on quantum meruit. 
Quaere : Under our new i tiles can one re-
cover on a contract implied in law where 
he pleads and attempts to prove an express 
contract, seeking no amendment of his 
pleadings, demanding no relief under and 
urging no claim under a quantum meruit or 
other theory? 
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Plaintiff savs Rule 54(c) (1), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure1 resolves tht question 
affirmatively We disagree I h e rule 
reads in part that " * * * evcrv final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendcied is en-
titled, even if the partv has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings * * * " 
Recently we had this rule before us in 
Morns v Russell, Utah, 236 P 2d 451 4 5 \ 
where plaintiff pleaded an (1) evprcs3 con-
tract and (2) quantum meruit Dining the 
trial the latter count was stricken on de-
fendant's motion, but was reinstated nc\t 
day on pluntift's motion We held tint a 
judgment based on the quintuin meruit 
count did not violate the rule Diffeience 
between that case and this is obvious 
I here, the defendant had notice of his op-i 
ponent's claims, was not surpnscd, misled 
loi prejudiced in his deUn (, l i iun^ hull 
in oppoitunity to meet the issues present-
eel 
[1,2] It is true that our new rules 
should be "liberally consulted' to secure a 
"just * * * determination of every ac-
tion",2 but they do not represent a one wav 
street down which but one htigint m iv 
travel The rules allow locomotion in both 
directions by all interested travelers lhe} 
allow plaintiffs considciable latitude in 
pleading and proof, to the point where some 
people have expressed the opinion th it care-
less legal craftsmanship has been invited 
rather than discouraged Be that as it may, 
a defendant must be extended everv reason-
able opportunity to prcpaie his case uul to 
meet an adversary's claims Also he must 
be protected against surpusc and be as-
sured equal opportunity and facility to pie-
sent and prove counter contentions,—else 
unilateral justice and injustice would lcsult 
sufficient to raise serious doubts as to con-
Istitutional due process guarantees 
Mr Justice Crockett, in the cited case, 
recognized the true implications of the rule 
and the fairness which it was designed to 
engender when he said. "The adding of the 
quantum meruit count, was tho equivalent 
!. Lifted from Federal Rule 54(c) (1), 
28 USCA. Division of construction is 
reflected in Fed Rules Digest, Vol 2, pp 
ot permitting an amendment to conform to 
the proof * * * There is no showing 
th it the defendants were misled or pre-
vented from presenting all their evidence 
or in any wa> prejudiced by reinstating the 
count 
[3] Here the record indicates that the 
plaintiff had an express contract in mmd, 
not one implied m law Plaintiff sought no 
change in theory bv wav of pleading or 
proof We believe an injustice v ould re-
sult if the uile vveic intcipretcd to cliirge 
the defendant with liability under quantum 
meruit, an issue he was never called upon 
to meet 
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the opinion of Mr Justice 
HENRIOD Under the facts of this case 
it w as improper to award judgment to plain-
tili upon a theory of quantum meruit The 
plaintiff had been working for the defend-
ant at a specified salary, the new contract 
bv which his salary would have been m-
ei eased as discussed by the parties con-
templated services on a yearly basis. The 
business is seasonal A good portion of the 
vc ir is quiet and the time is spent in 
piepiration for the fall and winter when 
the grc itcst volume of merchandise is sold 
Inismueh as the plaintiff vvoikcd from 
M°rch 1st until July, accepting the old 
salary, and then quit in the off ceason, the 
only fair assumption would be that he held 
over under the old salary Any modifica-
tion of it wo ild have to be by express con-
U let 11 is is the view the plaintiff had of 
the mittcr, he so declared in his complaint 
and the case w ts tned on that theory Un-
der those circumstances it seems mamfest-
I ly unjust to impose liability upon the de-
fend mt for a higher salarv. on a theory of 
implied contract This would simply permit 
I the court, rather than the parties to fix the 
compensation of the plaintiff. 
[4] Fowevei under rule 54 requiring 
the court to "gr int the relief to which the 
party m whose f<tvor it is rendered is en-
titled, even if the part) has not demmded 
257-260, Tedcral Rules Service, Vol. 8, 
pp 822-8U 
2 Rule 1(a), U U C P 
STATE v. COOPEEATIVE SECURITY CORP. OF CHURCH 
Cite as 264 P.2d 281 
Utah 281 
such relief in his pleadings * * * " there 
undoubtedly would be circumstances where 
the court could allow recovery under quan-
tum meruit even though the plaintiff had 
declared on an express contract. It is of 
course true that such should never be done 
unless the opposing party had a fair oppor-
tunity to be apprised of and meet the issue 
so presented. 
McDONOUGH and WADE, JJ., concur 
in the opinion of Mr. Justice HENRIOD 
and also in the comments of Mr. Justice 
CROCKETT. 
WOLFE, C. J., not participating. 
O I KtT Ht»H«£H SYSTEM^ 
STATE et al. v. COOPERATIVE SECU-
RITY CORP. OF CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS et al. 
No. 8016. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 2, 1953. 
Condemnation proceedings. The 
ourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch 
iounty, Joseph E. Nelson, J., rendered 
jdgment awarding damages and the land-
vvners appealed. The Supreme Court hold 
iat where it was earnestly urged that 
ial court, on remand from the Supreme 
ourt, failed to properly reassess dam-
res in condemnation case and it was nec-
,sary to remand case for modification of 
jdgment so as to correct an olmous er-
>r therein, the case would also be remand-
l for affirmance of present judgment or 
ir modification in consonance with hir-
er observations of Supreme Court. 
Remanded. 
provo Water Fsers' Association v. Carl-
ton, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777. 
State, by and through Road Commission, 
r. Cooperative Security Corp. of Church 
2 4 P 2 L 1 - 1 < J 1 , J 
1. Appeal and Error <5=»I096(I) 
On appeal from judgment of district 
court^ to which Supreme Court on a former 
appeal had remanded case with instruc-
tions, Supreme Court would presume that 
district court followed instructions, and 
burden of showing that district court did 
not \\ras on the one asserting such error. 
2. Eminent Domain C=>I36 
Where there is other comparable land 
available to condemnee that would have ac-
complished the same use to which land tak-
en had been put, severance damages are not 
available to one refusing to accept such 
land, and in assessing damages in such a 
case the value of the land so refused would 
be the value of the land taken.1 
3. Eminent Domain 0 2 6 3 
Where it was earnestly urged that 
trial court, on remand from the Supreme 
Court, failed to properly reassess damages 
in condemnation case, and it was neces-
sary to remand case for modification of 
judgment so as to correct an obvious error 
therein, the case would afco be remanded 
for affirmance of present judgment or for 
modification in consonance with further ob-
servations of Supreme Court.2 
Arthur Woolley, Ogden, for appellants. 
E. R. Calhster, Jr., Atty. Gen., Walter L. 
Budge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents. 
PER CURIAM. 
Tins case, ansing out of condemnation 
proceedings was heie be lore.1 We held 
that (he facts did not warrant severance 
damages, except for 2 small parcels, be-
cause there was other contiguous available 
comparable land which equally could have 
been put to the same use as that taken. The 
tiial court, who had awarded severance 
damages generally, was reversed and m-
stiucted to re-assess the d images based on 
replacement value of the laioi taken, ex-
cept as to the 2 small parcels, which we 
<>f J« MI, Christ of Latter Day Saints, 217 
I. Utah, 2*7 I Mid 2(59. 
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Melody WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, Defendant, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 17496. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 27, 1982. 
Beneficiary filed action for face 
amount of life policy. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J., 
entered judgment for the insurer. Benefi-
ciary appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J., held that: (1) the district court did not 
err in concluding that a medical history 
form was "part of the policy'' and admissi-
ble in evidence; (2) the insurer's affirma-
tive defense that the insured misrepresen-
ted that he had never been treated for 
excessive use of alcohol was properly plead-
ed; (3) the fact that the affirmative de-
fense referred only to "treatment * * * for 
alcoholism," did not render notice that "ex-
cessive use of alcohol" was in issue insuffi-
cient; and (4) that the insurer based its 
affirmative defense on one answer in the 
insured's medical history form did not pre-
clude evidence relating to another answer 
on the same general issue. 
Judgment affirmed. 
1. Insurance <&=> 271.2 
In action by beneficiary for face 
amount of life policy, district court did not 
err in concluding that medical history of 
portion of application was "part of the poli-
cy" and admissible where there was no evi-
dence to contradict insurer's testimony that 
it was standard procedure for insurer to 
attach copy of medical history and life ap-
plication to each policy when it was issued, 
that there was no evidence that procedure 
was varied and medical history form stated 
that it would be part of application for 
policy. U.C.A. 1953, 31-19-7(1). 
2. Pleading <3=>48 
Fundamental purpose of liberalized 
pleading rules is to afford parties privilege 
of presenting whatever legitimate conten-
tions they have pertaining to their dispute, 
subject only to requirement that their ad-
versary have fair notice of nature and basis 
or grounds for claim and general indication 
of type of litigation involved. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rules 8(a)(1), (b, c), (e)(1), 9(b). 
3. Libel and Slander <s=>80 
When pleader complains of conduct de-
scribed by such general terms as "libel, 
intimidation, or false statements," allega-
tion of the conclusion is not sufficient; 
pleading must describe nature or substance 
of acts or words complained of. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rules 8(a)(1), (b, c), (eXl), 9(b). 
4. Fraud <5=>43 
Requirement that circumstances consti-
tuting fraud be stated with particularity 
reaches all circumstances where pleader 
alleges the kind of misrepresentations, 
omissions or other deceptions covered by 
term "fraud" in its broadest dimension. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 9(b). 
5. Insurance <s=>640(2) 
In action by beneficiary for face 
amount of life policy, affirmative defense 
which recited particular answer to question 
on application involving alcoholism and spe-
cifically alleged that answer was fraudulent 
or material to acceptance of risk or hazard 
assumed and that insurer would not have 
issued policy if true facts had been known 
was sufficiently pleaded to put in issue all 
statutory defenses of deception, including 
omission, incorrect statement and misrepre-
sentation. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 9(b); 
U.C.A. 1953, 31-19-8. 
6. Insurance <s=>640(2) 
In action by beneficiary for face 
amount of life policy, insurer's answer's ref-
erence to "treatment * * * for alcoholism" 
was sufficient and fair notice to beneficiary 
that general issue of treatment for "exces-
sive use of alcohol" was in issue. 
WILLIAMS v. STATE FARM INS. CO. 
CMeas,Utah,656P.2d966 
Utah 967 
7. Insurance <»=>645(3) 
In action by beneficiary for face 
amount of life policy, insureds affirmative 
defense that insured made misrepresenta-
tion in connection with his answer as to 
whether he had ever received treatment for 
alcoholism did not preclude proof of misrep-
resentation in another answer on applica-
tion for concerning excessive use of alcohol 
where the two questions involved different 
characterizations of same general course of 
conduct. 
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff, appellant and cross-respondent. 
Roger H. Bullock of Strong & Hanni, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant, respondent and 
cross-appellant. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This is an action by the beneficiary of life 
insurance against the insurer for the face 
amount of the policy. After the jury gave 
its verdict on special interrogatories, the 
court entered judgment for the defendant, 
no cause of action. Plaintiff's appeal 
presents a single issue having to do with an 
alleged misrepresentation the decedent-in-
sured made on the "Medical History portion 
of Life Application" in applying for the 
policy. Plaintiff contends that this issue 
should not have been submitted to the jury 
(1) because under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19-
7(1), the Medical History form was not 
"part of the policy" and therefore was not 
"admissible in evidence in any action rela-
tive to such policy," and (2) because, in any 
case, the defendant insurer waived its right 
to rely on the medical form because its 
answer did not plead misrepresentation as 
an affirmative defense.1 
The insurer issued a $38,000 policy of life 
insurance on plaintiffs husband in 1977. In 
1979, he was killed in a head-on automobile 
collision under circumstances indicating 
that his intoxication was a principal cause 
of his death. The insurer denied plaintiffs 
1. The defendant insurer has cross-appeaied, 
contending that if the judgment is not affirmed, 
a new trial should be granted because of wn 
claim on the basis "that there was a serious 
and material misrepresentation in obtaining 
the policy.. ." The insurer's letter ex-
plained: "We relied upon the representa-
tions made in the application and had we 
been aware of Mr. Williams' treatment for 
alcoholism with Dr. Jeppson and use of 
antabuse prior to our application, we would 
not have issued the policy." This action 
followed. 
There was ample evidence at trial from 
which the jury could conclude that the dece-
dent had a serious drinking problem and 
had been treated for excessive use of alco-
hol. Dr. Jeppson, his family physician, tes-
tified that he had treated decedent for alco-
holism from 1974 to 1976, including pre-
scriptions for antabuse, a drug used for 
patients otherwise unable to control their 
drinking. Dr. Jeppson also recommended 
consultation with a psychiatrist, Dr. Niel-
sen. Dr. Nielsen saw the decedent almost 
weekly through most of 1976 and several 
times in 1977 for treatment of various prob-
lems including drinking. While Dr. Nielsen 
concluded that the decedent was not an 
alcofTolic, he did diagnose his problem as 
alcohol abuse, and encouraged him to con-
tinue taking antabuse. Dr. Nielsen testi-
fied that the decedent was a "binge" drink-
er, who drank impulsively without regard 
for the consequences. The blood alcohol 
level reported at the time of his death 
(.088%) indicated the ingestion of about five 
drinks in one hour's time. 
In his signed "Life Application," dated 
Sept. 14, 1977, the insured answered the 
following question as noted: 
10 Have you ever received treatment or 
joined an organization for alcoholism 
or drug habit7 yes no 
_x_ 
In the "Medical Examiner's Report-Adult, 
Medical History Portion of Life Applica-
tion," dated Sept. 29, 1977, which was also 
signed by the insured, he answered the fol-
lowing question as noted: 
ous errors at trial In the view we take of the 
appeal, it is unnecessary tor us to deal with this 
u oss-appeal 
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2. Have you ever been treated for or 
ever had any known indication of 
• • • 
1. Excessive use of alcohol, tobacco, 
or any haoit-forming drugs7 >es no 
x 
So far as material to this appeal, the 
special verdicts of the jury found as fol-
lows: 
1. That the decedent's answer to ques-
tion No. 10 on the Life Application was 
not an omission, an incorrect statement, 
or a misrepresentation; 
2. That the decedent's answer to ques-
tion No. 2.1. on the Medical History was 
an omission, an incorrect statement, and 
a misrepresentation; and 
3. That although the answer to ques-
tion 2.1. was not fraudulent, it was mate-
rial to the acceptance of the risk and 
material to the hazard assumed by the 
insurer; and 
4. That the insurer would not have 
issued the policy and would not have is-
sued the policy at the same premium rate 
or in as large an amount if the true facts 
had been made known as required in the 
application.2 
Consistent with these special verdicts, the 
district court entered judgment for the de-
fendant insurer. 
The jury's special verdict that there was 
no omission, inaccuracy, or misrepresenta-
tion on the question having to do with 
"alcoholism" disposes of that basis for the 
insurer's denial of plaintiff's claim. This 
appeal must therefore turn upon whether 
the jury could properly hear evidence and 
rely upon the decedent's false answer to 
question 2.1. of the Medical History that he 
had never been treated for excessive use of 
alcohol. 
I. 
WAS THE MEDICAL HISTORY PART 
OF THE POLICY? 
Plaintiff first argues that the Medical 
History, which contained decedent's false 
denial that he had ever been treated for 
2. These special interrogatories treat the bases 
for denial of recovery under U C A, 1953, 
excessive use of alcohol, is not part of the 
policy and was therefore inadmissible in 
evidence under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19-7(1), 
which reads as follows: 
No application for the issuance of any life 
or disability insurance policy or annuity 
contract shall be admissible in evidence in 
any action relative to such policy or con-
tract, unless a true copy of such applica-
tion was attached to, or otherwise made a 
part of the policy or contract when is-
sued. 
[1] Plaintiff challenges the district 
court's specific finding "under our statute 
and the business practices of the carrier 
that this [Medical History] is a portion of 
the policy, it's included in the policy." As a 
result of this finding, the court permitted 
the Medical History to be introduced in 
evidence and later allowed the jury to con-
sider the insured's answer to question 2.1. in 
their deliberations. Plaintiff attacks the 
trial court's ruling as contrary to plaintiffs 
testimony that she did not remember find-
ing a copy of the Medical History with the 
insurance policy in the family financial pa-
pers. In support of the court's conclusion, 
the insurer refers to testimony that it was 
standard procedure for the insurer to attach 
a copy of the Medical History and Life 
Application to each policy when it was is-
sued, that there was no evidence that this 
procedure varied in this case, and that the 
Medical History form that was introduced 
in evidence was in the insurer's file. In 
addition, the insurer points to the following 
language that appears just above the in-
sured's signature on the Medical History: 
"this Medical History shall be a part of the 
application for life insurance on my life." 
On appeal, the record is reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the findings and 
action of the trial court, which are entitled 
to a presumption of validity and will not be 
disturbed if they are supported by substan-
tial, competent evidence. Search v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 649 P.2d 48 (1982); 
§ 31-19-8, discussed in Part II, infra 
WILLIAMS v. STATE FARM INS. CO. 
Cite as, Utah, 656 P.2d 966 
Utah % 9 
Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, Utah, 636 
P.2d 487 (1981); Car Doctor, Inc. v. Bel-
mont, Utah, 635 P.2d 82 (1981); Hutcheson 
v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P.2d 815 (1981). The 
evidence reviewed above provides the re-
quired support. We therefore decline to 
overrule the district court on this question. 
Plaintiff cites numerous cases making an 
insurance application inadmissible if it is 
not physically "attached to" or "endorsed 
upon" the policy of insurance. Eg, John-
son v. Des Moines Life Association, 105 
Iowa 273, 75 N.W. 101 (1898); Blatz v. 
• Travelers Insurance Co,, 272 App.Div. 9, 68 
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1947); Sandberg v. Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Co., 342 Pa. 326, 20 A.2d 
230 (1941). Also see AnnoL, 18 A.L.R.3d 
760, 766-67 (1968), and cases cited therein, 
such as Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Thomsberry, 66 Ill.App.3d 225, 23 Ill.Dec. 
13, 383 N.E.2d 780 (1978). But an examina-
tion of these cases reveals that with but one 
exception, which is not in point here,3 all 
were based upon statutes that made the 
application form inadmissible if it was not 
physically attached to or endorsed upon the 
policy. In contrast, the inadmissibility dic-
tated by § 31-19-7(1) of our statute does 
not apply where the application form is 
either "attached to, or otherwise made a 
part of the policy .. . ." (Emphasis added.) 
The district court's finding and conclusion 
that the Medical History was "included in" 
and "a portion of" the policy obviously re-
lied on the emphasized language. Hence, 
plaintiffs cases, which apply statutes with 
more restrictive requirements, are distin-
guishable. 
We therefore conclude that § 31-19-7(1) 
did not make the Medical History inadmissi-
ble in this action on the policy.4 
3. Lundmark v Mutual of Omaha Ins Co, 80 
Wash.2d 804, 498 P2d 867 (1972), invoked a 
statute identical to Utah's But the additional 
document that occasioned the holding of inad-
missibility in that case was an inter-ofhce 
memorandum prepared by the insuier altei the 
application \*as submitted. That memorandum 
was not signed by the insured In addition, the 
case contains no discussion oi the eitect ol the 
"otherwise made part o f language discussed 
above. 
II. 
WAS THE DEFENSE PROPERLY 
PLEADED? 
Second, plaintiff contends that the in-
sured's misrepresentation that he had never 
been treated for excessive use of alcohol 
should not have been submitted to the jury 
because that affirmative defense was not 
properly pleaded under Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c), 
and was therefore waived under Rule 12(h). 
Pratt v. Board of Education, Utah, 564 P.2d 
294, 298 (1977). 
This issue turns on how specifically a 
defendant must plead an affirmative de-
fense under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19-8. That 
statute, on which the insurer relies, pro-
vides that all statements in any application 
for an insurance policy shall be deemed to 
be representations, and that omissions, in-
correct statements, or misrepresentations 
"shall not prevent a recovery under the 
policy" unless they are (a) fraudulent, or (b) 
material either to the acceptance of the risk 
or to the hazard insured, or (c) the insurer 
would not have issued the policy if it had 
known the true facts. 
The insurer's answer contained the fol-
lowing paragraph, whose adequacy is at 
issue here 
As a separate affirmative defense, defendant 
alleges that on or about September 14, 1977, Charles 
Miller Williams completed a written application for 
said life insurance policy in part as follows 
10 Have you ever received treat-
ment or joined an organization for 
alcoholism or drug habit9 yes no 
x 
Defendant further alleges that said an-
swer was fraudulent or material to ac-
4. In the alternative, plaintiff contends in her 
repl\ brief that the district court's conclusion 
that the Medical History form was part of the 
lite insurance pohev and could therefore be 
admitted in evidence erroneously invaded the 
lac I ImdinK pioviiKe ol the jury Fg, 17A 
C J S Contracts $ 616 p 1249 (1963) We de-
cline to consider this argument, because it is 
laised loi the lust tune on appeal Bekms Bar 
V Ranch v Beryl Baptist Church, Utah, 642 
P2d 371 (1982), Collier v Frenchs, Utah, 626 
P2d 470 (1981) 
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ceptance of the risk or to the hazard 
assumed by defendant, or defendant in 
good faith either would not have issued 
the policy or would not have issued it at 
the same premium rate if the true 
facts had been made known as required 
by the application. 
Plaintiff contends that this affirmative de-
fense is insufficient in three respects: (1) it 
refers only to "fraudulent" answers, where-
as the jury found no fraud; (2) it refers 
only to "treatment for alcoholism," 
whereas the jury found no omission, incor-
rect statement, or misrepresentation in the 
insured's answer respecting alcoholism; and 
(3) it refers to an alleged false answer on 
question 10 on the application, but it makes 
no reference to question 2.1. on the Medical 
History. 
Plaintiff's arguments raise serious ques-
tions about the adequacy of defendant's 
pleadings. Before we address these ques-
tions, it will be helpful to review our rules 
and decisions governing the pleading of af-
firmative defenses. 
Rule 8(a)(1) of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, adopted in 1950, requires that a plead-
ing set forth "a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief . . . " Defenses must be 
stated "in short and plain terms " 
Rule 8(b). "Each averment of a pleading 
shall be simple, concise and direct." Rule 
8(e)(1). Rule 8(c) specifies that "[i]n plead-
ing to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively . . fraud .. and 
any other matter constituting an avoidance 
or affirmative defense." Finally, Rule 9(b) 
states that "[i]n all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with partic-
ularity." 
Our decisions have construed these re-
quirements. Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 
204, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (1953), unanimously 
approved a pleading the Court characteriz-
ed asj"a crisp statement of ultimate facts."] 
That opinion quotes with approval the fol-
lowing passage from Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388-389, 
91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), concerning the Federal 
Rules, from which our Rules had been tak-
en: 
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-
trial functions of notice-giving, issue-for-
mulation and fact-revelation were per-
formed primarily and inadequately by the 
pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and 
the facts before trial was narrowly con-
fined and was often cumbersome in meth-
od. The new rules, however, restrict the 
pleadings to the task of general notice-
giving and invest the deposition-discovery 
process with a vital role in the prepara-
tion for trial. 
Blackham v. Sneigrovef 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 
280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955), quoted this same 
language and also referred approvingly to 
other authorities, as follows: 
Thus, it can very often be found stated in 
these cases that a complaint is required 
only to " * * * give the opposing party 
fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indi-
cation of the type of litigation involved." 
The leading statement of these pleading 
principles in the context of an affirmative 
defense is Justice Crockett's much-cited 
opinion for the Court in Cheney v. Rucker, 
14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), 
which held admissible a supplementary 
agreement reducing the compensation fixed 
in a real estate contract notwithstanding it 
had not been specifically pleaded as an af-
firmative defense. After explaining that 
the purpose of the Rule 8(c) requirement 
that affirmative defenses be pleaded was 
"to have the issues to be tried clearly 
framed," the Court added that this was only 
one of the Rules: 
They must all be looked to in the light of 
their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure 
to the end that the parties are afforded 
the privilege of presenting whatever le-
gitimate contentions they have pertaining 
to their dispute. \ What they are entitled 
to is notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them. When this is 
accomplished, that is all that is required. 
Our rules provide for liberality to allow 
examination into and settlement of alK 
v 
issues bearing upon the controversy, but 
safeguard the rights of the other party to 
have a reasonable time to meet a new 
issue if he so requests, j [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
The foregoing passage was quoted with ap-
proval by a unanimous Court in Eie v. St 
Benedict's Hospital, Utah, 638 P.2d 1190, 
1193-94 (1981) (answer referring generally 
to fraudulent inducement, estoppel, and 
breach by plaintiffs held sufficient pleading 
to raise issue that parties' agreement not 
integrated and therefore subject to modifi-
cation by contemporaneous oral communica-
tions). 
[2] It is evident from these statements 
that the fundamental purpose of our liber-
alized pleading rules is to afford parties 
"the privilege of presenting whatever legit-
imate contentions they have pertaining to 
their dispute," Cheney v. Rucker, supra, 
'Hlbjprt, only to frhr rrquirpmpnt thnt their 
adversary have "fair nnt.ir.p of the nature 
nr]fi hflfrfo nr grounds of the claim and £ 
general indicationof the type of litigation 
Invoh^LL- lilackham v. Snelgrove, supra. 
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the acts allegedly committed by defendants 
.. " Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 
Utah 2d 85, 86, 87, 475 P.2d 1019, 1020 
(1970). Allegations which contained merely 
broad and general statements that a "false 
affidavit and false pleadings were filed" 
but which contained "no allegation whatev-
er of the contents, nature or substance" of 
any such false statements are insufficient. 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 
/ 
2d 60, 62, 377 P2d 189, 190 (1962). I It 
The functions of issue-formulation and fact-
revelation are appropriately left to the dep-
osition-discovery process. The rules "allow 
examination into and settlement of all is-
sues bearing upon the controversy," Cheney 
v. Rucker, supra, with latitude for proof 
that extends beyond the pleadings, where 
appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears 
from the cited decisions that these princi-
ples are applied with great liberality in 
sustaining the sufficiency of allegations 
stating a cause of action or an affirmative 
defense. 
[3] The application of these principles to 
specific pleadings is also instructive. An 
allegation of "certain derogatory and libe-
lous statements" is insufficient; a com-
plaint for defamation must set forth "the 
language complained of in words or 
words to that effect " Dennett v. 
Smith, 21 Utah 2d 368, 369, 445 P.2d 983, 
984 (1968). An allegation that the defend-
ant conspired to "annoy, threaten and in-
timidate the plaintiff" is insufficient when 
it does not state "the nature or substance of 
appears from these precedents that when 
the pleader complains of conduct described 
by such general terms as libel, intimidation, 
or false statements, the allegation of the 
conclusion is not sufficient; the pleading 
must describe the nature or substance of 
the acts or words complained of. 
The same is true of fraud. Rule 9(b) 
specifies that "the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud shall be stated with particu-
larity." In Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 
'266, 267-68, 372 P2d 990, 991 (1962), a 
complaint charging a lawyer with "fraud," 
"conspiracy," and "negligence" was dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action. 
In affirming unanimously, this Court stat-
ed: 
It is to be noted that the terms "fraud," 
"conspiracy" and "negligence" are but 
general accusations in the nature of con-
clusions of the pleader. They will not 
stand up against a motion to dismiss on 
that ground. The basic facts must be set 
forth with sufficient particularity to 
show what facts are claimed to constitute 
such cfoirgeS-liEmphasis added.] 
Similarly, in Shayne v Stanley & Sons, Inc., 
Utah, 605 P.2d 775, 776 (1980), the Court 
affirmed the granting of summary judg-
ment for defendants on a complaint charg-
ing "fraud" where plaintiff admitted in an-
swering defendant's interrogatories that he 
could not designate any specific fraud on 
the part of defendants, but had brought his 
action "to determine what acts were insti-
gated by defendants to deceive plain-
tiff." 
Against the background of the foregoing 
principles, we now examine plaintiffs argu-
ments on the insufficiency of defendant's 
pleading of its affirmative defense. 
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1. Fraud vs. omission, incorrect state-
ment or misrepresentation. 
First, plaintiff contends that the affirma-
tive defense is insufficient because it only 
alleges that the "answer was fraudulent," 
whereas the jury found no fraud. In con-
trast, the statutory terms—omission, incor-
rect statement, and misrepresentation— 
which the jury did find, are not alleged. 
[4] "Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms 
of uncertain meaning. They are conclu-
sions that must be fleshed out by elabora-
tion and by consideration of the context in 
which they are used. This is why Rule 9(b) 
requires that the circumstances constituting 
fraud "shall be stated with particularity," a 
requirement we have construed to require 
allegation of the substance of the acts con-
stituting the alleged wrong. The Rule 9(b) 
requirement should not be understood as 
limited to allegations of common-law fraud. 
The purpose of that requirement dictates 
that it reach all circumstances where the 
pleader alleges the kind of misrepresenta-
tions, omissions, or other deceptions covered 
by the term "fraud" in its broadest dimen-
sion. Consequently, if the pleading had 
merely alleged that the insured had given 
"fraudulent" or "deceptive" or "misrepre-
senting" answers, it would have been insuf-
ficient. 
[5] In contrast, this affirmative defense 
recited a particular answer to a question 
involving alcoholism, and specifically al-
leged that this answer was fraudulent or 
material to the acceptance of the risk or the 
hazard assumed or that the defendant 
would not have issued the policy (at least 
not at that rate) "if the true facts had been 
made known . . . ." In the context of the 
statute paraphrased here, § 31-19-8, this 
5. Pratt v. Board of Education, supra, is not to 
the contrary That case involved the effect of a 
defendant's omitting to allege any affirmative 
defense (including, particularly, plaintiffs fail-
ure to mitigate damages) In this case, defend-
ant clearly alleged an affirmative defense, and 
the only issue is how broadly its allegation is to 
be construed 
6. The Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication 
Treatment Act, § 2(1), 9 Uniform 1 aws Anno-
ailegation was sufficient and fair notice to 
put in issue all of the statutory defenses of 
deception, including the omission, incorrect 
statement, and misrepresentation ultimate-
ly found by the jury.5 
2. Alcoholism vs. excessive use of alco-
hol. 
[61 Plaintiff next relies on the fact that 
the affirmative defense refers only to 
"treatment for alcoholism," whereas 
the jury found no deception in the insured's 
answer on alcoholism. In contrast, the 
pleading makes no reference to the in-
sured's denial that he had been "treated for 
excessive use of alcohol," which the jury did 
find constituted an omission, an incorrect 
statement, and a misrepresentation. 
We agree with the district court that the 
answer's reference to "treatment . . . for 
alcoholism" was sufficient and fair notice to 
plaintiff that the general subject of treat-
ment for "excessive use of alcohol" was in 
issue. Pleadings need not be as precisely 
phrased or as rigorously construed as spe-
cial interrogatories. The fact that the jury 
was called upon to distinguish between the 
truthfulness of these two terms does not 
mean that the two must be distinguished 
for purposes of the general notice required 
to be communicated in the pleadings. 
In the course of the trial, both parties 
elicited evidence or took positions to the 
effect that there are no concrete definitions 
of "alcoholic" or "alcoholism."6 In view of 
the general nature of the term used in the 
pleadings, and in view oi the liberalized* 
pleading rules discussed earlier, we think 
the district court was clearly correct in rul-
ing that defendant's pleading of misrepre-
sentations about "alcoholism" permitted the 
introduction of evidence on misrepresenta-
tated 63 (1979), adopted in thirteen states, in-
cludes in its definition of "alcoholic" a "person 
who habitually lacks self-control as to the use 
of alcoholic beverages " Utah statutes are 
not uniform in their use of the terms "alcohol-
ism" or "alcoholics " Eg., compare U.C A, 
1953, § 63-43-3(2) (apparently broad meaning) 
and $ 78^-7(j) (1981 Supp) (less inclusive 
meaning) 
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tions concerning "excessive use of alcohol." 
The trial court followed the proper proce-
dure in leaving the meaning of these terms 
and the question of misrepresentation to 
the jury. This is especially true since ques-
tions of material and prejudicial variance 
between pleadings and proof, 71 C.J.S. 
Pleading §§ 531-35 (1951), are peculiarly 
within the province of the trial court, and 
will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. 
3. Question 10 on the Life Application 
vs. Question 2.1. on the Medical History. 
[7] Finally, plaintiff argues that the in-
sured's statement that defeated recovery on 
the policy (Medical History question 2.1. on 
excessive use of alcohol) was not alleged in 
the answer, whereas the jury found that 
the statement alleged in the answer (Life 
Application question 10 on alcoholism) was 
not a misrepresentation. 
It is evident from the earlier discussion 
that if the answer had alleged only that the 
insured's application for the policy misrep-
resented the facts concerning his treatment 
for "alcoholism" this would Hve been suffi-
ciently specific to permit proof of misrepre-
sentations concerning treatment for "exces-
sive use of alcohol." But when the answer 
quotes a specific answer to a particular 
question on one form, does this preclude 
proof of another answer to a different ques-
tion on a different form, when both an-
swers are part of the application? In other 
words, where the pleadings are more specif-
ic than the rules require, must the latitude 
of proof be more narrowly confined than 
the rules contemplate? 
No rule of law can answer that question. 
It is a matter to be resolved by the trial 
court under the groundrules of "fair notice" 
of the basis of the claim and opportunity to 
adjudicate, Cheney v. Rucker, supra; Black-
ham v. Snelgrove, supraf and under the 
more specific requirement that a charge of 
fraud must be supported by "sufficient par-
ticularity to show what facts are claimed to 
constitute such charges." Heathman v. 
Hatch, quoted supra. 
Here, in response to plaintiff's vigorous 
and timely claims of prejudice in the admis-
sion of the Medical History form, the trial 
court found that there was no prejudice. 
For the following reasons, we find no abuse 
of discretion in that finding and that deci-
sion. 
First, the question quoted in the answer 
and the question contained in the Medical 
History form were different characteriza-
tions of the same general course of conduct, 
alcohol abuse. | Consequently, this is not a 
circumstance where an adversary would 
suffer prejudice as a result of preparing to 
litigate the factual circumstance alleged in 
the pleadings, only to face proof of another 
circumstance at trial. 1 Defendant's pleading 
provided plaintiff with adequate notice of 
"what facts [were] claimed to constitute" 
its defense. The law requires no more. 
Second, the defendant's intention to rely 
at least in part on the insured's answer on 
the Medical History form was also evident 
during discovery. Defendant provided 
plaintiff a copy of the Medical History form 
over seven months before trial. At about 
that same time, during defendant's taking 
of plaintiff's deposition, plaintiff was shown 
the Medical History form and questioned in 
detail about the insured's answer to ques-
tion 2.1. on excessive use of alcohol. 
For the reasons discussed above, we con-
clude that the affirmative defense of the 
insured's misrepresentation was properly 
pleaded and that the evidence thereof was 
properly admitted. The judgment on the 
verdict for defendant is therefore affirmed. 
Costs to respondent. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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E. N. YOUNGREN and Jerry Snider, a co-
partnership, dba Youngren & Snider, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
JOHN W. LLOYD CONSTRUCTION COM-
PANY, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 11224. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 27, 1909. 
Suit to recover for services rendered 
to the defendant in crushing aggregate for 
use in highway construction. The Fourth 
District Court, Wasatch County, Allen B. 
Sorensen, J., entered judgment for plaintiff 
and defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Con L, Crockett, C. J., held that where issue 
as to whether defendant, sued for plaintiff's 
services in crushing aggregate for use in 
highway construction, had been charged 
with too much aggregate because of mois-
ture content had not been framed in either 
the pleadings or the pretrial order, and con-
tract did not refer to moisture content, trial 
court's refusal to permit defendant to raise 
issue in absence of showing that water 
had been added to aggregate was not un-
reasonable or unjust. 
Affirmed. 
1. Continuance <§=>49 
Where there had already been con-
siderable delay in getting suit for services 
lo trial, and on ample notice to parties 
plaintiffs and witnesses had traveled con-
siderable distance and were in court and 
ready to proceed, trial court's refusal of 
defendant's request to amend pleadings and 
to have a continuance, except upon condi-
tion that he pay $200, was not unreasonable 
or unfair. 
2. Evidence 3=3417(9) 
Pleading <§=>380 
Trial e=s9(l) 
WTiere issue as to whether defendant, 
sued for plaintiff's services in crushing ag-
gregate for use in highway construction 
450 P 2d—62V2 
had been charged with too much aggregate 
because of moisture content had not been 
framed in either the pleadings or the pre-
trial order, and contract did not refer to 
moisture content, trial court's refusal to 
permit defendant to raise issue in absence 
of showing that water had been added to 
aggregate was not unreasonable or unjust. 
3. Evidence 0397(1) 
When parties have negotiated on a 
subject and have thereafter entered into 
written contract, it should be assumed that 
prior negotiations are fused into the con-
tract so that it represents their full agree-
ment with respect thereto, and extraneous 
evidence should ordinarily not be permitted 
to add to, subtract from, vary, or contra-
dict it. 
4. Evidence 0445(1) 
Fact that parties have a written con-
tract on a subject does not prevent them 
from entering into other agreements re-
lating to the same general subject matter. 
5. Appeal and Error €=>99l 
Whether parties who negotiated writ-
ten contract for furnishing of aggregate for 
use in highway construction had a separate 
agreement pursuant to which plaintiff was 
to perform and be paid for other services 
was for trial court to determine. 
6. Contracts 0350(1) 
Fvidence supported finding that in ad-
dition to written contract pursuant to which 
plaintiff was to furnish aggregate for high-
way construction parties had separate 
agreement pursuant to which plaintiff was 
to perform and be paid for other services. 
fobn L. Chidester, Heber, for appellant. 
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr., of Kirton & 
MeConkie, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs Youngren and Snider sued to 
recover for services rendered to the de-
lendant, Llo>d Construction Company, in 
crushing aggregate (rock and gravel) for 
use in highway construction in Wasatch 
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County After a plenary trial the district 
court granted judgment for the pluntifis 
from which defendant appeals 
The findings of the trial court include 
the following (1) That under a written 
contract dated September 8, 1965, the plain-
tiffs were to furnish defendant certain 
quantities and types of crushed gravel valu-
ed at $20,000, based on prices set forth in 
the contract, for which the defendant was 
to convey to the plaintiffs a D8 H \ cater-
pillar tractor, valued at $10,000, and $10,000 
m cash. (2) That the plaintiffs performed 
by delivering and/or stockpiling ready foi 
pickup by the defendant crushed aggregate 
worth in excess of the $20,000 (]) Hu t 
the defendant has paid only the sum of" 
$1992 81 (4) That in addition to the 
above, the defendant requested the plain-
tiffs to perform certain extra work, outside 
the written contract, of the reasonable val-
ue of $2968.37. 
Based upon those findings the court ga\e 
plaintiffs judgment for $8007 19 under the 
contract, $2968.37 for other services re 
quested and rendered, for a transfer of title 
to the 1)8 HA caterpillar tractor, and for 
the sum of $1200 pursuant to the provision 
in the contract for reasonable .ittonus s 
fees for enforcement. 
[1] The defendant makes a gcnenl ac-
cusation of unfairness against the trial 
court in refusing, on the day set for trial, 
his request to amend his pleadings and to 
have a continuance, except upon condition 
that he pay $200. The facts are that there 
had already been considerable delay in get-
ting the case trial, and that on ample 
notice to the parties, the plaintif fs and tht ir 
witnesses had traveled a considerable dis-
tance to Heber City and were in court and 
ready to proceed. The judge emphasized 
the desirability of avoiding further delay, 
and made the order above stated. In re-
sponse, defendant's counsel indicated that 
he elected to go on with the trial Except 
for a statement that the order was arbitrary 
and unreasonable, and that he did not want 
to be bound 1>> the pleadings, the record 
does not disclose just what, if any, dis-
advantage the defendant suffered because 
of proeeuling to trul Lnder the circum-
stances shown we are not convinced that 
the order was unreasonable or that the de-
fendant was treated unfairly. 
[2] During the trial the defendant at-
tempted to raise an issue that, due to the 
moisture content, it had been charged with 
too much iggregate Evidence concerning 
that issue was excluded by the trial court 
on the ground that it had not been framed 
in either the pie idings or the pretrial or-
der, and more important, because it was not 
leferred to in the contract | He remarked 
on the fact that the contract said nothing 
about moisture content, but " * * * 
just savs so much per ton It doesn't say 
net dr> ton, or am thing else " The parties 
were well acquainted with this particular 
gravel pit and the) ccrtainlv must have 
known of the condition generally of the 
materials which came from it The trial 
court proceeded on the assumption that any 
omission should be construed against the 
defendmt, whose attornc} drew the con-
tr ict, l and that, consequently, it should 
hive bten covered if there had been any 
concern about the matter 
The couit further observed 
I have ruled, in order to make this 
case move forward, that I am not going 
to consider, unless, of course, >ou can 
demonstrate when it went across the 
scales it was slopped with many many 
gillons of water—if you can establish 
th it, that is another matter—but as for 
run of the mill grivel from a pit with 
the usual ordinary water content I am not 
going to consider it Rightly or wrongly 
I have ruled on it on the principles of 
the construction of the contract. So the 
objection is sustained. 
We see nothing unreasonable or unjust in 
the views thus expressed by the trial court, 
nor with his procedure in determining the 
amount of the aggregate delivered on the 
I. See Continental Bank & Trust Co v Bvbee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 30G P 2d 773 (1957). 
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basis of what the evidence shows to be a 
reasonable "conversion factor" of 140 
pounds weight per cubic foot. 
[3] Defendant urges that all of the 
work involved should have been considered 
as included in the written contract; and 
that the trial court transgressed the parol 
evidence rule in allowing testimony about 
the extra work and allowing compensation 
therefor. In that regard we acknowledge 
agreement with these principles: When 
parties have negotiated on a subject and 
have thereafter entered into a written con-
tract, it should be assumed that their prior 
negotiations are fused into the contract 
so that it represents their full agreement 
with respect thereto; and that, consequent-
ly, after its due execution, extraneous evi-
dence should ordinarily not be permitted to 
aid to, subtract from, vary, or contradict 
it.2 
[4-6] On this subject it is appropriate 
to here note a previous statement of this 
court, that the parol evidence rule, "while 
simple to state, is often confusing in its 
application, due largely to misunderstand-
ing of its purposes; that is, attempting to 
apply a rule rather than a reason." 3 Con-
sistent with that idea that the rule should 
not be regarded as applicable in rigidity 
and without exception, but in the light of 
reason under the particular circumstances, 
is this thought pertinent here: the fact 
that the parties have a written contract on 
a subject does not prevent them from enter-
ing into other agreements relating to the 
same general subject matter. Whether 
there was such a separate agreement was 
for the trial court to determine. The evi-
dence justifies his finding that, separate 
from the rock crushing stipulated in the 
written contract, the parties agreed upon 
other services in stripping and stockpiling 
work to be performed by the plaintiffs and 
paid for by defendant. This was admitted 
by Mr. John W. Lloyd himself on cross-
2. 32A, C..T.S. Evidence § SOI, p. 211; 30 
Am.Jur.2d 149. 
3. Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 1S4. 1SS, 72 
P.2d 449, 451, 129 A.L.U. Crftt (1937). 
examination and without objection. The 
trial court properly made an award for the 
reasonable value of such services.4 
Other points raised by the defendant do 
not impress us as warranting discussion. 
It is sufficient to say that in our opinion 
none of the matters complained of, either 
singly or cumulatively, so prejudiced the de-
fendant as to deprive it of a fair trial; 
and that the findings and judgment are 
amply supported by the evidence. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs (respond-
ents). 
CALLISTER, TUCKETT, HENRIOD, 
and ELLETT, )J., concur. 
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Prosecution resulting in a fictitious 
check conviction by virtue of judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Merrill C. Faux, J., and the defendant ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., 
held that where check was written on paper 
imprinted with purported name of a local 
existing company, thereby at least implied-
ly representing company to be the payor 
and defendant who passed check made no 
claim to be person named as payee, charg-
ing defendant with violation of statute 
making it a felony to falsely make any 
check with intent to defraud was proper, 
4. Ross V. Loftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71, 377 
I'.2d 495 (1903). 
